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A b s tra c t
The thesis explores whether and how democratic and autocratic political institutions 
affect the welfare of people in developing countries. First, we empirically investi­
gate whether democracy improves people’s health, by using time-series country-level 
aggregate statistics. We find th a t there is a robust cross-sectional correlation be­
tween democracy and life expectancy at birth. Country fixed effects estimation, on 
the other hand, does not yield a statistically significant correlation between the two. 
This empirical approach, however, does not disentangle the effect of democracy from 
country-level confounding factors. To overcome this, I empirically examine whether 
democratization has reduced infant m ortality in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, 
by using micro data  on child survival. Mother fixed effects estimation shows tha t 
mothers see their infants more likely to survive after democratization than  before. 
This result may suggest th a t African dictatorships are particularly bad compared 
to those in other regions. To shed some light on this possibility, we theoretically 
investigate under what condition autocracy yields good policy outcomes. We show 
th a t such a condition is th a t those enfranchised in autocracy can retain the right of 
leadership selection after overthrowing a dictator for his bad performance. We also 
show th a t such a successful autocracy outperforms a democracy if distributional 
issues are so im portant th a t voters in democracy cannot discipline policy-makers 
in the general interest policy outcomes. W hat affects the salience of distributional 
issues, therefore, needs to be understood. One such factor may be ethnic favoritism 
by the government, which has rarely been empirically investigated in a systematic 
way. By using micro data on infant m ortality and by exploiting one-time unex­
pected change in the president’s ethnicity in Guinea, I provide evidence on whether 
the ethnicity of those in power affects infant m ortality for each ethnic group under 
an autocratic rule.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Development economics has long been a field of economics th a t studies what policy 
will improve the welfare of people in poor countries. W hat policy promotes develop­
ment is, however, still unknown, partly because policy-making is endogenous, posing 
a serious difficulty in identifying the effect of policies empirically. During the last 
decade, development economists have begun to take politics seriously. A research 
program th a t can be called political economy of development has emerged in which 
researchers analyze how socio-economic characteristics typical for poor countries af­
fect the nature of politics and, through the resultant political process, policy and 
welfare outcomes. The present thesis contributes to this young literature on political 
economy of development, by focusing on health as a development outcome, using 
individual-level data, and explicitly considering heterogeneities among democracies 
and autocracies.
Health as a development outcome has been ignored in the literature on political 
economy of development. However, along with education, better health constitutes 
what is now known as human development, and is in itself what we should aim to 
achieve. Although higher income appears to  contribute to better health, the role of 
public health policies is not negligible, either . 1 Focusing on the role of politics on 
economic growth alone, therefore, does not help us wholly understand how better
1 Examples of Cuba, Sri Lanka, and the Indian state of Kerala, where mortality fell in the 20th 
century despite only modest gains in per capita income, support this view. Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2006) exploit the role of public health in mortality reduction to estimate the effect of longer life 
expectancy on economic growth.
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health can be achieved. How politics directly affects people’s health needs to be 
understood.
C hapter 2, co-authored with Timothy Besley, tackles this research agenda by 
looking a t whether democracy increases life expectancy a t birth. Democracy is 
probably the most im portant political institution today, and investigating its ef­
fect on development is one of the most recurring themes in social science. Using 
cross-country aggregate statistics on life expectancy, we find th a t there is a ro­
bust correlation between democracy and health (conditional on per capita income). 
However, this correlation is mainly cross-sectional—once country fixed effects are 
controlled for, the correlation is no longer statistically significant, leaving evidence 
for a positive effect of democracy on health inconclusive.
This inconclusiveness partly comes from the use of country-level aggregate data. 
As democracy status only varies a t the country level, using country-level aggre­
gate data  does not allow us to  disentangle the effect of democracy from unob­
servable country-level factors affecting the outcome under investigation. The use 
of individual-level panel data  to  measure an outcome can solve this problem, be­
cause tracking the same individual over time allows us to separate the effect of 
democracy—or more generally, any country-wide political institutions or events— 
from changes in the composition of individuals in a country over time. Although 
this empirical approach is not a panacea for solving the endogeneity of democracy, 
or political institutions and events in general, it excludes probably the most impor­
tan t factors th a t affect political institutions—changes in population characteristics 
over time—from the list of alternative explanations on findings from regressions of 
socio-economic outcomes on political institutions.
Chapter 3 takes this empirical approach to  estim ate the effect of democracy on 
infant mortality, another popular measure of people’s health. Using mothers’ recall 
data  on their child survival from 28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, I find tha t 
democratization in 1 1  of these countries has reduced infant mortality after con­
trolling for unobservable time-invariant mother characteristics. I also find tha t not 
every kind of democratization m atters. If the introduction of multiparty elections
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for the chief executive of government leads to  a new person assuming office, then 
infant mortality goes down. If a d ictator introduces m ultiparty elections and stays 
in power by winning them, infant mortality does not change.
The second finding leads to the third tenet of this thesis: heterogeneity of democ­
racies and autocracies. One interpretation of this finding is th a t democracy has an 
impact on health only if m ultiparty elections bring about leadership change. Another 
interpretation is tha t African dictators winning multiparty elections are relatively 
benevolent and have already reduced infant m ortality to  a certain level. 2 In either 
case, my empirical finding stresses the im portance of recognizing heterogeneity both 
among democracies and among autocracies.
Chapter 4, co-authored with Timothy Besley, takes this heterogeneity within 
each political regime seriously. We develop a simple model th a t explains when dic­
tators implement general interest policies such as those promoting economic growth, 
educational attainm ent, and population health. By extending the model to democ­
racy, we also show when democracy delivers such general interest policies to  citizens. 
The critical factors turn out to be polarization among citizens. If citizens are po­
larized in the sense th a t they care much more about distributional policies than 
general interest policies, then democracy fails to  deliver the latter. Autocracy can 
overcome this to the extent th a t it mitigates polarization by excluding groups of 
citizens opposing the government from political process. If the degree of polariza­
tion is minimal, then democracy outperforms autocracy in terms of implementing 
general interest policies.
These theoretical results, which are largely consistent with several case studies 
discussed in the second half of Chapter 4, suggest the importance of understanding 
what causes polarization of the population. One source of such polarization is eth­
nic favoritism by the government, namely, the phenomenon th a t the ethnic group 
represented in the government is better off than other groups in the same country. 
Chapter 5 tackles this issue empirically, by focusing on health as a development 
outcome—as in Chapters 2 and 3— and by using micro data  as in Chapter 3. It
2This interpretation can be seen in Figure 3.3.
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proposes an empirical strategy th a t gives convincing evidence on whether the ethnic 
group in power is really better off than other groups in the same country.
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Chapter 2
Health and Dem ocracy
co-authored with Timothy Besley
2.1 Introduction
In spite of the inexorable march of democracy around the globe, just how democratic 
institutions affect human well-being is open to  debate. The evidence th a t democracy 
promotes prosperity is neither strong nor robust. Moreover which aspects of policy 
making and human well-being are promoted by democracies is still a subject of 
debate . 1
Even if correlations between democracy and outcome measures can be found, 
there is an overriding difficulty of interpreting them  as causal effects. W hether 
democracy m atters per se or simply serves as a proxy for societal and political 
development presents a difficult problem for research in this area. Thinkers such 
as Lipset (1959) have argued th a t democracy can thrive only when conditions are 
right. If this is correct, then becoming democratic may only serve as a proxy for 
these hard-to-measure cultural and societal preconditions.
This chapter explores these issues further by reconsidering the link between 
democracy and health using panel data  from a cross-section of countries. The data 
show a strong (conditional) correlation between life expectancy and democracy. This
1 See, for example, Mulligan et al. (2004). Sen (1999) emphasizes the intrinsic benefits of 
democracy in addition to the search for instrumental policy and stability gains that are normally 
the subject of economic analyses.
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relationship is strongest for the decades of the 1960s and 1970s and is robust to con­
trolling for the initial level of human capital as well as political histories. The data  
also suggest th a t health policy interventions are superior in democracies.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
discuss some background issues. In Section 2.3, we present the results and the 
possible interpretations of these empirical findings. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Background
Human history has witnessed remarkable increases in life expectancy alongside in­
creases in prosperity. Preston (1975) showed th a t this relationship is non-linear 
with the largest gains in life expectancy being associated with increases in income 
per capita a t low incomes. Crudely speaking, these increases in life expectancy 
can be traced to  three factors. First, there are reductions in m alnutrition and im­
provements in infrastructure such as clean water supply and improved sanitation 
facilities. Second, there is medical intervention through control (due to immuniza­
tion and insecticides) and treatm ent of infectious diseases using antibiotics. Third, 
there are improvements in knowledge and lifestyle. All three of these are associated 
with increases in prosperity although the direction of causation is hard to establish . 2
Of particular importance in recent history is the increased use of insecticides 
and antibiotics which lead to remarkable increases in life expectancy in the post 
war period (see, for example, Gwatkin (1980)). Preston (1975, 1980) attributes the 
upward shift in the non-linear relationship between life expectancy and per capita 
income in the 2 0 th  century to social policy measures, especially vector control and 
immunization, undertaken in less developed countries. Deaton (2004) attributes this 
wave of mortality reduction which hit the third world after World War II to “the 
globalization of knowledge, facilitated by local political, economic, and educational 
conditions” (page 109). The literature to  date has focused more on the la tter influ­
ences (education and economics) rather than the political foundations of increased
2See Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) for a recent attempt to establish whether increases in life 
expectancy were a cause of increased prosperity.
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life expectancy.
As a background, Figure 2.1 presents the “Preston Curve” for mid-way through 
our data period (1982) showing the link between life-expectancy and income per 
capita. The curve shown here is fitted non-parametrically. The Figure labels the 
democracies and autocracies differently to get a feel for whether they have differ­
ent levels of life-expectancy. The importance of controlling for income is apparent 
here as most very poor countries are autocracies while all very rich countries are 
democracies.
•  Democracies * Autocracies
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Figure 2.1: The Preston Curve in 1982
Notes: The solid line is a plot of a non-parametric regression using the tricube weighting function with bandwidth 
0 .2 .
There are three main theoretical differences between democracies and autocracies 
that we might expect to influence health issues. The first concerns representation. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) focus on who controls political office, modeling au­
tocracy as a dictatorship of the rich and democracy as a dictatorship of the poor 
or middle classes. On this view, health indicators will improve if public health is 
more of a priority for groups who dominate under a democracy compared to those
18
who gain political influence in an autocracy. An effect on health seems plausible on 
this view to the extent tha t the rich have less interest in public solutions to health 
problems .3
A second view of the difference between democracy and autocracy emphasizes 
accountability structures. Democracies demand accountability to a broad set of cit­
izens at regular intervals whereas autocrats are accountable only to a smaller group 
such as the military .4 Moreover, autocrats typically repress political opposition and 
the media to stifle public policy debate. This view also predicts th a t greater a tten­
tion will be paid to health issues in democracies since failure to do so should result 
in leaders being removed from office -  this link being weaker in autocracies.
A third  difference between democracies and autocracies concerns the process of 
political selection with democracies having stronger mechanisms for selecting compe­
tent and honest leaders to implement policy. To the extent tha t health interventions 
are supported by skilled and incorruptible political leaders, then democracies should 
lead to  better health outcomes than autocracies.
There are conflicting views about whether democracy affects policy and eco­
nomic performance. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) review empirical research on 
the effect of democracy on economic growth, concluding th a t the correlation is weak 
and not robust. Persson and Tabellini (2006a) try  a novel econometric approach 
finding some support for the proposition th a t persistent democracy is associated 
with improvements in economic performance .5
There is a small literature th a t looks a t the relationship between life expectancy 
and democracy in cross-country data. Franco et al. (2004) report a positive corre­
lation between life expectancy and democracy. (See also Govindaraj and Rannan- 
Eliya (1994).) Lake and Baum (2001) relate democracy to a variety of public health 
interventions.
3This view is borne out in discussions of investments in public health measures historically; see, 
for example, Szreter (1988) for a discussion of Great Britain.
4Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002) argue that, given the total amount of government expenditures, 
the larger the number of people whose support is required for the government to stay in power, 
the higher the level of public goods provided by the government.
5See also Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) for the argument 
that democratization is associated with subsequent growth.
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2.3 Evidence
We use panel data  across countries from the 1960s to  the 2000s. 6 We begin by 
showing th a t there is a strong and robust link between life expectancy at birth and 
democracy after controlling for income. Our basic specification uses data  for every 
fifth year between 1962 and 2002. We estimate an equation of the form:
h srt — &r “I- fit ~b 'Yld srt ~b T2^sr£ “1“ @1 Vsrt “I- @2 (?/srf) "b Xsr^A -(- £Srt (^'^)
where hsrt is some health indicator in country s in region r  in year t, a r is a region 
dummy variable, is a year dummy variable, ysrt is income per capita in country 
s in region r  averaged over years t — 4 to  t,7 and x srt are other (in practice time 
invariant) exogenous variables such as legal origins and political history .8 The vari­
ables (dsrt, D srt) are measures of democracy. The first is a contemporaneous measure 
denoting the fraction of democratic years between year t — 4 and t while D srt is a 
longer-term one denoting the fraction of democratic years since 1956 until year t 9 
The variable esrt is an error for which we compute robust standard errors clustered 
at the country level.
The main concern in interpreting results stems from the possibility that, as 
argued by Lipset (1959), there are social and cultural factors th a t evolve and make 
it easier for democratic institutions to be supported. Thus:
dsrt — "b W “I- ^1 Vsrt "b ^2 (Vsrt) ”b Xsrfl Zsrfp  “b IJsrt
6Our measure of democracy is from the Polity IV data base. Following Persson (2005) and 
Persson and Tabellini (2006a), a country is defined as democratic if variable POLITY2 is positive. 
See Appendix A for the definitions, sources, and the construction of variables used in the analysis. 
For descriptive statistics, see Tables A .l to A.3.
7 As we know from the work of Preston (1975) and others, there is a strong correlation between 
income and life expectancy with a non-linear effect. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
8Legal origin dummies effectively control for the effects of communist regimes on health out­
comes (see Govindaraj and Rannan-Eliya 1994) as legal origin classification includes socialist law. 
La Porta et al. (1999) find that legal origins are significantly correlated with infant mortality and 
democracy.
9Keefer (2005) (young versus old democracies) and Persson and Tabellini (2006a) (democratic 
capital) argue that longer-lived democratic experience is important. We choose 1956 as infant 
mortality data begins in 1960 (see column (5) of Table 2.1).
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where z srt is a vector of factors th a t evolve and make it easier to  sustain democratic 
institutions. If such factors exist, then we would spuriously attribu te a direct effect 
of democracy on outcomes th a t is really due to  z srt.
Table 2.1 presents the basic results. In column (1), we look solely at the par­
tial relationship with contemporaneous democracy finding th a t being democratic is 
associated with a 3.5 year increase in life expectancy. In column (2) we add in­
come per capita measures. After controlling for income, the democracy effect falls 
to  around two years, but remains positive and significant. Column (3) adds the 
fraction of democratic years since 1956. The data  suggest th a t it is more permanent 
democratic transitions th a t m atter and the contemporaneous democracy effect is 
no longer significant, although an F-test indicates th a t the two democracy variables 
are jointly significant. The point estimate suggests th a t a country th a t has been 
democratic for the whole period from 1956 through year t has a life expectancy tha t 
is more than  five years higher than a country th a t has been autocratic since 1956. 
To put this in perspective, this point estim ate “explains” 3.5 of the 13.7 year life 
expectancy difference between Ghana (democratic for 1 1  out of 47 years) and the 
U.S.A. (always democratic) in 2002. Column (4) reports the results for a different 
measure of democracy available due to Boix and Rosato (2001) . 10 The main results 
hold up in this case . 11 Column (5) shows th a t the result holds when we look at 
infant m ortality rather than life-expectancy. It indicates th a t countries tha t have 
always been democratic since 1956 have fewer infants dying before reaching one year 
of age by about 17 per 1000 live births (about one-fourth of the sample mean) than 
countries th a t have been continuously autocratic since 1956.
The remaining columns in Table 2.1 look at the possibility th a t democracy is 
correlated with pre-existing values and hence not picking up an institutional effect.
10Boix and Rosato (2001), who extend the democracy dataset constructed by Przeworski et 
al. (2000), define a country as a democracy if the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) the 
legislature is elected in multiparty elections; (2) the executive is elected in a multicandidate election 
or elected by the legislature satisfying condition (1); (3) at least 50 percent of adult men have the 
right to vote. Compared to POLITY IV, this measure of democracy heavily depends on political 
contestation, putting less weight on political participation and on executive constraints.
11 The number of observations goes down since Boix and Rosato (2001)’s data covers only years 
until 1994. The number of countries in the sample goes down even though Boix and Rosato (2001), 
unlike POLITY IV, include the least populous countries, because countries for which income is 
observed only in the late 1990s in the Penn World Table are all dropped in column (4).
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Table 2.1: Health and Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy at Birth Infant Life Expectancy at Birth
Mortality
DEMOCRACY 3.55*** 2.44** -0.24 -0.78 -2.09
since t-4 [1.26] [0.96] [1.14] [1.68] [5.36]
INCOME 1.75*** 1.61*** 2.08*** -9.19*** 1.62*** 1.61*** 148*** 1.45***
[0.22] [0.22] [0.29] [1.15] [0.23] [0.23] [0.26] [0.25]
INCOME squared -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.32*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.04***
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
DEMOCRACY 5.39*** 4.88** -17.41** 5.49*** 5.45*** 4.09** 4 10**
since 1956 [1.65] [2.26] [8.17] [1.45] [1.46] [1.60] [1.61]
DEMOCRACY -0.92 -0.05 -2.98 -3.21
during 1900-1955 [1.59] [2.37] [1.97] [2.00]
COLONY 0.57 1.97 1.71 1.78
during 1900-1955 [1.13] [1.86] [1.25] [1.26]
(DEMOCRACY -0.20
during 1900-1995)*TREND [0.38]
(COLONY -0.34
during 1900-1955)*TREND [0.29]
Average years of schooling 1.19*** 1.49***
aged over 15 in 1960 [0.41] [0.44]
(Average years of schooling -0.09**
aged over 15 in 1960) T R E N D [0.04]
F-test: F value 7.297 3.910 4.482
p-value 0.001 0.022 0.013
Controls:
Legal Origin Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Countries 160 146 145 136 146 144 144 92 92
Observations 1309 999 996 764 543 993 993 752 752
Adjusted R'? 0.991 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.921 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.995
Notes-. Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in brackets. The sample years axe every fifth year from 1962 through 2002 except for column (5) in which the sample years 
are every tenth year from 1960 through 2000. The data source for democracy variables is POLITY IV except for column (4), in which Boix and Rosato (2001)’s democracy dataset (available until 
1994) is used instead. This drops observations in 1997 and 2002. TREND is a trend variable taking 0 in 1962, 1 in 1967, and so forth. See Appendix A for other variable definitions. Germany is 
dropped from the sample for columns (3) to (9) because it is difficult to construct DEMOCRACY since 1956. Yemen is dropped from the sample for columns (6) to (9) because it is difficult to 
calculate DEMOCRACY during 1900-1955 and COLONY during 1900-1955. The null for F-test is that coefficients on DEMOCRACY since t — 4 and since 1956 axe both zero. *** significant at 
1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
In column (6 ) we add measures of political history -  specifically the fraction of 
years between 1900 and 1955 for which the country was democratic and the fraction 
of years in the same period for which the country was a colony. These are not 
significant and the effect of democratic years since 1956 remains. This holds true 
even if we allow the history to affect the time trend in life expectancy in column (7). 
Thus, it is difficult to argue th a t we are picking up long lived differences in values 
th a t are related to  prior democratic experience.
Column (8 ) controls for the stock of education in the population aged over 15 
in 1960 using Barro and Lee (2000)’s data. Prerequisites for democracy are likely 
to be correlated with human capital and Glaeser et al. (2006) have recently argued 
th a t education affects the sustainability of democratic institutions. Education is 
positively related to  life expectancy. However, the democracy variable remains pos­
itive and significant although a little smaller in size (by about one year compared 
to  column (3)). In column (9), we allow the initial level of education to affect the 
time trend in life expectancy. Countries with more education in 1960 tend to  have 
smaller trend increases in life expectancy but the proportion of democratic years 
since 1956 remains significant.
In Table 2 .2 , we explore in greater detail where the democracy effect is coming 
from . 12 First, we allow the democracy effect (7 1  in equation (2.1)) to be differ­
ent across time periods by estimating separate year effects for democracies and 
non-democracies. The results reported in column (1) reveal th a t the significant dif­
ferences obtain for the early part of our sample and disappear in the later period. 
Figure 2 . 2  plots the estimated year effects for democracies and autocracies. This 
shows th a t the upward trend in life expectancy disappear in the 1990s for both 
democracies and autocracies. These results are consistent with a view th a t the 
1960s and 1970s were a key period in mortality decline (Gwatkin (1980)), coupled 
with an additional observation tha t democracies were quicker to adopting mortality 
reducing technologies. 13
12Note that we do not include the longer-term democracy variable, D rst, as a regressor in Table 
2 . 2 .
13As shown in Table A.l ,  the average life expectancy goes up in the 1990s. This, combined with 
Figure 2.2, suggests that increases in life expectancy in the 1990s are mainly due to income growth
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Table 2.2: Democracy and Life Expectancy across Time and Income
(Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy at Birth)
(1 ) (2 )
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1962 6.33***
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1967
[1.39]
3.66***
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1972
[1.25]
2 .8 6 **
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1977
[1.31]
2.74**
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1982
[1.26]
1.92
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1987
[1 .2 0 ]
1.08
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1992
[1 .1 1 ]
1 .8 6 *
DEMOCRACY*YEAR1997
[1 .1 2 ]
1.14
DEMOCRACY* YE AR2002
[0.99]
2 .2 0
DEMOCRACY*HIGHINCOME
[1.45]
1 .0 2
DEMOCRACY*MIDDLEINCOME
[1.36]
3.28**
DEMOCRACY*LOWINCOME
[1.27]
3.63**
DEMOCRACY* VERYLOWINCOME
[1.43]
1.97
HIGHINCOME
[1.35]
12.48***
MIDDLEINCOME
[1.57]
7.83***
LOWINCOME
[1.42]
3.60***
F-test: F value 3.788
[1 .2 2 ]
1.334
p-value 0 .0 0 0 0.266
Controls:
INCOME YES NO
(INCOME) 2 YES NO
Legal Origins YES YES
Regions YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
Countries 146 146
Observations 999 999
Adjusted R 2 0.994 0.994
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in brackets. DEMOCRACY is the fraction of 
democratic years since 4 years ago. HIGHINCOME is a dummy for per capita GDP (averaged during 4 years ago to 
present) being 10,000 constant 1996 international dollars or more; MIDDLEINCOME for between 5,000 and 10,000; 
LOWINCOME for between 2,500 and 5,000; and VERYLOWINCOME for less than 2,500. The null for F-test is 
the equality of all coefficients on the interaction terms between DEMOCRACY and year dummies (for column 1) 
or income dummies (for column 2). *** indicates 1% significance; ** 5%; and * 10%.
Column (2) of Table 2 .2  shows tha t the democracy effect is identified primarily 
from middle and lower income countries as opposed to the very poorest and richest 
countries. This reflects the fact tha t most very low income countries have tended to 
be autocracies and rich countries tend to be democracies so we simple observe no 
variation in these cases. 14
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Figure 2 .2 : Estimated Year Fixed Effects for Democracy and Autocracy
Notes: Estimated year fixed effects for autocracy is obtained as coefficient estimates on year dummies in a regression 
of life expectancy on the interaction terms of DEMOCRACY since t-4 and year dummies, INCOME, INCOME 
squared, legal origins, regions, and year dummies for the same sample as in Column (2) of Table 2.1. Estimated 
year fixed effects for democracy is obtained by adding coefficient estimates on the interaction terms of year dummies 
and DEMOCRACY since t-4 in the same regression to the estimated fixed effects for autocracy.
Table 2.3 explores in more detail the source of identification . 15 The first column 
shows tha t the result is not robust to including country fixed effects. 16 If most of 
the identification is coming from cross-sectional differences between countries that 
are permanent in nature, we will not find anything in the fixed effects regressions. 
However, it could also be symptomatic of there being common omitted factors, such
(Figure 2.2 shows year fixed effects after controlling for income).
14 In fact, we cannot reject the equality of coefficients on all the interaction terms.
15 We drop the short term measure of democracy, dsrt, from our specifications in the following.
16We need to be cautious in interpreting fixed effects estimates as their consistency requires
strict exogeneity: regressors arc orthogonal to the errors at all leads and lags.
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as culture and institutions, driving both democracy and life-expectancy . 17 We divide 
the sample into those countries th a t have been either continuously democratic or 
autocratic over the entire period (no regime change) and those th a t have switched 
a t some point (switching regimes). Using the basic specification, the original effect 
shows up in both  sub-samples as shown in columns (2) and (3). In column (4), we 
show th a t there is no effect when we exploit only within-country variation in the 
group of countries th a t switched regime. Columns (5) and (6 ) show tha t, when we 
concentrate on those countries th a t have had a single democratic transition which 
has not subsequently been reversed, then we do get an effect of being democratic 
once again . 18 In column (5), this is identified solely from the 2 1  countries th a t have 
been in the da ta  set throughout the period whereas column (6 ) is an unbalanced 
panel including, for example, some countries th a t were formed after the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
Table 2.4 looks for evidence of differences in policy priorities between democracies 
and autocracies . 19 In columns (1) and (2), we investigate the difference in sanitation 
and clean water supply between democratic and non-democratic countries. These 
two health infrastructures prevent deaths caused by diarrhea, typhoid, and cholera. 
We see th a t the percentage of the population with access to improved sanitation 
facilities and improved water sources is higher by about 15 points (25 percent of the 
sample mean) and about 11 points (14 percent of the sample mean), respectively, 
in perm anent democracies since 1956 than in permanent autocracies.
In columns (3) and (4), we explore the relationship between democracy and 
immunization. The la tter is mostly a preventive measure against air-borne infectious 
diseases.20 We find th a t the percentage of children aged 1 2  to  23 months who 
received D PT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) vaccination before the age of one
17Acemoglu et al. (2005b) have argued that the relationship between income and democracy is 
suspect on the basis of its non-robustness to the inclusion of country fixed effects. Acemoglu et al. 
(2005a) makes a similar claim in respect of the link from education to democracy.
18This result does not, however, survive clustering of the standard errors at the country level.
19Note that we do not cluster standard errors for Table 2.4 due to the limited time span of the 
sample.
20As immunization data is observed annually, we replace hsrt in equation (2.1) with a health 
indicator averaged over the period from t — 4 to t, where £ is a five year interval between 1985 and 
2000. We also substitute D srt- 5 for Dsrt accordingly.
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Table 2.3: How Much Does W ithin-country Variation M atter?
(Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy at Birth)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
Sample Whole No Regime 
Change
Switching
Regimes
Switching
Regimes
Single Switch to Democracy 
(Balanced) (Unbalanced)
DEMOCRACY 0.08 7.26*** 3.72*** 0.69 7.65** 6.15*
since 1956 [1 .0 2 ] [1.23] [0.78] [1.07] [3.26] [3.21]
INCOME 0.28*  ^ IQ*** 2.19*** 0.17 0.37 0.08
[0.15] [0.14] [0.32] [0.30] [0.55] [0.52]
INCOME squared -0 .0 1 *** -0.03*** -0.08*** -0 .0 1 -0.03 -0 . 0 2
Controls:
[0 .0 0 ] [0 .0 0 ] [0 .0 2 ] [0 .0 1 ] [0.03] [0.03]
Country Dummies YES NO NO YES YES YES
Legal Origins NO YES YES NO NO NO
Regions NO YES YES NO NO NO
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Countries 145 54 91 91 2 1 38
Observations 996 358 638 638 189 235
Adjusted R 2 0.998 0.997 0.993 0.998 0.998 0.998
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The sample years are every fifth year from 1962 to 2002. Column (2) restricts the sample to countries without regime change (ie. 
DEMOCRACY since 1956 is either 0 or 1 for the whole sample period). Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to countries switching regimes at least once (including independence from the 
colonial rule) during the sample period. Columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to countries switching only once from autocracy to democracy during the sample period with Column (5) further 
restricting the sample to those with observations for all the nine sample years. Germany is always dropped from the sample (see notes for Table 2.1). *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
Table 2.4: Democracy and O ther Health Outcomes
(i) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Sanitation Clean Immunization Health
variable W ater D PT Measles Spending
DEMOCRACY 14.93** 10.76** 8.80** 0.55 161.38*
since 1956 [6.72] [4.70] [3.53] [3.30] [95.28]
DEMOCRACY -0.82 -0.38 -0 . 8 8 5.78 191.58**
for 1900-1955 [6 .6 6 ] [4.21] [4.01] [4.12] [75.73]
COLONY 6.45 -0.82 -4.37 -5.05* -97.37*
for 1900-1955 [4.05] [3.78] [2.71] [3.04] [53.08]
Controls:
INCOME YES YES YES YES YES
(INCOME ) 2 YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origins YES YES YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Countries 108 1 1 2 145 145 145
Observations 183 190 486 484 145
Adjusted R 2 0.957 0.976 0.956 0.959 0.947
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The sample years are 1990 and 2002 for columns (1) and 
(2), every fifth year during 1985 to 2000 for columns (3) and (4), and 2000 for column (5). For columns (3) to (5). 
the dependent variable is the mean value over the period from 4 years before to the present year, and DEMOCRACY 
since 1956 is the value for year t-5. For the same reason as in columns (5) to (8) of Table 2.1, Germany and Yemen 
are dropped from the sample. *** significant at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
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is higher by about 9 points (more than  10% of the sample mean) in democracies 
compared to  autocracies. For measles vaccination, democracy variables are not 
significant while former colonies have lower immunization rates .21
Finally, column (5) investigates the relationship between democracy and govern­
ment health expenditures per capita (excluding expenditures on water and sanitation 
provision). The specification is the same as in columns (3) and (4) with data  being 
available for the year 2000 only. Here we find th a t the government in a permanent 
democracy during 1956 to  1995 spends around 160 dollars (in purchasing power 
parity terms) per person more on health than the one in a permanent autocracy .22
In Table 2.5, we undertake some further robustness checks by including exoge­
nous variables th a t might be thought to affect either the disease environment or 
the ease of public action. In column (1), we introduce the malaria ecology index of 
Kiszewski et al. (2004). The higher this index, the more likely malaria is transm itted 
due to  ecological factors. This is negatively correlated with life expectancy as we 
might expect. In column (2), we control for European settler m ortality in the 19th 
century as in Acemoglu et al. (2001) . 23 This is correlated with lower life expectancy 
today though the magnitude is very small.24 Column (3) includes the ethnic frac- 
tionalization index studied in Alesina et al. (2003).25 Higher ethnic fractionalization 
is correlated with lower life expectancy .26 In column (4), we control for the incidence 
of armed conflicts using the Armed Conflict D ataset by Gleditsch et al. (2 0 0 2 ). Wars 
are negatively correlated with life expectancy. Finally, column (5) adds the mineral 
exporter dummy (time-invariant), constructed from World Development Indicators,
21 Lake and Baum (2001) find a similar result (significant for DPT but insignificant for measles). 
Gauri and Khaleghian (2002) find that, after controlling for country fixed effects, the democracy 
effect on immunization is positive among poorest countries but decreases with per capita income 
and eventually becomes negative among middle-income countries.
22The fact that countries that were democratic between 1900 and 1955 spend around 200 dollars 
more per capita than those that were continuously autocratic suggests that democratic experience 
may well be picking up long-lived cultural/political trends as well as health investments.
23In their subsequent research, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) argue that European settler mortality 
is associated with the evolution of democracy as well as long-run economic development.
24Settler mortality is measured as the number of deaths per 1000 settlers.
25Aghion et al. (2004) theoretically argue that increased polarization of preference leads to the 
adoption of a Constitution in which political leaders are more insulated. They also find some 
empirical support for this claim by using the same index of ethnic fractionalization.
26Alesina et al. (2003) find that infant mortality is higher in ethnically more fractionalized 
countries.
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to  the set of controls.27 Mineral exporting countries have lower life expectancy. In 
all cases, the democracy effect th a t we identified in Table 2.1 remains significant.
Table 2.5: Further Robustness Checks 
(Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy a t Birth)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
DEMOCRACY 5.33*** 5  7 4 *** 5.45*** 5.58*** 5.55***
since 1956 [1.43] [1.92] [1.42] [1.45] [1.35]
DEMOCRACY - 1 .1 1 -1.63 -1.06 -0 . 8 8 -1.19
for 1900-1955 [1.60] [2.82] [1.52] [1.58] [1.54]
COLONY 1.07 1 .1 1 0.47 0.48 1.15
for 1900-1955 [1 .2 1 ] [2.26] [1.08] [1.13] [1 .0 1 ]
Malaria ecology -0.14*
[0.07]
Settler mortality -0.0014**
[0.0005]
Ethnic fractionalization -2.99**
[1.50]
Incidence of wars -1.33*
[0.69]
Mineral exporters - 1 .8 8 **
[0.75]
Controls:
INCOME YES YES YES YES YES
(INCOME) 2 YES YES YES YES YES
Legal Origins YES YES YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Countries 143 61 144 144 138
Observations 992 523 993 993 972
Adjusted R 2 0.995 0.994 0.995 0.995 0.995
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in brackets. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Compared to the sample for column (6) of Table 2.1, Bahrain drops from the sample for column (1) 
as the malaria ecology index is unavailable; Cuba, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Laos, Lesotho, and Uzbekistan drop 
from the sample for column (5) due to unavailability of mineral export data. Germany and Yemen are dropped 
from the samples for all columns (see notes for Table 2.1). ***significant at 1%; **5%; *10%.
Finally, Table 2.6 looks at more disaggregated measures of democracy. Column 
(1 ) explores whether disaggregating democracies into presidential and parliam entary 
regimes yields differential correlations with life expectancy. Column (2) does the 
same analysis for proportional representation and m ajoritarian electoral rules. In 
neither case is there a significant difference between these different forms of democ­
2 7 R o s s  (2001) provides a panel cross-country evidence that mineral exporting countries are more 
likely to be non-democratic.
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racy. In column (3), we disaggregate democracy in POLITY IV’s three sub-indices. 
There is suggestive evidence of the correlation driven by there being higher executive 
competition in democracies. However, given the relatively high correlations between 
these components, one should not wover-interpret” the significance of this finding.
Table 2.6: Disaggregating Democracy 
(Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy a t Birth)
(1 ) (2 ) (3)
PRESIDENTIAL 5.04***
since 1956 [1.55]
PARLIAMENTAL 5.39***
since 1956 
M A J ORITARIAN
[1.52]
5.63***
since 1956 
PROPORTIONAL
[1.52]
4.88***
since 1956 [1.49]
EXECUTIVE COMPETITION 5.13***
since 1956 [1 .6 6 ]
EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINT 1.67
since 1956 [2.04]
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION -1.04
since 1956 [2 .1 2 ]
F-test 0.068 0.422 2.353
p-value 0.795 0.517 0.099
Controls:
INCOME YES YES YES
(INCOME) 2 YES YES YES
Legal Origins YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES YES
Countries 145 145 145
Observations 996 996 996
Adjusted R 2 0.994 0.994 0.995
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country level are reported in brackets. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Germany is dropped from the sample (see notes for Table 2.1). The null for F-test is the equality of 
coefficients on the disaggregated democracy measures (all the coefficients reported in each column of this table), 
♦♦♦significant at 1%; ♦♦5%; ♦10%.
2.4 Concluding Comments
Our results suggest th a t there is a robust correlation between democratic institutions 
and health, resulting in greater life expectancy in democracies. The results suggest
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th a t it is a prolonged exposure to democracy th a t m atters. However, without truly 
exogenous variation in constitutional differences, the concern th a t this represents 
omitted cultural and social variables remains. Still, the fact th a t these results are 
robust to including education and political history as regressors is encouraging to  the 
interpretation of this effect as telling us something about the impact of institutions 
of policy making.
The results contribute to  a growing body of the literature th a t takes political 
economy factors seriously in understanding human well-being. The challenge now 
is to take this agenda beyond broad cross-country comparisons and into the de­
tailed workings of political and bureaucratic behavior under different systems of 
government.
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Chapter 3 
Has Dem ocratization Reduced  
Infant M ortality in Sub-Saharan 
Africa? Evidence from Micro D ata
3.1 Introduction
Does democracy promote development? This question has long attracted  attention 
from many social scientists. Despite a large number of empirical studies on this 
subject, evidence remains inconclusive because it is difficult to establish causality 
running from democracy to development: democracy is likely to  be endogenous to  
socio-economic factors th a t also affect development (Lipset 1959). The empirical 
challenge is to disentangle the effect of democracy from other confounding factors. 
This chapter revisits this question in the context of human development in sub- 
Saharan Africa. Specifically, I investigate whether democratization sweeping the 
region in the 1990s has reduced infant mortality, by using a cross-country micro 
panel dataset covering 28 countries in the region.
How to confront underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most 
im portant questions in economics today. Economists, however, have so far ignored 
one im portant change tha t the world’s poorest region recently experienced: a  wave 
of democratization in the 1990s. By the end of 2000, among the 48 countries in
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sub-Saharan Africa “[ojnly Congo-Kinshasa, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, 
and Uganda held no multiparty elections whatsoever .” 1 Much has been discussed, 
by political scientists and Africanists, on what caused democratization in Africa and 
whether new democracies in the region will be consolidated .2 Very few, however, pay 
attention to  how this political change has affected the lives of people in sub-Saharan 
Africa .3 Perhaps because of this, the pessimism on the quality of African government 
is deeply entrenched in any debate on African underdevelopment. The long-standing 
question of whether democracy promotes development, therefore, gains additional 
importance in sub-Saharan Africa.
As a measure of development, this chapter focuses on infant mortality, defined 
as death within the first year of life. The survival of infants remains a huge concern 
in sub-Saharan Africa today. Figure 3.1 plots infant m ortality rates per 1,000 live 
births by developing region over time. Sub-Saharan Africa has been lagging behind 
other regions in reducing infant mortality, since 1980 in particular, with more than  
one in ten babies still dying before turning one year old in 2000. In addition, 
focusing on infant mortality has a methodological advantage: unlike other socio­
economic outcomes such as personal income, the data  a t the individual level across 
many countries over a long period of time is available from the retrospective fertility 
survey component of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), conducted in 28 
African countries after the mid-1990s. In these surveys, women of childbearing age 
report when their children were born and whether, and when (if applicable), they 
died. As surveyed women in Africa give birth to four children on average during 
their lifetime, I observe a sizable number of mothers having babies both before and 
after democratization in the 1990s. This characteristic of the data allows me to 
identify the effect of democratization by exploiting within-mother variation in the
1Van de Walle (2002), p. 67. See also Bratton (1998) and Lindberg (2003). Rwanda then 
held multiparty elections in 2003, and Congo-Kinshasa in 2006. Uganda has been holding multi- 
candidate elections since 1996.
2One exogenous factor that contributes to democratization in Africa in the 1990s is the end 
of the Cold War. The news of the collapse of communist dictatorships encouraged Africans to 
protest against non-democratic regimes. Western donor countries became reluctant to provide 
development assistance to African countries unless democracy was introduced. These changes 
often forced African dictators to accept the introduction of multiparty elections.
3An exception to this is Stasavage (2005), who looks at whether democratization in Africa has 
improved primary school attendance.
34
survival of babies, instead of cross-country or within-country variation. As a result, 
the estimated effect of democratization on infant mortality is robust to a possibility 
that changes in the composition of the population over time (e.g. overall education 
level) drive both democratization and changes in infant mortality with no direct 
relationship between the two.
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Figure 3.1: Infant Mortality by Developing Region, 1960-2000 
Source: World Development Indicators, April 2006.
Notes: The definition of regions follows the World Bank’s classification.
The DHS surveys also provide information on socio-economic characteristics of 
interviewed mothers, including their educational attainm ent and ethnicity. Using 
this information, I check if the effect of democracy is larger for babies born to 
disadvantaged groups of mothers such as those uneducated or those whose ethnicity 
is different from the former dictator’s. The fundamental idea of democracy is to give 
voice to every citizen in a country whereas typically only a few people can influence 
policy-making under dictatorship. The effect of democratization will therefore be 
larger for groups of people who are otherwise excluded from political process. The 
use of individual-level data allows me to see if this argument holds in reality.
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Last but not least, any discussion regarding democracy faces a thorny issue 
of what constitutes democracy. In this chapter, I define democracy as a political 
institution satisfying the following two conditions: (1 ) the chief executive of the 
government has been elected in multiparty elections with universal suffrage, with­
out subsequently banning opposition parties and (2 ) the first multiparty election 
brings in a new chief executive to office. Political economy models predict th a t the 
combination of contested elections and universal suffrage — features of democracy 
underlying the first condition — will provide an incentive for the government to im­
plement public health interventions to combat infant mortality. Several additional 
arguments suggest th a t contested elections and universal suffrage do not make a 
difference in policy-making unless the second condition is also satisfied. To identify 
the year of democratization defined this way, I originally collect information on these 
requirements for a country to be democratic. I check how results differ when I drop 
the second requirement in the definition above or rely on widely-used democracy 
indicators to  define democracy instead. I also check whether leadership without 
democratization reduces infant mortality. By doing so, I try  to make some progress 
in our understanding of what features of democracy, and what combination of them, 
contribute to development.
My findings are as follows. Democratization has reduced infant m ortality in sub- 
Saharan Africa by 1.8 percentage point, roughly equivalent to w hat the region as a 
whole has achieved over the past two decades (see Figure 3.1). The effect of democ­
ratization emerges immediately and becomes larger over time. A sizable portion of 
this reduction comes from a fall in neonatal mortality, the number of deaths within 
the first month of life. The effects of democratization on both infant and neonatal 
m ortality are larger for babies bom  to uneducated mothers and mothers who do not 
share their ethnicity with the dictator who ruled the country until democratization. 
There is no such reduction in infant m ortality in countries where the dictator holds 
m ultiparty elections and stays in power by winning them. W hen the year of democ­
ratization is identified from widely-used democracy indicators, estimation results 
suggest th a t such measures of democracy may be subject to  measurement error.
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Additional evidence suggests th a t maternal health care provision to  uneducated 
mothers has expanded since democratization, consistent with the finding th a t de­
mocratization has reduced neonatal mortality, especially for babies born to  unedu­
cated mothers. The breastfeeding practice has spread after democratization, which 
can explain the immediate effect of democratization. Access to better sanitation 
facilities has also expanded, consistent with the growing effect of democratization 
over time. On the other hand, there is no evidence for an increase in affluence af­
ter democratization. Consequently, the key mechanism in which democratization 
has reduced infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa is likely to  be improvements in 
public health service delivery, not in overall living standards.
This chapter contributes to the large empirical literature th a t tries to identify 
the effect of democracy on development or other socio-economic outcomes. I am 
not aware of studies using micro panel data  to  estimate the effect of democracy. 
Most studies focus on economic growth as an outcome variable. As the source of 
identification, early studies reviewed in Przeworski and Limongi (1993) hinge on 
cross-country variation while recent studies rely on within-country variation (Pa- 
paioannou and Siourounis 2005 and Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005). Others look at 
the effect of democracy on manufacturing wages (Rodrik 1999), child immunization 
(Gauri and Khaleghian 2002), socio-economic policies (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i- 
M artin 2004), and life expectancy at birth (Chapter 2 of this thesis). Ross (2006) 
studies the effect of democracy on infant mortality a t the country level, finding no 
association between the two. This finding may, however, be subject to  confounding 
factors a t the country level.
As an attem pt to disaggregate a blunt concept of democracy in the estimation of 
its effect, this chapter is also related to works summarized in Persson and Tabellini 
(2006b). Finally, this study contributes to recent debates on how to improve public 
service delivery in poor countries (e.g. World Bank 2003; Banerjee and Duflo 2006; 
Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers 2006).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses how 
I measure democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and describes the individual-level data
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on infant mortality. Section 3.3 describes empirical method, reports main results, 
checks their robustness, and investigates what type of democracy m atters for infant 
mortality. Section 3.4 provides evidence for possible pathways from democratization 
to  the reduction of infant mortality. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background and D ata
To estimate the effect of democratization on infant m ortality a t the individual level, 
we need to decide how to measure democracy and to obtain micro data  on the 
survival of babies. In this section, I first discuss how I measure democracy and, 
based on this measure, show how democracy has evolved in African countries in the 
sample. Then I describe the Demographic and Health Surveys, from which I obtain 
micro data  on infant mortality.
3.2.1 M easuring D em ocracy in Africa
Democracy is a multi-faceted political institution. Some features of democracy may 
affect a certain outcome while other features may not. To identify the effect of 
democracy, therefore, we need to choose the appropriate definition of democracy 
depending on what outcome we study. In this chapter, I define democracy as a 
political system in which (1 ) the chief executive of the government has been elected 
in multiparty elections with universal suffrage without subsequently banning oppo­
sition parties and (2 ) a new chief executive assumed office after the first m ultiparty 
elections. Below I explain theoretical motivations behind these two conditions for 
democracy.
The key concepts underlying the first condition are contested elections and uni­
versal suffrage. The political economy literature provides a t least two reasons for 
which public health interventions to  reduce infant m ortality will be implemented af­
ter the introduction of contested elections with universal suffrage. First, the median 
voter theorem, combined with the assumption tha t public health interventions are 
the policies the majority of all citizens prefer, predicts th a t contested elections with
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universal suffrage make politicians propose public health policies to  assume office. 
Under universal suffrage, candidates proposing policies favored by the m ajority of 
the population will win elections.4 Second, under the assumption th a t public health 
interventions are the provision of public goods, the model of distributive politics 
indicates th a t implementing public health interventions is less costly for politicians 
to  win the majority of votes than  distributing private goods to each voter, because 
under universal suffrage politicians need to appease a large number of people to  win 
elections.5 These two arguments suggest th a t contested elections and universal suf­
frage are complements. If suffrage is limited to  a certain segment of the population, 
contested elections alone do not ensure th a t politicians propose policies favored by 
the m ajority of the population or provide public goods to appease a large number 
of people, because they can still win the elections without doing so. Likewise, uni­
versal suffrage alone does not lead to  the implementation of these policies because 
politicians will stay in office anyway by “winning” non-contested elections.
There are reasons to  believe th a t public health policy to combat infant m ortality 
was one of the policies the m ajority of the population prefer in sub-Sahara African 
countries in the early 1990s, when democratization took place (see below). In 1990, 
only 33% of the population had access to  improved sanitation facilities in sub- 
Saharan Africa ( World Development Indicators 2005). Only 40% of births in the 
region in 1990 were attended by skilled health personnel (UNICEF 2006, Table 
2) . 6 These figures suggest th a t the provision of sanitation facilities and skilled child 
delivery care would benefit the m ajority of the population in the region in the early 
1990s.
Public health interventions to  reduce infant mortality also have a public good 
component in sub-Saharan Africa because a large number of child deaths in the re­
gion are caused by infectious diseases. According to estimates provided by Murray 
and Lopez (1996, Appendix Table 6 f), the following four infectious diseases together
account for about 65 percent of 4.03 million deaths of children aged under 5 years in
4Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) develop a model of democratization based on this idea.
5See Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith (2002) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) 
for this line of arguments.
6See section 3.4 for how these two public health interventions affect infant mortality.
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sub-Saharan Africa in 1990: diarrhea (20%), lower respiratory infections (e.g. pneu­
monia) (18%), malaria (15%), and measles (12% ) . 7 Providing preventive measures 
and treatm ents against these diseases, therefore, benefits all infants living in the 
same area .8
The argument has so far indicated th a t politicians need to be elected in con­
tested elections with universal suffrage so th a t democratization leads to  a  reduction 
in infant mortality. Further considerations refine this condition in three ways. First, 
contested elections must be multiparty elections. It may be difficult for opposition 
candidates w ithout the support of political parties to  defeat the incumbent, under­
mining the incentive for the government to  adopt policies favored by the majority 
or to provide public goods. This is particularly im portant in the parliam entary sys­
tem  of government. Second, the political agency model (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986) 
suggests th a t, if the chief executive elected in multiparty elections bans opposition 
parties, he or she loses an incentive to  implement policies favored by the majority 
of citizens. Therefore, opposition parties need to be legal to exist after m ultiparty 
elections are held. Finally, the political office th a t is filled via m ultiparty elections 
must be an effective one in policy-making. Otherwise m ultiparty elections do not 
bring about policy change. The literature on African politics indicates th a t such 
political office is the chief executive.9
The second condition for a country to be democratic — the replacement of a chief 
executive — is an equilibrium outcome rather than  the rule of the game. There are, 
however, several reasons to believe tha t leadership turnover is necessary for contested 
elections with universal suffrage to have any bite.
If a d ictator decides to introduce multiparty elections in which he intends to run 
as a candidate and actually wins, he does so because he knows he can win. This
7Estimates for infant death (i.e. death during the first year of life) are not available. In 1990, 
HIV accounts for only 1.5 percent of child deaths in sub-Saharan Africa.
8Mani and Mukand (2007) offer another possible explanation for why health policies may change 
after democratization. Outcomes caused by health policies may be easier for voters to observe than, 
say, economic growth at the country level. This observability of health outcomes for voters creates 
an incentive for policy-makers who seek re-election to prioritize health issues over others. This 
effect does not emerge under non-democratic policy-making.
9For example, van de Walle (2003, p. 310) notes that “power is highly centralized around the 
president”.
40
may be due to his popularity relative to potential opposition candidates or due to  
his capability of rigging the votes. As a result, he does not need to change his policy 
to  win m ultiparty elections. (See Przeworski et al. 2000, pp. 23-8, for a similar 
argument.)
The second reason is th a t the identity of political leaders m atters for policy­
making . 10 Democratization may bring about change in government policy only if 
it replaces policy-makers with those whose policy preference is different from their 
predecessor.
Yet another reason can be given based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2006b). 
They argue th a t democratization does not lead to  change in economic institutions 
if the elite can intensify their influence on policy outcomes through what they call 
de facto political power, such as lobbying. This argument may apply to health 
policies as well. Change in political leadership after democratization may increase 
the cost of lobbying for the elite as they need to  cultivate personal connections with 
new political leaders from scratch. As a result, the cost of intensifying political 
influences outweighs its benefit, allowing democratization to bring policy change.
W hether or not these arguments hold true is, however, an empirical question. In 
section 3 .3 .4 ,1 investigate whether the replacement of a chief executive is necessary 
for democratization to have an impact on infant mortality.
As none of the existing democracy datasets collect all of the requirements for 
democracy discussed above, I need to originally create the measurement of democ­
racy . 11
For each of the 28 sub-Sahara African countries for which the DHS surveys 
were conducted since 1996 (see section 3.2.2 below) and for the beginning of each
10There is a growing number of empirical studies that support this idea. See Pande (2003); 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004); Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004); Jones and Olken (2005); and 
Besley, Persson, and Sturm (2005).
11 The dataset that is most closely related to the purpose of this study is the one constructed 
by Przeworski et al. (2000) for the period from 1950 to 1990. There are, however, two differences. 
First, Przeworski et al. (2000) do not require universal suffrage to qualify a country as democratic. 
Second, they require multiparty elections not only for executive office but also for legislature. 
If their dataset covered the period up to present, I would only need to collect information on 
universal suffrage because Przeworski et al. (2000) provide information on multiparty elections for 
executive office and for legislature separately. Boix and Rosato (2001) and Cheibub and Gandhi 
(2004) update Przeworski et al. (2000)’s data to more recent years, but they do not provide such 
disaggregated information as necessary to fit the purpose of this study.
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year since independence or 1950, I collect information on who the chief executive 
of the government is, whether the chief executive in office (or national legislature 
if a country adopted the parliamentary form of government) has been elected in 
m ultiparty elections with universal suffrage, and whether opposition parties are 
legal. I consult Nohlen et al. (1999) and Africa South o f the Sahara (London: 
Europa Publications, various issues) for collecting such inform ation . 12
This coding procedure reveals the following p attern  of the evolution of democracy 
in the 28 countries. Among 23 countries th a t became independent by the 1960s, 13 
were democratic a t independence. All these countries, however, experienced the 
collapse of democracy either by a military coup or by the banning of opposition 
parties by the early 1970s. Around 1980, three countries (Ghana, Nigeria, and 
Uganda) became democratic, but all of them  saw m ilitary coups toppling democratic 
governments by the mid-1980s. During the 1990s, 11 countries were democratized 
(see column (1) in Table 3.1 for the list of these democratized countries) . 13
I exploit these 1 1  episodes of democratization during the 1990s to  estimate the 
effect of democracy in the following analysis. The focus on democratization during 
the 1990s deserves some explanation. The end of the Cold War has increased the 
African government’s cost of ignoring democratic procedures for choosing the chief 
execuive of government. Western donor countries are now reluctant to provide for­
eign aid to non-democratic countries. If an African president wants to  term inate 
democracy, he needs to  be prepared for financing the government expenditure with­
out foreing aid revenues. Democratic institutions are therefore more likely to persist 
and shape the incentive of policy-makers. During the Cold War, on the other hand, 
the African government could ignore democratic procedures as long as it expressed 
the support for the U.S. or the Soviet Union, because foreign aid then kept flowing 
in irrespective of political regimes. Therefore, democratic rules of the game were 
unlikely to shape the incentive of policy-makers.
12 See Appendix B for more details on the measurement of democracy.
13Namibia and Zimbabwe became independent in 1990 and 1980, respectively, with the chief 
executive elected in multiparty elections with universal suffrage. Opposition parties have been 
legal in both countries until present. However, it is impossible to disentangle the effect of democ­
ratization from that of independence in these two cases. Therefore, I treat the two countries as 
non-democratized ones by dropping the sample before the year of independence.
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Table 3.1: Years of Democratization by Different Measures of Democracy and the Sample Period for 28 African Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Country Multiparty P R O P R O P R O POLITY2>6 POLITY2> POLITY2>0 EXREC>7 & PARCOMP>3 Sample Period
Democratized Countries
Benin 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 : 1991 1991 1964-2000
Comoros 1990 1991 1990 1990 1975-1995
Ethiopia 1995 1995 1993 1995 1963-1999
Lesotho 1993 2002 *1993 1993 *1993 *1993 *1993 *1993 1967,69-2004
Madagascar 1993 1993 1993 1990 1992 1992 1991 1992 1962-1996
Malawi 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1964-1999
Mali 1992 *1992 1992 1992 *1992 1992 1992 1992 1964-2000
Niger 1993 *1993 *1993 *1992 *1992 *1991 *1992 1960-1997
Nigeria 1999 1999 1999 1965-2002
South Africa 1994 1994 1994 1994 1993 1990 - 1994 1961-1997
Zambia 1991 *1991 *1991 *1991 *1991 1991 *1991 1965-2001
Non-democratized Countries
Burkina Faso 1991 1999 1966-2002
Cameroon 1992 1968-2003
Chad 1996 1962,65,67-2003
Cote d’Ivoire 1990 1962-1998
Gabon 1993 *1990 1962-1999
Ghana 1992 2000 1996 1995 2001 1996 2001 1967-2002
Guinea 1993 1961-1998
Kenya 1992 *1992 • 2002 2002 2002 2002 1965-2002
Mauritania 1992 1962-2000
Mozambique 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1975-2002
Namibia - - - - - - - - 1990-1999
Rwanda (2003) 1963-1999
Senegal 1978 (2002) *1984 1978 (2000) (2000) (2000) 1961-1996
Tanzania 1995 1999 2000 2000 1968-2004
Togo 1993 1960-1997
Uganda 1996 *1997 1964-2000
Zimbabwe - 1980-1998
Notes: Column (1) lists the year of the first multiparty elections for executive office. indicates that the country is democratic for all years in the sample. Years in parentheses are the years 
of democratization outside the sample period. The blank cells indicate that the country is never democratic during the sample period.
* Democracy collapses within the sample period.
I create a dummy variable for the post-Cold War democratization which is equal 
to  one for years after the year of democratization in these 1 1  democratized countries 
(listed in column (1 ) of Table 3.1). This ensures th a t the post-Cold War democra­
tization dummy is equal to one only if all babies born in a given year are exposed 
to  democracy . 14 Below I call this dummy the democratization dummy for simplic­
ity although it should be noted th a t this variable is actually an interaction term  
between the democracy dummy and the post-Cold War period dummy.
For the consistent estimation of the effect of democratization, the 11 democ­
ratized countries must be comparable to  the other 17 countries in term s of de­
term inants of infant mortality. Figure 3.2 shows the geographical distribution of 
democratized countries during the 1990s. It reveals tha t democratized countries are 
not concentrated in a particular region, which ensures the comparability of democ­
ratized and non-democratized countries in terms of geographical factors. Columns 
(1) and (2) in Table 3.2 show how comparable the two groups of countries are in 
terms of country-level variables tha t are likely to be associated with infant mortality. 
Differences in the means of these variables are never statistically significant at the 
conventional level.
3.2.2 M icro D ata on Infant M ortality
The data  on infant mortality at the individual level is obtained from the Demo­
graphic and Health Surveys (DHS), conducted by ORC Macro in various developing 
countries since the late 1980s with funding from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID ) . 15 The DHS questionnaire consists of standardized compo-
14 There are three countries in which democratization was followed by coups within the sample 
period (the Comoros, Lesotho, and Niger). I do not treat these cases differently for two reasons. 
First, in each case, a fresh multiparty election for executive office immediately followed (often 
due to international pressure). Second, treating these cases differently could cause the selection 
bias: the remaining “permanent” democratizations are permanent because they are successful 
in bringing about benefits to the population while “broken-down” democratizations broke down 
because they failed to do so. Limiting attention to only those “permanent” democratization may 
cause an overestimation of the beneficial effect of democratization.
15See http://www.measuredhs.com (the DHS survey website) for more details and for down­
loading data files. The DHS data is widely used by demographers and public health researchers. 
Economic research using the DHS data includes Pitt (1997), Dow, Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin 
(1999), and, most recently, Young (2005).
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Table 3.2: Comparability of Different Groups of Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
Group of countries:
(1 )
Democratized
(2 )
Non-
democratized
(3)
Sample
(4)
All
Per Capita Income in 1990 1657 2 0 2 0 1877 2182
(1996 constant int’l dollars) (2078) (2036) (2 0 2 2 ) (2353)
11 17 28 42
Average Years of Schooling 2.81 2.92 2.87 2.93
in 1990 (1.79) (1.05) (1.33) (1.51)
(for those aged 15 or over) 7 11 18 30
Average Years of Schooling 2.42 2.19 2.28 2.37
in 1990 (1.92) (0.94) (1.36) (1.61)
(for female aged 15 or over) 7 11 18 30
Ethnic Fractionalization Index 0.640 0.709 0.682 0.659
( 0  to 1 ) (0.269) (0.159) (0.207) (0.233)
1 1 17 28 46
British Legal Origin 0.455 0.353 0.393 0.383
(dummy variable) (0.522) (0.493) (0.497) (0.491)
1 1 17 28 47
European Settler Mortality 987 369 587 556
(per 1 0 0 0  mean strengths) (1205) (213) (758) (693)
6 11 17 23
Malaria Ecology Index 10.53 12.96 1 2 .0 0 11.38
(0 to more than 30) (10.31) (8.67) (9.24) (7.98)
11 17 28 46
HIV infection rate in 2001 9.71 7.45 8.29 9.05
(% of adults aged 15-49) (10.06) (6.58) (7.93) (9.86)
1 0 17 27 38
% of years of armed conflicts 14.68 16.54 15.81 21.52
from 1951 or independence (23.30) (24.85) (23.83) (29.65)
to 2004 11 17 28 47
Sources: Penn World Table 6.1 for per capita income; Barro and Lee (2000) for years of schooling; Alesina et al. 
(2003) for ethnic fractionalization; La Porta et al. (1999) for British legal origin; Acemoglu et al. (2001) for European 
settler mortality; Kiszewski et al. (2004) for malaria ecology; the World Development Indicators 2005 for the HIV 
infection rate; and Armed Conflict Dataset Version 3-2005b (Gleditsch et al. 2002) for armed conflicts.
Notes: In each cell, the mean, the standard deviation (in parentheses), and the number of countries are reported at 
the top, the middle, and the bottom row, respectively. Column (1) includes 11 democratized countries; column (2) 
17 non-democratized countries; column (3) 28 countries with the DHS surveys available; column (4) all the countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding Eritrea). Eritrea is excluded because it became independent in 1993, and data in 
1990 is therefore not available.
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Figure 3.2: Democratization in the Sample Countries over Time 
Notes: Black-colored countries are democratized; gray-colored ones are the other countries in the 
sample. In 1990, the Comoros was democratized but due to its small area size it is not visible.
nents and country-specific ones. Using the standardized part of the questionnaire 
allows researchers to compile cross-country micro datasets.
In each DHS survey, a nationally representative sample of women of child-bearing 
age (15 to 49) are interviewed about the survival of almost all the children they gave 
birth to in the past, including those who died by the time of the interview . 16 From 
this recall data, I construct a panel dataset of mothers where the time dimension 
is the year of child birth given by each mother. Therefore, as long as at least one 
round of survey was conducted in a country, a panel dataset of mothers is available 
for tha t country . 17
To investigate the effect of democratization on infant mortality in sub-Saharan 
Africa, I select 28 DHS surveys, one for each sub-Sahara African country, conducted
16The maximum number of children for each interviewed mother in the dataset is 20. In the 
sample, however, there is only one mother giving birth to more than 20 children.
17An issue with the recall data is its accuracy. The DHS survey interviewers conduct a number 
of probes to ensure the quality of birth history data based on interviewees’ memory. See page 14 
of ORC Macro (2006).
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since 1996.18 If there are more than  one surveys available in a country during this 
period, I select the latest survey to  maximize the number of post-democratization 
years covered in the sample .19 See Table 3.3 for the list of surveys used in the 
analysis.20
The 28 DHS surveys provide a sample of 693,495 children born to  171,110 moth­
ers with the year of birth  of children spanning from 1958 through 2005. From this, 
the following observations are dropped: (i) children born before the year of indepen­
dence of their country and (ii) children born within 1 2  months before their m other’s 
interview. Children of type (i) are excluded in order to prevent the effect of colo­
nial rule from muddling the comparison of dictatorship and democracy. Children of 
type (ii) might have died before reaching the age of one even if they were alive at 
the time of their mother’s interview, which results in measurement error. Dropping 
these observations results in the base sample of 643,846 children born to  161,876 
mothers with the year of birth of children spanning from 1960 and 2004.
To measure individual-level infant mortality, a  dummy for whether a  child dies 
before turning the age of one year is constructed. As the literature suggests tha t 
determinants of infant death within the first month of life (known as neonatal mor­
tality) differ from those for the rest of the first year of life,21 a dummy for whether a 
child dies before turning the age of one month is also constructed. These two dummy 
variables are the dependent variables in the following analysis. O ther characteristics 
of babies used in the analysis below are their sex, whether or not they are born in 
multiple birth (i.e. twins, triplets, etc.), their birth order, the age of their mother a t 
their birth, the preceding birth  interval (how many months have passed when they
18I thank Bernard Barrere for granting access to Mauritania DHS survey results. The 28 countries 
in the sample are fairly representative for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Columns (3) and (4) 
in Table 3.2 compare the means of various country-level variables that are likely to be associated 
with infant mortality between the 28 sample countries and all the countries in the region. There 
is no systematic difference between the two.
19One exception is Senegal, for which I use the 1997 survey instead of the latest survey in 1999, 
because the 1999 survey data is not recoded and the codebook is written in French.
20Five more African countries (Botswana, Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, and Su­
dan) conducted the DHS survey before 1996. Given that democratization in Africa took place 
mostly in the early 1990s, however, these surveys are not useful to investigate the effect of democ­
ratization. In addition, Eritrea conducted the DHS surveys in 1995 and in 2002. However, access 
to survey results is restricted and I have not managed to gain permission.
21See, for example, Razzaque, Alam, Wai, and Foster (1990).
47
Table 3.3: Years of DHS surveys used in the analysis
Country Infant M ortality Analysis Pathway Analysis
Benin 2 0 0 1 2001, 1996
Burkina Faso 2003 2003, 1998, 1992
Cameroon 2004 2004, 1998, 1991
Chad 2004
Comoros 1996
Cote d ’Ivoire 1998
Ethiopia 2 0 0 0
Gabon 2 0 0 0
Ghana 2003 2003, 1998, 1993, 1988
Guinea 1999
Kenya 2003 2003, 1998, 1993, 1989
Lesotho 2004
Madagascar 1997 1997, 1992
Malawi 2 0 0 0 2000, 1992
Mali 2 0 0 1 2001, 1995, 1987
M auritania 2 0 0 0
Mozambique 2003 2003, 1997
Namibia 2 0 0 0 2000*, 1992*
Niger 1998 1998, 1992
Nigeria 2003 2003, 1999, 1990
Rwanda 2 0 0 0 2000, 1992
Senegal 1997 1997, 1992
South Africa 1998
Tanzania 2004 2004, 1999, 1996, 1992
Togo 1998 1998, 1988
Uganda 2 0 0 0 2000, 1995, 1988
Zambia 2 0 0 1 2001, 1996, 1992
Zimbabwe 1999 1999, 1988
Notes: If a survey was completed in the following year, the year in the table refers to the one in which the survey 
began.
* Namibia surveys are not used for analysis of tetanus toxoid injections because the 2000 survey does not collect 
information on it, leaving only one round of survey available.
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are born since their mother gave birth to  the previous child), the ownership of con­
sumer durable goods by their household a t the survey date, how many years their 
mother has lived in the surveyed community when she is interviewed, the level of 
their m other’s education, the area of residence (urban or rural), and their mother’s 
ethnicity.
Note tha t, due to  the nature of retrospective data, children born to the mothers 
who are dead or not eligible to be surveyed (i.e. 50 years old or over) at the tim e of the 
survey are missing in the sample. If the impact of democratization is systematically 
different between these missing children and those in the sample, all the results in 
this chapter will suffer from sample selection bias. However, there is no a priori 
reason for why the impact of democratization differs between these two types of 
children.
3.2.3 Sum mary Statistics
Table 3.4 shows summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. Column (1 ) 
provides sample means for all countries in the sample; column (2 ) for babies born in 
democratized countries until the year of democratization; column (3) for babies born 
in democratized countries after the year of democratization; column (4) for babies 
born in non-democratized countries. The infant mortality rate is 10 percent of live 
births on average for all the 28 countries in the sample. The .neonatal m ortality 
rate is 4.7 percent, indicating th a t nearly half of infant deaths occur within the first 
month after birth.
Figure 3.3 plots sample mean infant mortality rates by year for democratized 
and non-democratized countries. It reveals th a t non-democratized countries consis­
tently have lower infant m ortality rates than democratized countries, with the gap 
widening in the early 1980s. This gap, however, dramatically disappears by the mid- 
1990s, when most of the 11 democratization episodes already took place. Figure 3.3 
also shows th a t infant mortality has been on the decline for both groups of countries 
with non-democratized countries having a steeper downward trend. This difference 
in the trend between the two groups of countries will bias the democracy coeffi-
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Countries:
(1 )
All
(2) (3) 
Democratized
Before After
(4)
Non-
democratized
Baby-level Variables
Infant death
(All) 0 .1 0 0 0.116 0 .1 0 0 0.091
643846 197891 79805 366150
(Educated) 0.080 0.086 0.086 0.076
287387 81284 37267 168836
(Uneducated) 0.116 0.138 0 .1 1 1 0.104
356450 116600 42538 197312
(Dictator’s ethnicity) N/A 0 .1 2 1 0 .1 1 2 N/A
37800 18365
(Other ethnicity) N/A 0.124 0 .1 0 0 N/A
89028 37987
Neonatal death
(All) 0.047 0.054 0.046 0.043
643846 197891 79805 366150
(Educated) 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.035
287387 81284 37267 168836
(Uneducated) 0.055 0.065 0.053 “ 0.049
356450 116600 42538 197312
(Dictator’s ethnicity) N/A 0 .1 2 1 0 .1 1 2 N/A
37800 18365
(Other ethnicity) N/A 0.124 0 .1 0 0 N/A
89028 37987
Girl 0.491 0.487 0.494 0.492
643846 197891 79805 366150
Multiple birth 0.032 0.029 0.037 0.032
643846 197891 79805 366150
Mother’s age at birth 0.534 0.541 0.506 0.537
20-29 643846 197891 79805 366150
Mother’s age at birth 0 .2 0 0 0.168 0.261 0.203
30-39 643846 197891 79805 366150
Mother’s age at birth 0.018 0.008 0.040 0.018
40-49 643846 197891 79805 366150
Short birth spacing 0.292 0.333 0.237 0.282
483880 146213 62589 275078
Mother-level Variable
Number of births 4.028 4.059 4.005
(2 .6 8 6 ) (2.754) (2.634)
161876 68602 93274
Notes: In each cell, the sample mean is reported at the top row; the number of observations at the bottom row. For 
number of births, which refers to the birth order of the youngest child in the sample, standard deviations are reported 
in parentheses at the middle row. Column (2) reports means for children born in democratized countries until the 
year of democratization; Column (3) for children born in democratized countries after the year of democratization; 
Column (4) for children born in non-democratized countries.
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cient upwards, going against the finding that democratization has reduced infant 
mortality.
Democratized -----*----- Non-democratized
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Figure 3.3: Sample mean infant mortality rates by year for democratized and non- 
democratized countries
Notes: Plotted are sample mean infant mortality rates by year for democratized and non- 
democratized countries. Year 1970 includes children born in the 1960s; year 2003 includes children 
born in 2004. See Table 3.1 for the list of democratized and non-democratized countries.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show sample mean infant mortality rates by year for each 
country. While the overall infant mortality has been on the decline as shown in 
Figure 3.3, each country exhibits its own trend in infant mortality.
3.3 Em pirical Analysis
3.3.1 M ethod
To investigate whether democratization has reduced infant mortality, I estimate the 
following equation:
Vi met — otm +  (3t +  7  Dct +  5CT  R E N  Dct +  ’K imct0 +  £imc*, (3.1)
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Notes: Plotted are sample mean infant mortality rates by year for each of the 11 democratized 
countries. Year 1970 includes children born in the 1960s; year 2003 includes children born in 2004.
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where 2/*mc* is a dummy equal to one if baby i who is born to mother m  in country 
c in year t  dies before reaching the age of one year (or one m onth if the outcome 
of concern is neonatal mortality), a m is a mother fixed effect, and (3t is a birth-year 
fixed effect. D ct is a dummy variable equal to  one if country c is democratized by the 
beginning of year t. The term  dcTREND ct represents a linear time trend specific 
to country c .22 X imct is a vector of exogenous covariates. In the base regression, 
includes dummies for baby girls and for multiple birth  (i.e. twins, triplets, 
or quadruplets). The sex of babies may affect their survival if the return to  raising 
children for their parents is different between boys and girls.23 Multiple b irth  results 
in an unexpected reduction in the amount of available household resources per child, 
which may increase the likelihood of infant death .24 Although there is no a priori 
association between democratization and the likelihood th a t female babies or twins 
are born, controlling for these exogenous characteristics of babies reduces the error 
variance, and thus increases the precision of estimation of coefficients of interest. 
Standard errors are clustered a t the country level to  take into account any arbitrary 
correlations of the error term  Eimct across babies born in country c in year t  and over 
time in country c .25
The param eter of interest, 7  in equation (3.1), measures the average difference in 
changes in the probability of the death of babies born to  the same mother between 
those countries th a t are democratized and those th a t are not. Under the assump­
tion tha t, after controlling for mother and year fixed effects, country-specific linear 
trends, and exogenous covariates, changes in infant mortality in non-democratized 
countries provide a counterfactual for democratized countries (i.e. changes in infant 
m ortality th a t would occur if there were no democratization), 7  represents the ef-
22 As there are plenty of observations before democratization (compare columns 1 and 9 in Table 
3.1), linear trends are unlikely to pick up the post-democratization trend (Wolfers 2006).
23There is mixed evidence on gender bias in infant and child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. 
See Klasen (1996) and references therein.
24Pison (1992) reports that in sub-Saharan Africa twins are 3 to 4 times as likely to die within 
the first year of life as singletons are.
251 specify the linear probability model. Conditional fixed effects logit estimation yields similar 
results in terms of the sign and statistical significance of the estimated democracy coefficient. 
However, its consistency requires no serial correlation in the error term, which is unlikely to hold 
in the present context (see Zenger 1993, for example). In addition, the coefficient estimates in 
fixed effects logit models are difficult to interpret.
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feet of democratization on infant mortality. Specifically, the error term, £imct, must 
satisfy the following equation:
Q-mi f i t i  &ct X met ^ t )  0, (3.2)
where D mc and X mc are the vectors containing D ct and X imCi, respectively, for all t 
in which mother m  gives birth, and D t and X* the vectors containing Dct and X iTOCt 
for all c. Due to the presence of mother and year fixed effects as controls, £imct must 
be uncorrelated not only with the contemporary status of democracy Dct bu t also 
with the past and future status of democracy when the same mother gives b irth  to  
another child, and with all other countries’ status of democracy in year t.
Unobservable “prerequisites for democracy” plague all empirical studies th a t 
try  to  identify the effect of democracy. Unlike cross-country regression analysis, 
however, unobservable time-invariant characteristics of countries such as geography, 
history and culture are not the source of violation of the identifying assumption 
represented by equation (3.2) because the set of m other fixed effects in each country 
captures such country fixed effects. Among time-variant prerequisites at the country 
level, one of the m ajor factors tha t may drive both  democracy and infant m ortality 
is the level of education among adults . 26 However, change in the stock of education 
in the adult population does not affect equation (3.2) because the effect of m others’ 
education on infant mortality is captured by mother fixed effects.27 This is the 
main advantage of using individual-level data  instead of country-level da ta  in the 
investigation of the effect of democracy. In the country-level regression analysis, 
controlling for a time-variant measure of education such as the average years of 
schooling in the adult population does not help identification because it is correlated
26See Strauss and Thomas (1996, section 3.3) for a survey on the effect of parental education 
on child health. For a classical account of education as the main drive for democracy, see Lipset 
(1959). For the latest debate on this issue, see Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2005a) 
and Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2006).
27Among babies with their mother’s years of schooling available, there are 2,351 babies who are 
not the only child and born before the year of completion of their mother’s study (calculated as 
the number of years of schooling plus 6, assuming that primary school begins at the age of 6). 
There are 6,896 babies whose mother’s years of schooling is not available. Therefore, the level of 
maternal education differs across different babies born to the same mother only for at most 1.4 
percent of the sample observations.
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with the error term by some lags. For example, an improvement in child health 
th a t also boosts educational attainm ent (e.g. Miguel and Kremer 2004) leads to  an 
increase in the stock of education some years later. This breaks down the strict 
exogeneity assumption on the error term  for consistency in fixed effects estimation.
Another time-variant factor th a t may drive both  democracy and infant mortality 
is income.28 Due to  the lack of data  on earnings of each m other’s household over 
time, this remains a major concern for identification in this analysis. In section 
3.3.3, I deal with this issue in a couple of ways.
3.3.2 Main R esults
Table 3.5 reports estimated coefficients on the democratization dummy by adding 
controls one by one. Column (1 ) only controls for year fixed effects. The democ­
racy coefficient is positive but not significantly different from zero. Column (2 ) 
additionally controls for country fixed effects. The democracy coefficient becomes 
negative and statistically significant. Given th a t non-democratized countries have 
lower infant mortality rates on average than  democratized countries (see Table 3.4 
and Figure 3.3), the coefficient estimate in column (1) picks up such cross-country 
variation, offsetting within country variation shown in column (2 ).
Column (3) controls for mother fixed effects instead of country fixed effects. The 
democracy coefficient becomes larger in absolute terms. This result indicates tha t 
the composition of mothers changes after democratization with their characteristics 
worsening in relation to infant mortality. A possible explanation is th a t women 
becoming mothers after democratization are less healthy because they were born in 
the 1980s, when economic recessions may have impoverished their parents, and grew 
up with insufficient nutrients. Economic recessions may have led to  democratiza­
tion in the early 1990s in the democratized countries . 29 The country fixed effects
28See Strauss and Thomas (1996, section 3.4) for a survey on the effect of income on child 
health. A recent empirical investigation of the income-democracy link is found in Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2005b).
29Bratton and van de Walle (1997) find that democratization in Africa followed frequent political 
protests, which were in turn more frequent the more often the government adopted structural 
adjustment programs in the 1980s.
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Table 3.5: Infant M ortality Drops After Democratization
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Infant Infant Infant Infant Infant Neonatal
Death Death Death Death Death Death
Democratization 0.009 -0 .0 1 1 * -0.017** -0.017** -0.018** -0 .0 1 0 **
Girl
[0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
-0.014**
[0.003]
-0 .0 1 1 **
Multiple birth
[0 .0 0 1 ]
0.231**
[0 .0 1 2 ]
[0 .0 0 1 ]
0.163**
[0.009]
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO NO NO NO
Mother FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
TREND NO NO NO YES YES YES
#  of Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28
#  of Mothers 161876 161876 161876 161876 161876 161876
Observations 643846 643846 643846 643846 643846 643846
Adjusted R 2 0 .0 0 1 0.008 0.060 0.061 0.077 0.080
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. Infant death is death before turning 
the age of 1 year; neonatal death is death before turning the age of 1 month. Adjusted R 2 refers to  variation 
explained by all regressors including any fixed effects.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
estimation, therefore, picks up such omitted factors, yielding the biased estim ate for 
the democracy coefficient.
Column (4) additionally controls for country-specific linear trends. The democ­
racy coefficient remains almost the same and statistically significant. This result 
shows tha t the coefficient estimate in column (3) does not reflect a steeper declin­
ing trend in infant mortality in democratized countries than in non-democratized 
countries.30
Finally, column (5) adds exogenous covariates (dummies for female babies and 
for multiple births) in the set of control variables. Democratization is followed by a 
reduction in the infant mortality rate by 1 . 8  percentage points, which is as much as 
18 percent of the sample mean. To gauge the magnitude of this fall, recall Figure 3.1. 
The 1.8 percentage point decline roughly corresponds to  the fall in infant m ortality
in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa between 1980 and 2000.
30 Controlling for quadratic or cubic country-specific trends makes the democracy coefficient 
estimate smaller and insignificant, suggesting that the effect of democratization is not a sudden 
change in infant mortality.
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Column (6 ) reports the result for neonatal death in the same specification as 
in column (5). The probability th a t a mother sees her baby die within the first 
month of life falls after democratization by 1 percentage point, 2 1  percent of the 
sample mean. A sizable portion of the fall in m ortality within the first year of life 
is therefore due to the fall in mortality within the first month of life.
The democracy coefficient estimates in columns (5) and (6 ), however, may not 
reflect the effect of democracy. Given tha t democratization in Africa often followed 
economic stagnation, it may be the case th a t infant m ortality temporarily went up 
due to impoverishment of their mothers before democratization. If this is the case, 
the democratization coefficient is estimated to be negative even if democratization 
has no impact. Alternatively, infant mortality may begin to  drop some years before 
democratization due to changes in some socio-economic prerequisites for democracy. 
We then spuriously attribu te such an effect to  the one of democratization. To 
deal with these concerns, I estimate the dynamics of infant m ortality before and 
after democratization. I replace D& in equation (3.1) with the set of year-wise 
dummy variables which are equal to 1 if n  years have passed since the year of 
democratization, where —5 <  n  <  3, and another dummy variable equal to 1 if 4 
years or more have passed since the year of dem ocratization .31 Figure 3.6 plots the 
estimated coefficients on these dummies (see also Table 3.6) and shows the 95 percent 
level confidence intervals.32 These are interpreted as percentage point changes in 
infant mortality, relative to changes in non-democratized countries, compared to  
the period until 6  years before democratization. There is no statistically significant 
change in infant mortality until the year of democratization. This result supports 
the interpretation of estimated democracy coefficients in columns (5) and (6 ) of 
Table 3.5 as the effect of democratization.
Figure 3.6 also indicates th a t infant mortality drops immediately after democra­
tization and continues to fall subsequently. The immediate fall in infant mortality
311 lump together 4 or more years after democratization because three of the 11 democratized 
countries (Madagascar, Nigeria, and South Africa) have observations only until 3 years after democ­
ratization. Therefore, estimated change in infant mortality from three years after democratization 
to four or more years after can be due to change in the composition of countries in the sample.
32This type of analysis is increasingly common in labor economics. See Jacobson, LaLonde, and 
Sullivan (1993), Autor (2003), and Wolfers (2006).
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Figure 3.6: Dynamics of Infant M ortality Before and After Democratization 
Notes: Plotted are estimated coefficients reported in Table 3.6. Vertical bands represent 95 percent 
level confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients.
may reflect the promotion of awareness among mothers on healthy behavior such as 
hand-washing. The subsequent additional decline in infant mortality may indicate 
th a t health infrastructure such as sanitation facilities and health clinics are now 
put in place after a couple of years of preparation. These interpretations assume 
th a t health policy changes immediately after democratization. If democratic policy­
making tends to be slow because mustering support from the majority of legislators 
takes time, this assumption is unlikely to hold. However, given th a t the chief ex­
ecutives of government have large discretion over policy-making in Africa, as the 
literature on African politics suggests, the immediate change in health policy after 
dem ocratization is not entirely implausible.
The estimation results have so far concerned the aggregate effects. The effects 
of democratization, however, may not be homogeneous among the population. Two 
characteristics of mothers are likely to  yield heterogeneity in changes in infant mor­
tality  after democratization: their level of education and their ethnicity. The effect
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Table 3.6: Dynamics of Infant M ortality Before and After Democratization 
(The Dependent Variable: Death before turning the age of one year)
5 Years Before -0.004
[0.006]
4 Years Before -0 . 0 0 1
[0.005]
3 Years Before -0.004
[0.004]
2  Years Before -0.009
[0.008]
1 Year Before -0.008
[0.008]
Year of Democratization -0.014
[0 .0 1 1 ]
1 Year After -0.023*
[0 .0 1 0 ]
2 Years After -0.028*
[0 .0 1 2 ]
3 Years After -0.030
[0.016]
4 Years or More After -0.038**
[0.013]
F-test 0.44
p-value 0.817
Controls:
Girl YES
Multiple Birth YES
M other FE YES
Year FE YES
TREND YES
#  of Countries 28
#  of Mothers 161876
Observations 643846
Adjusted R 2 0.077
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. The null for F-test is that 
five coefficients on dummies for years before democratization are all zero. Adjusted R 2 refers to variation explained 
by all regressors, including any fixed effects.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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of democratization may be stronger for uneducated mothers, if the democratized 
government provides knowledge on health to tackle infant mortality and if educated 
mothers are already aware of it. Mothers who do not share their ethnicity with the 
dictator who ruled the country until democratization may also benefit more from 
democracy. Under dictatorship, they may have been excluded from policy-making 
process. Their desire for the survival of their babies, therefore, may not be heard 
by the government. 33 After democratization, these mothers gain the right to  vote 
in contested elections for executive office. As a result, the government has an incen­
tive to help their babies survive. On the other hand, mothers from the dictator’s 
ethnic group may enjoy public health interventions even under dictatorship. Conse­
quently, the effect of democratization on the reduction of infant m ortality is likely 
to  be stronger for babies born to mothers from ethnic groups not in power under 
dictatorship .34
The use of micro data  allows me to  investigate these possibilities. Table 3.7 
reports the estimated impacts of democratization on infant and neonatal m ortality 
by m others’ education level and ethnicity. In columns (1) and (2), I interact the 
democratization dummy with indicator variables for uneducated mothers (those who 
never went to  school) and for educated mothers (those who at least attended primary 
school). For both infant m ortality and neonatal mortality, it is uneducated mothers 
who benefit the most from democratization. Babies born to uneducated mothers 
are less likely to  die within the first year (month) of life after democratization than 
before by 2.3 (1.2) percentage points. The difference in the estim ated coefficients of 
democratization between uneducated and educated mothers (1.4 percentage point 
for infant m ortality and 0 . 6  for neonatal mortality) is statistically significant a t 1
33African countries are known to be highly heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity (Easterly and 
Levine, 1997), and it is often argued that political leaders favor their own ethnic groups against 
the others (see, for example, Bates 1983). Chapter 5 of this thesis takes this issue seriously.
34The same argument may explain Almond, Chay, and Greenstone (2003)’s finding that infant 
mortality among black people converged to the level of infant mortality for white people in the 
United States from 1965 to 1971 via improved access to hospitals for black people. Although 
Almond et al. (2003) attribute this infant mortality convergence to the prohibition of racial dis­
crimination in hospital care by a U.S. Appeals Court decision in 1963 and Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, which eliminated poll taxes and literacy 
tests that had effectively disenfranchised black people (see Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2005), may 
have also contributed by the logic described here.
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percent level. To gauge the economic significance of these results, note th a t the 
difference in the sample average infant (neonatal) m ortality between babies born to 
educated and uneducated mothers is 3.6 (1.9) percentage points (see column (1) of 
Table 3.4). Therefore, after democratization, inequality in health in term s of infant 
mortality between the two groups of babies declines by 39 percent. For neonatal 
mortality, it is a 32 percent fall in the gap .35
The finding th a t uneducated mothers benefit more from democratization might 
be driven by the fact tha t there are more uneducated mothers in rural areas than 
in urban areas and th a t democratization has corrected w hat is often called “urban- 
bias” . Bates (1981) points out th a t African governments in the 1960s and 1970s — 
the period when they were more or less autocratic — favored urban residents against 
rural ones in term s of the allocation of public resources.36 To explore this possibil­
ity, I create four dummies for uneducated mothers living in urban areas, educated 
mothers in urban areas, uneducated mothers in rural areas, and educated mothers in 
rural areas .37 These four dummies are interacted with the dem ocratization dummy.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results. Uneducated mothers benefit from de­
mocratization equally between those living in urban and rural areas, though the 
estimated coefficient is larger in absolute term s and more precise for rural mothers. 
The difference between educated mothers living in urban areas and in rural areas is 
also small. An F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis th a t there is no difference 
in the democracy coefficient between urban and rural areas both for uneducated 
mothers and for educated mothers. These results indicate th a t uneducated mothers 
benefit from democratization irrespective of where they five.38
35These results, however, do not suggest that democratization has no impact for educated moth­
ers. The coefficient on the interaction term between democratization and educated mothers re­
flects a difference between educated mothers in democratized countries and all mothers in non- 
democratized countries. If I restrict the sample to babies born to educated mothers and estimate 
equation (3.1), then the democracy coefficient is significantly negative, suggesting that educated 
mothers also benefit from democratization.
36Majumdar, Mani, and Mukand (2004) suggest that even a democracy creates urban bias: 
voters in urban areas are better at observing policy outcomes, and thus more responsive to policy 
change, than those in rural areas, creating an incentive for policy-makers to favor urban people in 
the allocation of public resources.
37Note that areas of residence refer to mothers’ residence at the survey date. For mothers who 
migrated from rural to urban areas or vice versa, this results in measurement error. If I drop such 
mothers as I do for column (8) of Table 3.8 (see section 3.3.3 below), I obtain similar results.
38If I include only urban and rural dummies (without interaction with education), the difference
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Table 3.7: Impact of Democratization by M other’s Education and Ethnicity
(i) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
Dependent Infant Neonatal Infant Neonatal Infant Neonatal
variable: Death Death Death Death Death Death
Democratization
interacted with
Educated -0.009
[0.006]
-0.006
[0.003]
Uneducated -0.023**
[0.007]
-0 .0 1 2 **
[0.003]
Educated -0.005 -0.004
h  Urban [0.007] [0.005]
Educated -0 . 0 1 1 -0.006
h  Rural
Uneducated -0.018 -0.004
h  Urban [0 .0 1 2 ] [0.009]
Uneducated -0.024** -0.014**
& Rural [0.007] [0.003]
D ictator’s -0.008 -0.004
ethnic group [0.008] [0.005]
Other -0.017* -0 .0 1 2 **
ethnic groups [0.006] [0.004]
F-test 7.94 8.46 0.78 0.81 17.16 6.79
p-value 0.009 0.007 0.469 0.454 0 . 0 0 1 0.018
Girl YES YES YES YES YES YES
Multiple birth YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mother FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
TREND YES YES YES YES YES YES
#  of Countries 28 28 28 28 19 19
i f  of Mothers 161873 161873 161873 161873 114324 114324
Observations 643837 643837 643837 643837 460952 460952
Adjusted R 2 0.077 0.080 0.309 0.311 0.074 0.077
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. Infant death (the dependent variables 
in odd-numbered columns) is death before turning the age of 1 year. Neonatal death (the dependent variables in 
even-numbered columns) is death before turning the age of 1 month. Adjusted R2 refers to variation explained 
by all the regressors, including any fixed effects. The nulls for F-tests are: for columns (1) and (2), coefficients on 
the two interaction terms between democratization and mothers’ education level are the same; for columns (3) and 
(4), coefficients on the two interaction terms of democratization and educated mothers with areas of residence are 
the same and coefficients on the two interaction terms of democratization and uneducated mothers with areas of 
residence axe the same; for columns (5) and (6), coefficients on the two interaction terms between democratization 
and mothers’ ethnicity are the same.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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In columns (5) and (6 ), I interact the democratization dummy with dummies 
for the d ic tator’s ethnic group and the other ethnic groups. To create ethnicity 
dummies, from various sources I identify the ethnicity of the dictator who ruled 
the country until the year of democratization and match it with the list of ethnic 
groups in the DHS surveys.39 Ethnic groups th a t are different from the former 
d ic tator’s benefit more from democratization. The difference in the magnitude of 
the  democratization effect is statistically significant for both infant and neonatal 
mortality. On the other hand, the former dictator’s ethnic group does not see a 
statistically significant change in infant and neonatal mortality though the point 
estimates are negative. A newly elected chief executive, therefore, does not appear 
to  retaliate against the ethnic group in power until democratization. In other words, 
democratization in Africa does not worsen ethnic conflict.40
3.3.3 R obustness Checks
The previous subsection reveals th a t infant m ortality falls after democratization. 
This finding, however, does not necessarily reflect the effect of democratization on 
public health policy-making, as argued in section 3.2, because other factors may 
have changed a t the same time as democratization.
One such factor is m others’ income. Even though democratization does not 
affect any government health policy, mothers may have become richer after democ­
ratization, because democratization, for example, brings about political stability 
and hence an increased investment. Then they become healthier and thus give birth 
to  healthier babies, and /or babies can afford sufficient nutrient intake, leading to a 
reduction in infant mortality.
As the DHS surveys do not collect information on earnings by mothers or their
in estimated coefficients on these two dummies interacted with democratization is not statistically 
significant.
39See Appendix B for details. Nine countries are dropped from the sample in this analysis 
because the DHS surveys in these countries do not ask respondents about their ethnicity.
40T o deal with a concern that there are more educated mothers among the dictator’s ethnic 
group and that this drives the result, I estimated coefficients on the interaction terms of ethnic 
groups and educational status, like what I did in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.7. I cannot reject 
the null that coefficients for each type of ethnic groups are the same across educational status.
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household members over time, I cannot directly control for income at the individual 
level. An indirect way of controlling for change of m others’ income over time is to 
control for real GDP per capita available in the Penn World Table 6.2. Column
(1) of Table 3.8 reports the estimation result when the logarithm of per capita real 
GDP and its one-year lag are controlled for. An increase in per capita GDP seems to 
reduce infant m ortality concurrently but not one year after, though both coefficient 
estimates are not significantly different from zero. The democratization coefficient, 
on the other hand, remains statistically significant and its size is almost the same 
as in column (5) of Table 3.5. This result suggests th a t the estimated effect of 
democratization in Table 3.5 is not driven by the concurrent move in per capita 
income at the country level.
Another way of checking the robustness to the income hypothesis is to restrict the 
sample to  those babies born to  mothers w ith no assets a t the time of the interview. 
As these mothers are poor a t the time of the survey, the only possible trajectories of 
their personal income in the past are either th a t they have always been poor since 
their first child birth  or th a t they used to  be better off bu t have become poorer over 
time. Therefore, the bias to the democracy coefficient due to  unobserved personal 
income change over time will be, if anything, upward for this subsample of babies. 
If we still see a significantly negative coefficient on the democracy dummy, then the 
income hypothesis is less likely to be an alternative explanation of the result found 
in Table 3.5, a t least for babies born to asset-poor mothers.
The DHS surveys ask the possession of the following consumer durables: radio, 
television set, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, and car. If a baby’s mother owns 
none of these items, such a baby is retained in the sample. Column (2) of Table 3.8 
reports coefficient estimates for this subsample of babies born to  asset-poor moth­
ers. Although it slightly loses precision, the estimated coefficient on the democracy 
dummy does not change substantially. This result encourages the interpretation of 
the results in Table 3.5 as not picking up the effect of change in personal income
after dem ocratization .41
41 In section 3.4.3 below, the possibility that growth in personal income drives the results will be 
revisited.
Table 3.8: Robustness Checks 
(The Dependent Variable: Death before turning the age of one year)
(1) (2) (3) . (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample: PWT6.2 Born to Until Since All All All but Without
Poor 2003 1961 First-born Migration
Mothers
Democratization -0.017** -0.018* -0.018** -0.018** -0.018** -0.016** -0.015* -0.017*
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Log per capita GDP -0.032
[0.017]
Log per capita GDP (1-year lag) 0.004
[0.014]
War 0.004
[0.004]
Foreign Aid 0.000
(million US$, 2004 prices) [0.000]
Foreign Aid (1-year lag) 0.000
(million US$, 2004 prices) [0.000]
HIV infection rates 0.021
among pregnant women [0.069]
Short birthspacing 0.039**
(less than 24 months) [0.004]
Girl YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Multiple birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mother FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TREND YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Additional Controls NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
#  of Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 25
#  of Mothers 161858 47910 161864 161876 161876 161876 129343 116259
Observations 643532 203027 643791 643843 643846 643846 483880 414767
Adjusted R 2 0.077 0.091 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.079 0.072 0.067
Notes'. Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. In columns (1), (3), (4), and (7), some observations are dropped due to the unavailability of control variables. 
Column (2) restricts the sample to babies born to mothers having no consumer durable good at the survey date; Column (8) drops babies born before one year has passed since their mother 
migrated to the surveyed community and babies whose mother’s information on migration is not available. In Column (6), birth order dummies and mothers’ age-at-birth category dummies are 
additionally controlled for. Adjusted R 2 refers to variation explained by all regressors, including any fixed effects.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Another time-variant factor th a t may confound the effect of democratization on 
health policy-making is the incidence of a war. Democratization may just bring 
about peace. Therefore, babies no longer die due to battle-related causes, or the 
government can now deliver health services for those living in areas previously con­
trolled by rebels. To deal with this concern, column (3) of Table 3.8 controls for 
a war dummy which is equal to  one if there is a t least 1 , 0 0 0  battle-related deaths 
per year in a country, obtained from the Armed Conflict Database Version 3-2005b 
(Gleditsch et al. 2 0 0 2 ). The democracy coefficient remains almost the same as in 
column (5) of Table 3.5, suggesting th a t the estimated effect of democracy does not 
pick up the effect of peace.
Yet another confounding factor may be foreign aid. Donor countries may be­
come willing to provide more financial resources for democratized countries, but 
not for non-democratized countries. This increased foreign aid may simply expand 
the budget set for policy-makers who are always willing to provide public health 
interventions to reduce infant m ortality irrespective of political regimes. Column
(4) of Table 3.8 deals with this concern by additionally controlling for the amount 
of disbursed official development assistance (in million US dollars, 2004 prices) each 
country receives in each year, obtained from the OECD Donor Assistance Commit­
tee Database 2005. The democracy coefficient remains almost the same as in column
(5) of Table 3.5, suggesting th a t change in foreign aid does not drive the effect of 
democratization on infant m ortality .42
Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa took place in the 1990s, when the HIV 
epidemic began to spread in the region. Although the spread of HIV/AIDS is 
unlikely to affect democratization, the coincidence of timing of the two in Africa 
may bias the democracy coefficient estimate. Bobat et al. (1999) report tha t about 
one-third of children born to HIV-infected mothers become infected as well and 
tha t about a third of the infected children die within the first year of life. A crude 
calculation suggests th a t a 10 percent increase in the HIV infection rate among
42 Controlling for the amount of foreign aid committed to the health sector, water supply and 
sanitation, developmental food aid, or emergency food aid (obtained from the OECD Creditor 
Reporting System Database 2005) does not change the result, either.
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pregnant women leads to a 1.1 percent increase in the infant mortality rate. I t may 
be the case th a t the estimated coefficients on democratization reported in Table
3.5 are biased because mothers who gave birth before democratization subsequently 
become infected with HIV and give birth to another child after democratization. 
Column (5) of Table 3.8 controls for United States Census Bureau’s estimates of 
annual HIV-infection rates amongst pregnant women at the country level, used by 
Young (2005).43 I fill missing values with zero because the estimates are missing 
before the outbreak of HIV infection in the late 1970s and the early 1980s.44 The HIV 
infection rate among pregnant women at the country level is positively correlated 
with infant mortality though it is not statistically significant. The point estim ate for 
the democracy coefficient as well as its precision does not change much, indicating 
th a t the spread of HIV infection does not significantly bias the estimation results.
Column (6 ) in Table 3.8 deals with another concern for the consistency of the es­
tim ation of the effect of democracy. As the source of identification of the democracy 
effect comes from democratization, not from the collapse of democracy, ignoring the 
effects of birth order and the m other’s age a t birth may result in estimation bias. 
Children of higher birth orders may be more likely to die because he or she needs to 
compete with many other children for household resources.45 Alternatively, children 
of lower b irth  orders, especially the first child, may be more likely to  die because 
mothers are not experienced in child-bearing or because labor tends to be prolonged 
during the first birth-giving, predisposing to  birth injury and respiratory distress 
syndrome of babies. In addition, the demographic literature finds th a t babies born 
to very young mothers are associated with higher infant mortality (e.g. Da Vanzo et 
al. 1983). If babies born later are more likely to survive irrespective of democracy, 
I will find a spurious association between democracy and infant mortality. To deal 
with this concern, I extract information on birth order and the age of mothers at
43I thank Alwyn Young for sharing the HIV data.
44Note that the estimates are missing for the Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritania because 
the Census Bureau does not consider these countries as generalized epidemics (i.e. HIV is firmly 
established in the general population). I assign a series of zeros to these three countries. The result 
does not essentially change if I drop these three countries from the sample.
45Behrman (1988) finds that parents favor older children in the allocation of nutrients in rural 
India.
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birth  from the DHS surveys. I create dummies for each birth  order from the second 
to  the ninth as well as the tenth or higher w ith the first b irth  as the omitted cate­
gory. For the age of mothers, I create dummies for whether the mother is aged at 
her child birth  in their 20s, in their 30s, or in their 40s with giving birth  under the 
age of 20 as the reference category. Column (6 ) in Table 3.8 reports the result after 
controlling for these dummies. The democracy coefficient becomes slightly smaller 
in absolute terms, suggesting th a t some of the estimated democracy effect captures 
the effect of birth  order and m others’ age. But the size of the coefficient remains 
sizable and statistically significant.
Another potentially confounding factor is fertility. After democratization, the 
government may have launched population control campaign, leading to longer birth 
spacing. The demographic literature finds tha t a child who has a sibling born within 
the preceding two years is associated with higher infant m ortality (e.g. Hobcraft et 
al. 1985). Column (7) of Table 3.8 controls for a dummy equal to  one if the preceding 
birth  interval obtained from the DHS surveys is less than  24 months. Consistent 
with the literature, short birth spacing is associated with higher infant mortality. 
The democracy coefficient, however, remains statistically significant though its size 
becomes slightly smaller. This result indicates th a t the effect of democratization on 
infant m ortality is not totally driven by change in population control policy.
Finally, the estimated effect of democratization in Table 3.5 may simply pick up 
the effect of migration of mothers to places where better health care provision is 
available around the time of democratization. If this is the case, then infant mortal­
ity can fall without any change in public health intervention after democratization. 
To deal with this concern, column (8 ) of Table 3.8 restricts the sample to  babies 
conceived in the surveyed community, by dropping those babies who were born be­
fore one year had passed since their mother migrated to  the surveyed community 
and those babies whose mother does not provide information on her migration .46 
Babies born during the first year since their m other’s migration are dropped be­
cause their survival may be affected by poor antenatal care provision during their
46As the DHS surveys for Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea do not ask any respondent how many 
years she has lived in the surveyed community, these three countries are dropped from the sample.
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m other’s pregnancy at the previous place of residence. For this subsample of babies, 
the democratization coefficient is almost the same as the one in column (5) of Table 
3.5, suggesting th a t the estimated effect of democratization does not pick up the 
effect of migration to places with better health care.
3.3.4 W hat T ype of D em ocracy M atters?
As discussed in section 3 .2 ,1 measure democratization in a specific way. Then I find 
th a t it has reduced infant mortality. However, the measurement of democracy in 
this chapter may be a noisy measure of the exact features of democracy th a t really 
drive infant mortality down.
In section 3.2, I mentioned tha t it is an empirical question whether the replace­
ment of the chief executive is necessary for the introduction of contested elections 
with universal suffrage to  reduce infant mortality. Column (1 ) of Table 3.1 lists the 
year of the introduction of multiparty elections with universal suffrage for execu­
tive office, based on the information I collect. Non-democratized countries except 
Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe also introduced m ultiparty elections in 
the 1990s. To see if the introduction of m ultiparty elections for executive office alone 
is sufficient to reduce infant mortality, I create a dummy variable which is equal to 
one for 13 non-democratized countries after the year of the first m ultiparty election 
in the 1990s listed in column (1) of Table 3.1. Then I estimate equation (3.1) with 
this dummy variable included as an additional regressor. Column (1 ) of Table 3.9 
reports th a t the multiparty election dummy coefficient is not statistically different 
from zero while the democracy coefficient remains significant. The equality of coef­
ficients on these two dummies is rejected a t 5 percent level. This result implies tha t 
the introduction of m ultiparty elections per se does not affect infant mortality. The 
chief executive needs to  be replaced for m ultiparty elections to bite.
On the other hand, the estimated effect of democratization may pick up the 
effect of leadership change per se, irrespective of whether the change is due to  the 
introduction of multiparty elections or not. To deal with this concern, I identify 
seven episodes of non-democratic leadership change in the late 1980s and the early
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Table 3.9: Robustness to Other Dimensions of
(The Dependent Variable: Death before turning the
Democracy 
age of one year)
( i ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Democratization
M ultiparty Elections
Leadership Change
Executive Constraints
Civil Liberty Restriction
Free Press
Partly  Free Press
F-test 
p-value
-0.018**
[0.006]
- 0.002
-0.018**
[0.006]
- 0.002
[0.006]
-0 . 021 * *
[0.006]
-0.019**
[0.006]
-0.015*
[0.007]
0.002
[0 .001]
- 0.001
[0.001]
-0.005
[0.009]
0.000
[0.003]
5.76
0.024
3.85
0.060
Girl YES YES YES YES YES
Multiple birth YES YES YES YES YES
M other FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
TREND YES YES YES YES YES
#  of Countries • 28 28 28 28 28
#  of Mothers 161876 161876 160184 161629 157709
Observations 643846 643846 611866 634011 552397
Adjusted R 2 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.077 0.076
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level Eire reported in brackets. Adjusted R 2 refers to  variation 
expleiined by all regressors, including any fixed effects. The nulls for F-test are: for column (1) coefficients on 
democratization and on multiparty elections are the same; for column (2) coefficients on democratization and on 
leadership change are the same.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
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1990s among the 17 non-democratized countries (see Appendix B for the list of 
such episodes). These changes are either due to  a military coup or to  the death 
or voluntary resignation of a dictator. Then the new chief executives stay in office 
until the end of the sample period. I create a dummy variable which is equal to one 
for years after these seven non-democratic changes in the chief executives. Column
(2 ) additionally controls for this dummy to equation (3.1). It shows th a t non- 
democratic leadership change does not significantly affect infant m ortality while the 
estimate of the democratization effect remains the same. The equality of coefficients 
on these two dummies is rejected at 10 percent level.47 This result indicates tha t 
the estimated effect of democratization does not solely reflect the effect of leadership 
change. The introduction of m ultiparty elections and the replacement of the chief 
executive are complementary in reducing infant mortality.
Columns (3) to  (5) of Table 3.9 check if the estimated effect of introducing 
m ultiparty elections with the replacement of the chief executive captures the effect 
of other features of democracy. Column (3) controls for the degree of executive 
constraints taken from the POLITY IV dataset. This variable takes values from 1 
to  7 with 7 as the highest degree of constraint. The coefficient on this variable is not 
statistically different from zero while the democracy coefficient remains significantly 
negative .48 This result suggests tha t unlike its effect on property rights enforcement 
(North and Weingast 1989; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001), constraints on 
the chief executive do not m atter for infant mortality.
Columns (4) and (5) explore the possibility tha t the measurement of democracy 
in this chapter may capture the degree of human rights protection. Column (4) 
additionally controls for the degree of civil liberty restriction (scaled from 1 to 7) 
taken from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World, an annual survey of political
47The large standard error for the non-democratic leadership change dummy is due to Rwanda: 
infant mortality went up sharply before leadership change in 1994 (see Figure 3.5). If I drop 
Rwanda from the sample, the equality of coefficients on the democracy and leadership change 
dummies is rejected at 1 percent level.
48As the POLITY IV dataset does not measure the degree of executive constraints for year 
2004 and for country-years in which a country is occupied by foreign powers, the central political 
authority collapses, or a country is undergoing the transition of a political regime, about 32,000 
observations are dropped from the sample. Change in the size of the democracy coefficient is 
mainly due to this change in the sample.
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rights and civil liberties since 1972. Column (5) controls for two dummies which are 
equal to  one if press freedom is rated as “Free” and as “Partly  Free” , respectively, as 
oppose to  “Not Free” by Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press, an annual survey of 
press freedom since 1980. Both columns show th a t what m atters for infant m ortality 
is not human rights protection or press freedom but the way in which the chief 
executive of the government is chosen .49
Finally, Table 3.10 provides estimation results when I measure the year of de­
m ocratization based on widely used democracy indicators: the POLITY2 score from 
the POLITY IV dataset and Freedom House’s Political Rights Index. These two 
indicators assign a score (-10 to  10 for the POLITY2 score and 7 to  1 for the Po­
litical Rights Index) for each country-year by aggregating different dimensions of 
democracy .50 An implicit assumption underlying the construction of these democ­
racy indicators is th a t each element of democracy is a substitute for each other. This 
assumption may not hold true depending on which outcome we expect democracy to 
have an impact on. Section 3.2 above, for example, discusses the complementarity of 
contested elections and universal suffrage in relation to public health policy-making.
Columns (2 ) to (7) of Table 3.1 show the list of years of democratization in 
the 1990s by using either of these two democracy indicators with different cut-off 
points . 51 I create a democratization dummy equal to one for years after the year 
of democratization listed in Table 3.1 for each cut-off value of each indicator. As 
both indicators suggest th a t some countries became non-democratic after they were 
democratized in the 1990s, I also create a dummy variable which is equal to  one for 
years after the collapse of democracy in the 1990s, in order to  check if the effect of 
democratization on infant mortality persists even after democracy collapses.
Columns (1 ) to  (6 ) of Table 3.10 show the estimated coefficients on these de­
mocratization dummies for infant mortality. Two main results emerge. First, the
49The smaller size (in absolute terms) of the democracy coefficient in column (5) is due to change 
in the sample. The press freedom variables are not available before 1980.
50Note that Freedom House’s Political Rights Index becomes smaller if a country becomes more 
democratic. The opposite is true for the POLITY2 score.
51 When choosing the cut-off points for the POLITY2 score, I follow the literature: score 0 is 
used by works summarized in Persson and Tabellini (2006); score 4 by Glaeser, Ponzetto, and 
Shleifer (2005). Political scientists often regard a country as democratic if its POLITY2 score is 
seven or higher (e.g. Epstein et al., 2003).
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Table 3.10: Different Measures of Democracy
(The Dependent Variable: Death before turning the age of one year)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7)
Measure of Democracy: P R O P R O PR<5 POLITY2>6 POLITY2>4 POLITY2>0 EXREC>7 
&
PARCOMP>3
Democratization -0.008 -0 .0 1 1 -0 .0 1 1 * -0 .0 1 2 -0 .0 1 1 -0.014** -0.015**
in the 1990s [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Collapse of Democracy -0 .0 2 1 ** -0 .0 2 1 -0.014 -0.025 -0.018 -0.046 -0 .0 2 2
in the 1990s [0.007] [0.013] [0 .0 1 1 ] [0.014] [0.015] [0.026] [0.014]
F-test 6.65 1 .2 1 0.15 1.84 0.36 1.46 0.36
p-value 0.016 0.280 0.701 0.187 0.551 0.238 0.554
Girl YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Multiple birth YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mother FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
TREND YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
#  of Countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
#  of Mothers 161521 161521 161521 161864 161864 161864 161864
Observations 629573 629573 629573 643791 643791 643791 643791
Adjusted R 2 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 - 0.077 0.077
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. In columns (1), (2), and (3), a country-year is regarded as democratic if Freedom House’s Political Rights Index is 
less than 3, 4, or 5, respectively; in columns (4), (5), and (6), a country-year is democratic if POLITY IV’s POLITY2 score is more than 6, 4, or 0, respectively. In column (7), a country-year is 
democratic if POLITY IV’s variable EXREC is 7 or higher and if another POLITY IV variable PARCOMP is 3 or higher. Adjusted R 2 refers to variation explained by all regressors, including 
any fixed effects. The null for F-tests is that coefficients on democratization and the collapse of democracy axe the same.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
democracy coefficient becomes statistically significant only when the cut-off point 
for a country to be democratic is the most generous (5 for the Political Rights In­
dex and 0 for the POLITY2 score). This result suggests th a t the minimal level of 
democracy is sufficient to reduce infant mortality, although what constitutes such 
a minimal level of democracy is unclear due to  the nature of these democracy in­
dicators. Second, the coefficient on the collapse of democracy is negative and not 
statistically different from the democracy coefficient (except for column 1 ). This sec­
ond result may be interpreted in two ways. Health infrastructure and clinics brought 
in place by democratization do not disappear even after the collapse of democracy, 
a t least not so quickly. Another interpretation is th a t the way African countries 
were democratized is different from the way some of them experienced the collapse 
of democracy. If some elements of democracy have an impact on infant mortality but 
others do not, it is natural to  see this asymmetric effect between democratization 
and the collapse of democracy.
Unlike Freedom House, which makes public disaggregated scores of democracy 
only from 2006, the POLITY IV dataset does provide disaggregated indicators of 
democracy for all years available in the dataset, allowing researchers to aggregate 
them in a way th a t is consistent with theory in their mind. I use variables EXREC 
and PARCOMP to construct a democracy dummy th a t is as close as possible to  
the definition of democracy adopted in this chapter. Specifically, a country-year is 
treated as democratic if EXREC is 7 or 8  and if PARCOMP is 3 or higher. The 
first condition roughly corresponds to the requirement of m ultiparty elections for 
executive office while the second is largely consistent with universal suffrage and 
the existence of legal opposition parties .52 Column (8 ) of Table 3.1 lists the years 
of democratization in the 1990s based on the above criteria. It is very similar to 
the years of democratization based on the POLITY2 score being positive though 
it completely ignores the degree of executive constraints, one component of the 
POLITY2 score. I again create a democratization dummy which is equal to one 
for years after these years of democratization as well as the dummy for the collapse
52See Appendix B for more details.
75
of democracy. Column (7) of Table 3.10 reports the estimation result when I use 
these dummies as regressors. The estimated coefficient on the democracy dummy is 
significantly negative, indicating th a t democratization reduces infant m ortality by
1.5 percentage points. The point estimates for the democracy coefficient in columns 
(1) to (6 ) are smaller than this or the one in column (5) of Table 3.5, suggestive of 
attenuation bias due to  measurement error.
3.4 Pathways
Estimation results in the previous section show tha t democratization has reduced 
infant m ortality in sub-Saharan Africa. In this section, I provide some evidence 
on the mechanisms in which democratization has affected the survival of babies. 
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 provides summary statistics for dependent variables used in 
this section.
3.4.1 M aternal H ealth Care
One key mechanism is likely to be improvements in maternal health care provision. 
Recall th a t a sizable portion of the reduction in infant m ortality after democrati­
zation comes from a fall in the probability of death within the first month of life 
(Columns (5) and (6 ) in Table 3.5). The public health literature finds tha t, among 
others, the following two health interventions affect the survival of babies in their 
first month of life: tetanus toxoid injections to pregnant mothers and child delivery 
assistance by skilled health professionals. The injection of tetanus toxoid transfers 
immunity against neonatal tetanus from a mother to her baby in her womb, which 
has proved to be effective (see Demicheli, Barale, and Rivetti (2005) for a comprehen­
sive review on evidence from randomized trials ) . 53 Having a skilled birth  attendant
53In addition to the direct effect of tetanus toxoid injections, Dow, Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin 
(1999) empirically show that, in four sub-Sahara African countries during 1986 to 1994, the birth 
weight of babies born to mothers who received tetanus toxoid is larger than those born to mothers 
who did not. The birth weight is known as a significant predictor of early childhood survival (e.g. 
Da Vanzo et al. 1983; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2007). Dow et al. (1999) argue that this is 
because mothers who received tetanus toxoid injections expect better access to vaccination for her 
child, thus increasing complementary investments in child health during pregnancy.
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Table 3.11: Summary Statistics for Health Inputs
Countries:
(1 )
All
(2) (3)
Democratized 
Before After
(4)
Non­
democratized
Tetanus Toxoid 
(All) 0.700 0.572 0.615 0.764
195564 34196 40053 121315
(Educated) 0.812 0.774 0.754 0.836
98158 15639 17327 65192
(Uneducated) 0.587 0.401 0.510 0.680
97384 18554 22724 56106
Delivery Assistance 
(All) 0.445 0.412 0.436 0.456
231645 32153 54428 145064
(Educated) 0.578 0.621 0.552 0.577
117787 14682 23217 79888
(Uneducated) 0.307 0.235 0.349 0.307
113836 17468 31209 65159
Ever Breastfed
(All) 0.975 0.976 0.977 0.975
228567 31551 53507 143509
(Educated) 0.974 0.976 0.979 0.973
116584 14455 23020 79109
(Uneducated) 0.977 0.977 0.975 0.977
111961 17093 30485 64383
Access to  Toilets 
(AU) 0.049 0.052 0.053 0.047
57111 6539 16054 34518
(Educated) 0.082 0.109 0.095 0.074
29574 2760 7091 19723
(Uneducated) 0.014 0 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 2 0 0 . 0 1 2
27532 3779 8962 14791
Notes: In each cell, the sample mean is reported at the top row; the number of observations at the bottom row. 
Column (2) reports means for children born in democratized countries until the year of democratization; Column 
(3) for children born in democratized countries after the year of democratization; Column (4) for children born in 
non-democratized countries.
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Table 3.12: Summary Statistics for Consumer Durables and Access to  Electricity
Countries:
(1)
All
(2)
Democratized
Before
(3)
After
(4)
Non­
democratized
Radio
(AH) 0.552 0.520 0.573 0.548
57121 6527 16048 34546
(Educated) 0.592 0.605 0.570 0.598
29578 2755 7090 19733
(Uneducated) 0.509 0.458 0.575 0.482
27538 3772 8957 14809
Television
(All) 0.096 0.132 0.099 0.088
57121 6527 16048 34546
(Educated) 0.142 0.220 0.151 0.127
29578 2755 7090 19733
(Uneducated) 0.047 0.067 0.057 0.036
27538 3772 8957 14809
Fridge
(All) 0.052 0.079 0.045 0.051
54084 5702 13851 34531
(Educated) 0.088 0.150 0.091 0.080
27599 2306 5571 19722
(Uneducated) 0.015 0.031 0.014 0.012
26480 3396 8279 14805
Bicycle
(AH) 0.355 0.228 0.388 0.364
57097 6518 16054 34525
(Educated) 0.297 0.195 0.331 0.299
29565 2747 7093 19725
(Uneducated) 0.417 0.252 0.432 0.450
27527 3771 8960 14796
Motorcycle
(All) 0.086 0.119 0.117 0.065
55970 6520 16044 33406
(Educated) 0.065 0.126 0.082 0.049
28637 2747 7086 18804
(Uneducated) 0.109 0.114 0.145 0.086
27328 3773 8957 14598
Car
(AH) 0.035 0.052 0.030 0.034
55037 6518 16032 32487
(Educated) 0.052 0.080 0.045 0.051
28061 2745 7084 18232
(Uneducated) 0.016 0.032 0.018 0.012
26971 3773 8947 14251
Electricity
(All) 0.137 0.208 0.116 0.134
56081 6531 16031 33519
(Educated) 0.206 0.339 0.186 0.195
29018 2759 7086 19173
(Uneducated) 0.063 0.112 0.062 0.052
27058 3772 8944 14342
Notes: See notes for Table 3.11.
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present during labor and delivery ensures clean child delivery and, if necessary, re­
suscitation of newborns. Clean delivery — keeping clean the birth  a ttendan t’s hands 
and instruments to cut the umbilical cord — avoids death from neonatal tetanus, 
and resuscitation prevents death from birth  asphyxia (see B hutta et al. 2005, Table 
2 0 , for a review on available evidence).
The literature also finds th a t more educated mothers are associated with a higher 
probability of receiving these maternal health care services, suggesting th a t the 
valuation of such services is higher for educated mothers than  for uneducated ones .54 
If democratically elected governments lower the cost of health care services, either 
by charging lower fees, by creating more health clinics to reduce the transportation 
cost, or by educating mothers about the benefits of such services, an im pact will be 
larger for uneducated mothers, consistent with earlier findings th a t a fall in neonatal 
m ortality is larger for babies born to uneducated mothers (Column (2 ) of Table 3.7).
To see if maternal health care provision is one key mechanism in which democra­
tization has reduced infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, I construct a repeated 
cross-section sample of live birth  episodes for 19 sub-Sahara African countries where 
the DHS survey was conducted more than once since the late 1980s (see Table 3.3 
for the list of surveys used ) . 55 The DHS survey asks a nationally representative 
sample of women aged 15 to  49 about their live birth episodes during the last few 
(usually five) years. Each respondent provides information on whether she received 
tetanus toxoid injections during pregnancy and on who assisted her child delivery. 
By treating each live birth episode as a single observation, I create the samples of 
235,516 and 285,739 live birth  episodes for tetanus vaccination and delivery assis­
tance, respectively.56 From this I drop live birth episodes for women who are visitors
54See, for example, Akin, Griffin, Guilkey, and Popkin (1986) for a cross-sectional evidence from 
the Philippines.
55Chad and Cote d’Ivoire are dropped from the sample though two rounds of the DHS surveys 
are available, because one of the two surveys for each country lacks information on the migration 
of mothers, making it impossible to match babies and mothers from different rounds of survey by 
region of residence without an error. For the same reason, I do not use Zimbabwe 1994 survey. If 
I include these surveys in the sample by ignoring the lack of information on migration, the result 
does not change substantially.
56I drop Namibia from the sample for tetanus vaccination because its 2000 survey does not ask 
whether the respondent received tetanus toxoid injections, leaving only one round of survey for the 
country. An additional difference in the number of observations between the two samples results
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to  the surveyed community or do not provide information on their migration as well 
as episodes of live b irth  before women of concern migrated to  the surveyed com­
munity. Dropping these observations ensures th a t estim ated change in m aternal 
care provision is not due to m others’ migration to  areas with better health care 
services.57 The resulting sample consists of 198,567 and 232,809 observations (in­
cluding those for which outcome variables are missing) for tetanus vaccination and 
delivery assistance, respectively, with years of live births spanning between 1982 and 
2005 inclusive.
In the estimation of changes in the take-up of m aternal health care services before 
and after democratization, I control for fixed effects of mother categories defined by 
where mothers five (which administrative regions and whether urban or rural areas), 
their level of education (whether they attended a t least prim ary school or did not 
go to school a t all), and their birth  cohort (the year of birth), in order to  make 
this analysis as comparable as possible to  the previous infant m ortality analysis .58 
Specifically, I estimate the following equations:
Vjrct =  &r T  fit “b -(- Sjrcti (^*^)
for tetanus vaccination, and
Vjrct =  ctr -\r Pt +  l D ct + 'K.jrctO + £jrctt (3.4)
for delivery assistance, where j  refers to a live birth  episode, r  refers to  a mother 
category by area-education-cohort (as described above), t  refers to  the year of five 
birth. a r is a mother-category fixed effect and /3t is a birth-year fixed effect. X jrct is 
a dummy variable for multiple birth. Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. The democracy dummy, defined in the same way as in the infant m ortality
from the fact that recent DHS surveys collect information on tetanus toxoid injections only for the 
last live birth while information on delivery assistance is collected for all live births during the 
past few years.
57In addition, observations for Namibia before independence (1990) are dropped for the delivery 
assistance sample.
58For example, I control for a fixed effect for educated mothers, born in 1970, living in urban 
areas of the Ashanti region of Ghana.
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analysis above, is lagged one year for tetanus vaccination because mothers receive 
tetanus toxoid injections during the pregnancy. I control for the multiple birth 
dummy for delivery assistance regression because pregnant women may know they 
will give birth to  twins before delivery and therefore change their valuation for 
delivery assistance .59 Note th a t this analysis does not aim to estimate the causal 
effect of democratization on the take-up of m aternal health care. The objective is to  
find a correlation th a t is consistent with the findings in the infant m ortality analysis.
Table 3.13 shows the estimation results. In columns (1) and (2), I re-estimate 
equation (3.1) for neonatal mortality by restricting the sample to the 19 countries 
where maternal health care information is available. The finding th a t democra­
tization has reduced neonatal mortality, especially for babies born to  uneducated 
mothers, holds for this subsample of countries. In column (3), I estim ate equation 
(3.3). In column (4), I interact -DC)t_i in equation (3.3) with dummies for educated 
and uneducated mothers. Although the take-up for receiving tetanus vaccination 
did not significantly go up on average after democratization, uneducated mothers 
became more likely to  be vaccinated after democratization by 1 0  percentage points 
(significant at 10 percent level), 17 percent of the sample mean for uneducated moth­
ers. Columns (5) and (6 ) report estimation results for delivery assistance. Similarly, 
although the probability of having a skilled birth  attendant present during delivery 
did not increase significantly after democratization on average, uneducated mothers 
became more likely to be attended by health professionals after democratization 
by 7.6 percentage points (significant at 5 percent level), 25 percent of the sample 
mean for uneducated mothers. These results suggest th a t one key mechanism in 
which democratization has reduced neonatal mortality, especially for babies born to  
uneducated mothers, is improvements in m aternal health care provision.
3.4.2 Breastfeeding and Sanitation
Another key mechanism in which democratization has reduced infant m ortality in 
sub-Saharan Africa may be the promotion of breastfeeding. The public health litera-
59I thank Miyuki Horiuchi for pointing this out.
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Table 3.13: Maternal Health Care
(i) (2 ) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
Dependent Variable: Neonatal Neonatal Tetanus Tetanus Delivery Delivery
Death Death Toxoid Toxoid Assistance Assistance
Democratization -0 .0 1 0 ** 0.041 0.049
[0.003] [0.049] [0.032]
Democratization -0.007+ -0.024 0 .0 2 1
interacted with Educated [0.004] [0.036] [0.026]
Democratization -0 .0 1 2 ** 0 .1 0 0 + 0.076*
interacted with Uneducated [0.003] [0.048] [0.034]
Multiple birth 0.164** 0.164** 0.071** 0.071**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
F-test 8.65 17.31 6 . 2 0
p-value 0.009 0 . 0 0 1 0.023
Girl YES YES NO NO NO NO
Mother FE YES YES N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mother category FE N/A N/A YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
TREND YES ' YES NO NO NO NO
#  of Countries 19 19 18 18 19 19
#  of Mothers 118010 118007 N/A N /A N/A N /A
#  of Mother categories N/A N/A 23255 23240 23786 23771
Observations 475995 475986 195564 195542 231645 231623
Adjusted R 2 0.081 0.081 0.237 0.238 0.396 0.396
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are reported in brackets. Neonatal death is death before turning the age of 1 month. Adjusted B? refers to variation explained by 
all the regressors, including any fixed effects. The null for F-tests is that coefficients on the two interaction terms between democratization and mothers’ education level are the same.
+  significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
tu re identifies breastfeeding as being associated with lower infant m ortality through 
the prevention of death from diarrhea and acute respiratory infection (WHO Collab­
orative Study Team 2000; Arifeen et al. 2001) . 60 The effect of promoting breastfeed­
ing on infant mortality is likely to be immediate, compared to  other public health 
interventions. This immediate impact is consistent with the finding th a t infant mor­
tality starts dropping immediately after the year of democratization (Figure 3.6).
The provision of sanitation facilities may also be a mechanism in which democra­
tization has reduced infant mortality. The public health literature finds th a t access 
to  sanitation facilities is associated with a lower child m ortality due to  diarrhea .61 
D eath from diarrhea is estimated to account for 20 percent of under-5 child m ortality 
in sub-Saharan Africa in 1990 (Murray and Lopez 1996, Appendix Table 6 f).
To investigate whether breastfeeding is more likely to  be practiced after democ­
ratization, I use the same repeated cross-sectional sample of live births episodes as 
the one used for delivery assistance. The DHS surveys ask the respondent if she ever 
breastfed each of her children born during the last few years. From this informa­
tion, I construct a dummy variable equal to one if the mother ever breast-feeds her 
baby. To assess whether sanitary conditions for infants are improved after democ­
ratization, I create a repeated cross-sectional sample of babies born within the past 
one year before the DHS survey was conducted, including those who died before 
the survey, and match each baby with information on their household’s access to 
toilets .62 The original sample includes 66,244 babies in total. From this, I drop the 
following observations: babies whose mother is a visitor to  the surveyed community; 
babies born within the first 1 2  months after their mother moved to the surveyed 
community; and babies whose mother does not provide information on how many
60According to Murray and Lopez (1996, Appendix Table 6f), diarrhea and lower respiratory 
infections accounted for 38 percent of 4.03 million deaths of children under 5 years old in sub- 
Saharan Africa in 1990.
61See Esrey et al. (1991) for a survey of available evidence.
62By “toilets” I mean the term “flush toilets” in the DHS surveys. According to a commentary on 
the DHS model questionnaire (Institute for Resource Development and Macro International 1990, p. 
6), the term flush toilet is defined as “a facility where the toilet is separated from the refuse disposal 
system by a water seal.” This definition of flush toilet “does not distinguish between whether the 
water seal is maintained by water dumped from a bucket or a plumbing system or whether the 
disposal system is a pit, septic tank or public sewer system.” To avoid the misinterpretation of the 
term flush toilet, I use the word “toilets” in this chapter instead.
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years she has lived in the surveyed community. Dropping these observations ensures 
th a t estimation results reflect change in public health service delivery in the same 
place over time. The final sample consists of 57,634 observations (including those 
for which information on access to toilets is missing) with survey years spanning 
between 1987 and 2004 inclusive.
For breastfeeding, equation (3.4) is estimated with X jrct including not only the 
multiple birth  dummy but also the girl dummy, because mothers may change their 
breastfeeding practice depending on the sex of their babies. For access to toilets, I 
estimate the following equation:
Vires — a r +  Ps +  7  ^ cs  +  £ircst (3.5)
where i refers to babies born within one year before the survey date, r  refers to 
mother categories by area-education-cohort (as described above), and s refers to 
five-year spells (1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04) in which the DHS survey was 
conducted. a r is a mother-category fixed effect and (3S is a five-year period fixed effect 
(the DHS survey is usually conducted every fifth year with the exact year of survey 
different from country to  country). The democracy dummy, D cs, is set to be one if 
country c is democratized before the DHS survey was conducted during spell s . 63 As 
each country has conducted at most four surveys, the standard errors are clustered 
at the country-year level because its underestimation due to  serial correlations in 
the error term is likely to be negligible. Again note th a t these regressions do not 
intend to  establish the causal effect of democratization on outcome variables. The 
aim is to  see if there is a correlation between democratization and improvements 
in health inputs th a t is consistent with the finding th a t democratization has an 
negative impact on infant mortality.
Table 3.14 shows estimation results. Columns (1 ) and (2 ) re-estimate equation 
(3.1) for infant mortality for the subsample of the 19 countries with more than  one
63 Consequently, for example, D cs is zero for Niger during 1990-94 even though its year of de­
mocratization (1993) falls into the same five-year spell, because the DHS survey was conducted in 
1992.
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DHS surveys conducted. They show th a t the main results hold for this subsample. 
Column (3) estimates equation (3.4) with the breastfeeding dummy as the depen­
dent variable. The probability th a t a mother ever breast-feeds her child goes up 
by 1.1 percentage points after democratization (significant a t 5 percent level). The 
magnitude of this change is not very large, however, because the sample mean prob­
ability of breastfeeding is 97.5 percent. Therefore, the promotion of breastfeeding 
alone does not seem to explain the whole immediate effect of democratization on 
infant mortality found in Figure 3.6. It may be th a t other health practices beneficial 
for the survival of babies are also promoted along with breastfeeding. Column (5) 
reports the result for access to  toilets. After democratization, the probability tha t 
an infant’s household has access to toilets goes up by 1.6 percentage points (signif­
icant at 5 percent). The size of this increase is large relative to  the sample mean 
access rate of 4.9 percent. Columns (4) and (6) show th a t the size of changes in 
breastfeeding practice and access to toilets is not significantly larger for uneducated 
mothers than for educated mothers. For access to toilets, however, this result can 
be still consistent with the larger reduction in infant m ortality for babies born to 
uneducated mothers because there is some evidence th a t m aternal education and 
sanitary facilities are substitutes: Using data  collected in Malaysia in the 1970s, 
Esrey and Habicht (1988) report th a t the effect of having toilets on a reduction in 
infant mortality is larger for illiterate mothers.64
3.4.3 Affluence
Finally, I provide evidence th a t the effect of democratization on infant mortality is 
unlikely to be due to  an increase in affluence of mothers. Using the repeated cross- 
sectional sample of infants used for estimating changes in access to  toilets, I check
64Barrera (1990) finds an opposite result for child’s height for age: the effects of maternal 
education and toilet facilities are complementary. Looking at the result (Table 4, column 5) 
carefully, however, the type of toilet facilities and its interaction with maternal education does not 
enter significantly for height for age of children aged under 2 years — the most relevant health 
outcome to my analysis. The reason for this is probably because the absence of excreta and its 
interaction with maternal education are included as regressors. Coefficients on these two variables 
show that sanitation and maternal education are substitutes, a result in line with Esrey and Habicht 
(1988).
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Table 3.14: Breastfeeding and Sanitation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Infant Infant Ever Ever Access to Access to
Death Death Breastfed Breastfed Toilets Toilets
Democratization -0.020* 0.011* 0.016*
[0.007] [0.004] [0.007]
Democratization -0.012 0.009 0.022
interacted with Educated [0.008] [0.006] [0.015]
Democratization -0.025* 0.012* 0.013*
interacted with Uneducated [0.009] [0.005] [0.005]
Girl -0.014** -0.014** 0.005** 0.004**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Multiple birth 0.229** 0.229** -0.067** -0.067**
[0.013] [0.013] [0.006] [0.006]
F-test 5.90 0.08 0.42
p-value 0.026 0.776 0.519
Mother FE YES YES N/A N /A N/A N/A
Mother category FE N /A N/A YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES NO NO
5-year period FE NO NO NO NO YES YES
TREND YES YES NO NO NO NO
#  of Clusters 19 19 19 19 50 50
#  of Mothers 118010 118007 N/A N/A N/A N/A
#  of Mother categories N/A N/A 23730 23715 16212 16207
Observations 475995 475986 228567 228545 57111 57106
Adjusted R 2 0.077 0.077 0.035 0.035 0.402 0.402
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level (columns (1) to (4)) or at the country-year level (columns (5) and (6)) are reported in brackets, Infant death is death before turning 
the age of 1 year. The number of clusters refers to the number of countries in columns (1) to (4) and to the number of country-year cells in columns (5) and (6). Adjusted R 2 refers to variation 
explained by all the regressors, including any fixed effects. The null for F-tests is that coefficients on the two interaction terms between democratization and mothers’ education level are the 
same.
4- significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
if an infant’s household is more likely to  own either of the six consumer durables 
(radio, television, refrigerator, bicycle, motorcycle, and car) or to have access to  
electricity after democratization.
Table 3.15 reports results from estimating equation (3.5) with dummies for own­
ing each of the consumer durables or having access to  electricity as the dependent 
variables. Columns (1) to  (6) show th a t there is no evidence tha t an infant’s house­
hold is more likely to  own any of the six consumer durables after democratization 
than  before. If anything, an infant who was born to an uneducated mother is less 
likely to live in a household with a television set and a refrigerator after democrati­
zation (columns (2) and (3) of panel B). If the ownership of a television set and a 
refrigerator signifies affluence, uneducated mothers have got poorer since democra­
tization. If infant m ortality is primarily determined by affluence, this finding cannot 
explain the earlier result tha t babies born to uneducated mothers are more likely to 
survive after democratization. This result also suggests th a t the estimated increases 
in access to  toilets and in the take-up of m aternal health care services by unedu­
cated mothers after democratization are unlikely to  be a result from an increase in 
affluence. Column (7) reports tha t there is no change in access to electricity be­
fore and after democratization, suggesting th a t democratically elected governments 
prioritized public health interventions over the electrification of households.
3.5 Conclusions
By comparing babies born to the same mother before and after democratization, I 
find tha t democratization has reduced infant mortality in sub-Saharan Africa. Var­
ious pieces of evidence, taken together, may suggest the following story. After a 
new chief executive assumes office by winning contested elections under universal 
suffrage, the government immediately starts promoting practices beneficial for the 
survival of babies, including breastfeeding. Infant mortality starts dropping. The 
government also makes m aternal health care more accessible. Uneducated women 
start using it, resulting in a reduction in neonatal mortality, especially for babies
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Table 3.15: Impact of Democratization on Asset Ownership and Access to Electricity
Dependent variable:
(i)
Radio
(2)
Television
(3)
Refrigerator
(4)
Bicycle
(5)
Motorcycle
(6)
Car
(7)
Electricity
P anel A
Democratization -0.027 -0.019 0.002 -0.010 -0.006 0.001 0.004
[0.022] [0.014] [0.009] [0.030] [0.008] [0.005] [0.018]
Mother category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
5-year period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
#  of Clusters 50 50 48 50 49 48 48
#  of Mother categories 16214 16214 14933 16206 16185 15866 15903
Observations 57121 57121 54084 57097 55970 55037 56081
Adjusted R 2 0.148 0.352 0.313 0.292 0.193 0.156 0.520
Panel B
Democratization interacted with 
Educated -0.031 0.005 0.030 -0.004 0.001 0.008 0.006
[0.025] [0.024] [0.029] [0.033] [0.011] [0.010] [0.023]
Uneducated -0.025 -0.033** -0.013* -0.0130 -0.010 -0.004 0.003
[0.023] [0.012] [0.006] [0.034] [0.010] [0.004] [0.019]
F-test 0.08 3.31 2.08 0.09 0.50 1.96 0.02
p-value 0.773 0.075 0.156 0.771 0.482 0.168 0.887
Mother category FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
5-year period FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
#  of Clusters 50 50 48 50 49 48 48
#  of Mother categories 16209 16209 14928 16201 16180 15861 15898
Observations 57116 57116 54079 57092 55965 55032 56076
Adjusted Ft? 0.148 0.353 0.313 0.292 0.193 0.157 0.520
Notes-. Reported in brackets are standard errors clustered at the country-year level. Panels A and B correspond to different regressions for each column. Mothers are categorized by administrative 
regions of residence, urban/rural areas of residence, education level, and age cohort to control for mother-category fixed effects. 5-year period fixed effects are those for 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, 
and 2000-04. The number of clusters refers to the number of country-year cells. Adjusted R 2 refers to variation explained by all regressors, including any fixed effects. The null for F-test in 
Panel B is that coefficients on the two interaction terms between democratization and mothers’ education level are the same.
+  significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
born to  uneducated mothers. Finally, the government starts investing in the pro­
vision of better sanitation facilities. Its effect materializes a couple of years after 
democratization, pushing infant m ortality further down.
In this paper I focus on the post-Cold War democratization in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Future research needs to  look a t whether democratization during the Cold 
War period had a difference consequence.
These empirical findings convey a powerful message: democratization may be an 
im portant means to improve the quality of government and to  promote development 
in some of the poorest countries in the world. To corroborate this implication, future 
empirical research needs to examine other outcomes and other developing regions. 
These studies will benefit from exploiting cross-country individual-level panel data  
on outcomes as this chapter does. Otherwise we cannot disentangle the effect of 
democracy from country-level confounding factors.
More generally, the use of micro panel da ta  can also be applied to estimate 
the effects on development of other national political institutions and country-wide 
political events, including decolonization and leadership change under dictatorship. 
Such studies promise to be a fruitful direction of empirical research in the political 
economy of development.
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Chapter 4
Making Autocracy Work
co-authored with Timothy Besley
4.1 Introduction
One of the goals of political economy is to  understand how institutional arrange­
ments shape policy outcomes and human well-being. A large literature has now 
emerged which studies aspects of this. For the most part this has concentrated 
on studying democratic institutions where elections are the main institution th a t 
shapes policy choices. However, throughout most of human history, elections have 
served a fairly modest role. Far more common are systems based on coercive power 
-  such as monarchies, military dictatorships or one party  rule where elections are 
either a veil or non-existent.
Recent history has seen a significant move towards open and free elections as 
a means of determining who should hold power. The case for such institutional 
arrangements is partly based on liberal values th a t emphasize the political freedoms 
tha t such institutions embody. Indeed, this intrinsic case for democracy, emphasized 
by Sen (1999), would stand regardless of whether it delivered concrete policy benefits 
to  its citizens. But the case for democracy would be cemented further if there were 
demonstrable benefits in terms of outcomes.
A key observation which motivates this chapter is th a t autocratic government is
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not always a disaster in economic terms. Indeed, throughout history there has been 
growth and development in autocratic systems of government. For example, the 
British industrial revolution predates the introduction of free and fair elections with 
mass participation. Modern China is also a case in point w ith a spectacular growth 
performance in a non-democratic setting. W hether these observations damage the 
instrum ental case for democracy is moot. After all, it is the counter-factual tha t 
m atters -  growth and development might have preceded a t a greater pace were 
democracy present. But it is equally clear th a t whether one looks at democracy or 
autocracy there is a great deal of heterogeneity in their performance th a t cries out 
for explanation.
This fact is illustrated in Figure 4.1, which shows estim ated density functions for 
real GDP per capita growth rates among autocratic and democratic regimes tha t 
lasted five full calendar years or longer. 1 A “regime” is defined as a period in which 
authority characteristics of a country stay the same, according to  the POLITY IV 
data  set . 2 Regimes are democratic if the Polity score is positive, and autocratic if 
it is non-positive .3 The striking fact th a t we will explore in more detail is th a t the 
distribution of autocracies has fatter tails—there are more very good autocracies 
and more very bad autocracies compared to  democracies.4
The key challenge for students of political economy is to extract lessons from 
historical and contemporary experience about what makes government work in the 
general interest of its citizens. There is very'little doubt th a t building infrastructure, 
managing macro-economic policy, facilitating private trade and investment and pro­
tecting the vulnerable are all facilitated by effective government. In this chapter, 
we will focus somewhat narrowly on the issue of why autocracy can sometimes be 
successful. This project is not intended as a defense of autocracy, but as means
1The density functions are estimated by using the Gaussian kernel and the bandwidth that 
minimizes the mean integrated squared error. Including regimes that lasted less than five years 
does not change the distributions substantially except for the inclusion of democratic regimes that 
existed less than 3 years, which tend to perform very badly (growth rates less than -1 percent).
2Section 4.4 provides details.
3The shapes of the two estimated density functions are similar if we define a democratic regime 
as its Polity score being more than 5, as Fearon (2006) does.
4Rodrik (1997, 2000), Almeida and Ferreira (2002), and Glaeser et al. (2004, Table 8 ) make 
similar observations although the unit of observation in their analysis is a country rather than a 
regime.
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of gaining further insights into the institutional basis of good government. It also 
contributes to broader discussion about the differences in policy and performance 
between democracies and autocracies.
The main focus of the chapter is on the institutions th a t make government ac­
countable -  specifically finding a means of removing poorly-performing leaders from 
office. Democracies organize this through regularized contests for power in elec­
tions. However, the means of achieving accountability are more murky in autocratic 
settings. The analysis emphasizes accountability from a “selectorate” comprising 
insiders who have the ability to depose a leader .5 We show th a t autocratic govern­
ment works well when the power of the selectorate does not depend on the existing 
leader remaining in office. The framework can be used to contrast the performance 
of autocracy and democracy in term s of accountability of leaders.
We then turn  to identifying successful autocracies empirically. We look at a vari­
ety of methods and use these to  pick out regimes th a t are robustly high performers. 
This sample of regimes provides a structured basis for some case study analysis. It 
also enables us to look statistically a t the patterns of successful autocracies across 
countries. We then examine the idea th a t successful autocracies are able to  generate 
accountability mechanisms in the absence of open contests for power.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
review some of the voluminous literature on autocracy and democracy by both 
economists and political scientists to  set our chapter in context. Section 4.3 develops 
the model. In section 4.4, we look empirically at successful autocracies and how far 
their incidence can be explained. Section 4.5 explores links between the theory 
and the characteristics of successful autocracies. Section 4.6 offers some concluding 
remarks.
5The term “selectorate” is borrowed from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
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4.2 Background
The background to  this chapter is a large body of studies on the way in which 
government and the economy interact. The key question for this research program 
known as political economy (or sometimes political economics) is to  understand how 
policy choices are shaped by institutions. One im portant institutional category is 
whether a country’s political institutions are deemed to be democratic. While the 
effect of democratic institutions on policy choices has been studied for a long time, 
there has been a surge in interest among economists in recent years.
W hether the analysis is theoretical or empirical, a precondition for investigat­
ing whether democracy or autocracy m atters is to find some way of characterizing 
their differences. From a theoretical point of view, a lot of attention has been paid 
to whether a country uses elections to  determine who governs. The literature fo­
cuses on two main roles of elections: determining the pattern  of representation (i.e. 
which groups of citizens hold political power) and holding politicians to account (i.e. 
whether the incumbents are punished for bad policy).
The influential work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) takes the first view, 
focusing on who controls political office and modeling autocracy as a dictatorship 
of the rich and democracy as a dictatorship of the poor or middle classes. As a 
result, income redistribution is greater under democracy compared to  dictatorship. 
The second perspective is taken in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2002, 2003) who 
are the first to model accountability in a framework applicable to  non-democratic 
government. In their theory, given the total amount of government expenditures, 
the larger is the selectorate whose support is required for the government to  stay in 
power, the higher the level of public goods provided by the government. Elections 
imply tha t the government requires the support from a large number of citizens 
to stay in power. Hence, democracy increases public goods provision. We follow 
them in putting weight on the role of the selectorate in shaping policy incentives. 
However, our theory gives greater emphasis to the interplay of accountability and 
representation issues in making government work.
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Elections are conducted differently depending on who can vote, who is eligible 
to stand and whether there is open access to  institutions like the media. The widely 
used Polity data  base provides a more continuous measure of democracy in several 
categories: how competitive and open the recruitment of chief executives is; to what 
extent the chief executive is constrained institutionally; and how competitive and 
regulated political participation is. These continuous measures are then aggregated 
into the single Polity score, measuring the degree of democracy .6 I t is common­
place to  use this Polity score to create a discrete cutoff between democracies and 
autocracies. For example, Persson and Tabellini (2006a, 2007) use a cutoff of zero 
with democracies being those with a positive Polity score. However, Fearon (2006) 
prefers a cutoff of five. Since discrete transformations of continuous data  series are 
always somewhat arbitrary, it is im portant to  test the robustness of specific empirical 
results to  alternative definitions.7
While elections are a central institution in democracies, there are other impor­
tan t institutions. One of the indicators in the Polity data  set is concerned with the 
checks and balances on a leader. The executive constraints variable “refers to  the 
extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief exec­
utives” (Marshall and Jaggers 2005, p.23). The political economy literature has so 
far focused on the role of executive constraints in conflict of interest between policy­
makers and citizens (e.g. property rights enforcement against government expropri­
ation) and used the executive constraints variable in th a t context (e.g. Acemoglu 
and Johnson 2005, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005). However, it could also 
affect how distributional issues are resolved among citizens.
Mindful of the importance of institutional variation in democracies, Persson 
and Tabellini (2000, 2003) have explored how institutional variations m atter within 
democracies. The main differences th a t they focus on are parliamentary versus pres­
idential forms of government and proportional representation versus m ajoritarian 
electoral rules. They explore theoretical differences between these regimes in terms
6See Marshall and Jaggers (2005) for more detail.
7See Munck and Verkuilen (2002) for a critical comparison on different democracy datasets 
including the Polity data base.
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of representation and accountability. They also show th a t policies differ across forms 
of democracy empirically.
The early theoretical political economy literature on autocracy attem pts to  ex­
plain different economic performances among autocracies in a model in which an 
autocrat maximizes his private consumption subject to the probability of staying in 
power. One recurring theme in this literature is what is known as the “stationary 
bandits” theory of dictatorship, first formalized by McGuire and Olson (1996).8 The 
theory argues th a t if a dictator expects to stay in power for a long period of time, 
he has an incentive to promote economic development because he will then increase 
his private consumption through increased tax  revenues resulting from economic 
growth. This mechanism has been incorporated into some subsequent studies of au­
tocracy .9 Our theory does not incorporate the stationary bandits theory in a strict 
sense; the dictator in our model has no private gain from choosing welfare-enhancing 
policies per se. However, successful autocracies emerge in our model if the ruling 
group of citizens are secure in power. In this sense, we incorporate one feature of 
the stationary bandits theory—the importance of political stability.
One contentious issue in this literature is how welfare-enhancing policies affect 
the probability of a dictator’s survival. Grossman and Noh (1994) and Overland 
et al. (2005) assume tha t a d ictator’s survival is more likely if he adopts welfare- 
enhancing policies. Grossman and Noh (1994) additionally assume th a t the proba­
bility of survival depends on non-economic factors, arguing th a t successful autocra­
cies are those whose survival does not depend significantly on non-economic factors. 
Overland et al. (2005) propose th a t the dictator’s survival chance increases with the 
level of capital accumulation (and therefore depends on growth-enhancing policies). 
As a result, autocracies with a low level of initial capital do not perform well because 
the dictator will be removed anyway, failing to reap the benefit from increased tax
8See also section VI of Barro (1990).
9Examples include Overland, Simons, and Spagat (2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a), 
as discussed below. What Acemoglu (2006) calls “revenue extraction” corresponds to this mecha­
nism. Paltseva (2006) incorporates the stationary bandit theory into the theory of democratization. 
Azam, Bates, and Biais (2005) argue that autocrats may refrain from predation to build up their 
reputation as benevolent so that the gain from predation in the future will be larger due to in­
creased economic productivity. Caselli (2006) uses this mechanism to explain the natural resource 
curse.
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revenues through economic growth. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006a) assume that 
welfare-enhancing policies directly reduce the dictator’s survival prospects while 
they also increase the survival chance through competition for power with a chal­
lenger. Consequently, successful autocrats are either those who are secure enough 
(so th a t the stationary bandits theory applies) or those who face tough competition 
from a challenger. In the intermediate level of survival chance, autocrats fail to  
adopt welfare-enhancing policies because such policies increase the chance th a t the 
autocrat is overthrown.
Our theoretical model will show th a t whether welfare-enhancing policies increase 
the probability of a dictator’s survival depends on the institutional features of au­
tocracy. Autocracy with a strong selectorate as modeled here has some features 
in common with the notion of a “consensually strong state” of Acemoglu (2005). 
We emphasize the role of institutions th a t organize accountability of leaders in the 
absence of elections.
The political economy literature on autocracy discussed so far fails to  explain 
why poorly-performing autocrats can stay in power for a long period of time (e.g. 
M obutu in former Zaire). Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) develop such a 
theory, arguing th a t autocrats can exacerbate the collective action problem involved 
in the ousting of leaders, by bribing loyalists and punishing coup plotters. This 
implies th a t autocracy performs poorly if natural resource abundance or foreign aid 
provision allows dictators to buy off the pivotal group of people. Padro-i-Miquel
(2006) offers an alternative explanation, assuming th a t only the ruling group of cit­
izens can replace the leader and th a t once the leader is replaced, there is a chance 
for citizens outside the ruling group to seize power. Consequently, autocrats ex­
propriate citizens outside the ruling group, and the ruling group cannot replace 
poorly-performing autocrats for fear of losing power and being expropriated under 
new leadership. Our theoretical model below assumes away the collective action 
problem in leadership replacement, but incorporates Padro-i-Miquel (2006)’s insight 
and therefore derives an equilibrium in which poorly-performing autocrats never­
theless stay in power.
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While the above studies trea t autocracy as a unitary form of government, more 
recent studies have focused on the internal organization of autocracy. Egorov and 
Sonin (2006) and Debs (2007) explore the incentive for an autocrat to keep incom­
petent cabinet ministers in his government while Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 
(2007) examine why rich people in autocratic regimes may want to support a bloated 
bureaucracy. Myerson (2006) and Svolik (2006) investigate under what condition 
an autocrat seeks support from members of the political elite instead of establishing 
personal rule. Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2006) examine an au tocrat’s incentive to  
restrict media freedom. These studies all try  to  endogenize autocratic institutions . 10
More sociological approaches in political science have long been aware of institu­
tional heterogeneity among autocracies . 11 However, these are not easily translated 
into the kind of empirical differences which can be used for statistical analysis. 
Moreover, they are poorly tied into the kinds of theoretical categories th a t shape 
policy incentives which can inform measurement. 12
The literature on the “developmental state” (Deyo 1987, Amsden 1989, Haggard 
1990, Wade 1990, Evans 1995) can also be seen as focusing on autocratic institu­
tions which are successful in achieving economic growth. These studies identify two 
seemingly contradictory institutional features as key for understanding economic 
success: autonomy of the state and constraints th a t prevent predatory behavior of 
the state. Our theory may explain why these two features of the developmental 
sta te  can coexist in autocracy: the state is autonomous only from opposition groups
10One study close to our model in spirit is Egorov and Sonin (2005), which study how the types 
of autocracy (hereditary versus non-hereditary) affect the mode of leadership succession. Wintrobe 
(1990, 1998) is an early attempt of formal modeling to compare different types of autocracy. Dixit 
(2006) investigates how the type of an autocrat (benevolent or predatory) affects how public goods 
are provided.
11 This political sociology literature has produced a wide array of terminology to classify auto­
cratic regimes. Examples include totalitarianism (Linz 2000), one-party systems (Huntington and 
Moore 1970), bureaucratic authoritarianism (O’Donnell 1979), sultanistic regimes (Chehabi and 
Linz 1998), neopatrimonialism (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, chapter 2), the rentier state (Be- 
blawi and Luciani 1987), and, perhaps most recently, competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and 
Way 2002). Geddes (1999) classifies autocracies into personal, military, and single-party rules to 
investigate how the type of autocracy affects its duration and the way it terminates. Haber (2006) 
attempts to bridge the gap between this political sociology literature and the political economy 
approach by classifying autocracies into three types according to the way dictators stay in power: 
terror, cooptation, and organizational proliferation.
12 An exception is Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), who try to find the determinants of institutional 
choices in autocracy by linking a theory of autocracy to data.
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while the ruling group disciplines the state to  avoid it from becoming predatory.
There is a growing empirical literature asking whether democracy or autocracy 
is superior in term s of economic outcomes. The evidence th a t democracy promotes 
prosperity is neither strong nor robust. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) review 
early empirical research on the effect of democracy on economic growth, concluding 
th a t the correlation is weak and not robust. Persson and Tabellini (2006a) try  a 
novel econometric approach finding some support for the proposition th a t persistent 
democracy is associated with improvements in economic performance. Papaioannou 
and Siourounis (2005) and Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) find th a t democratization 
is associated with subsequent growth. Jones and Olken (2005) find tha t economic 
growth rates change significantly when autocratic leaders are unexpectedly removed 
from office while such changes are less clear under democracy. Persson and Tabellini
(2007) find evidence of heterogeneity with transitions out of democracy being dam­
aging to growth, while transitions into democracy out of autocracy are less clearly 
marked by improved growth performance.
Which aspects of policy making and human well-being are promoted by democ­
racies is also a  subject of debate. For example, Mulligan et al. (2004) find few 
cross-country differences between socio-economic policies enacted in democracies 
and autocracies. On the other hand, Persson (2005) finds tha t, conditional on 
country fixed effects, democracy with a parliamentary system of government or a 
proportional representation electoral system enacts more open trade policy than 
autocracies. In Chapter 2  of this thesis, we find th a t there is a strong and robust 
cross-country correlation between democracy and life expectancy while this corre­
lation is not very robust to controlling for country fixed effects. Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, in turn, finds th a t the mortality of infants bom  to the same mother drops 
after dem ocratization in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s.
P retty  much all prior empirical efforts to  contrast the performance of democracy
and autocracy trea t the la tter as a homogeneous institution . 13 But, as we have seen,
13An important exception is Gandhi (2003a,b), who finds that autocracies with legislatures 
and/or political parties, compared to those without, have better economic performance, more 
spending on education and less on the military. The finding that a certain degree of institution­
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heterogeneity in the working of autocratic institutional arrangements comes out of 
a broad range of theoretical treatm ents. A key aim of this essay is to  explore one 
dimension of this.
4.3 The M odel
We lay out a simple agency model of autocracy which studies the incentives of an 
incumbent policy maker to implement a costly action th a t yields benefits to all 
citizens. It differs from a standard model of democracy as in Besley (2006, chapter 
3) in th a t there is no regularized contest for public office. We begin by assuming 
th a t such contests only arise when the ruling group replaces its leader. We will show 
th a t this institutional feature can lead to  autocracy working in the interests of all 
citizens (section 4.3.1). After discussing the robustness of our results (section 4.3.2), 
we compare the outcome of this model with a stylized representation of democracy 
where power is contested regularly (section 4.3.3).
The world comprises N  citizens each of whom belongs to  either group A  or B.  
Group A  comprises a fraction (3 of the population. There are two time periods 
denoted by £ G {1,2}. In each period, there is a policy maker in office who is a 
member of one of the two groups of citizens. W ithout loss of generality, we assume 
th a t the period one policy maker is from group A .14
The policy maker in office in period t  makes two policy decisions. The first is a 
discrete “general interest” policy denoted by {0,1}. This could be thought of as 
a wealth creation decision for the citizens which requires the policy maker to  forgo 
private benefits such as bribery by a special interest. The payoff to  citizens and the 
policy maker from this policy depends on a state of the world, st G {0,1}, which 
is only observed by the policy maker. Each state occurs with equal probability. 
Citizens and the policy maker receive a payoff A if et =  st and zero otherwise.
The second policy decision is purely distributive. This divides an exogenous
alization of autocracy yields better development policies and outcomes is broadly consistent with 
our theory.
14Whether group A  is in the majority does not affect our analysis.
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revenue of size T  between the groups. Let a j t G [a, a] denote the fraction of this 
revenue allocated to  group J  G {A, B } in period t. In the most extreme case 
u — 1 and g_ =  0. However, institutionalized checks and balances may limit this 
possibility.
As well as having a group identity, each policy maker is either good or bad. This 
is not observed by the citizens. Let ir be the probability th a t a randomly picked 
individual from either group is good . 15 Both types of policy makers receive A as 
a citizen if they choose e* =  s t . However, a good policy maker gets the payoff of 
0 by choosing et ^  st . We think of this as having a moral stance so th a t they 
get no utility from earning rents. Hence, a good politician will always act in the 
interests of all citizens on the general interest issue. A bad politician gets a private 
benefit of r  from picking et ^  st , where r is drawn independently each period 
from a distribution whose cumulative distribution function is G (r ) with E (r ) =  fi, 
G( A) =  0, and G (r ) ^  0 for /* . Denote the realized value of the rent available
in period t by rt .
A fraction of the citizens in each group is enfranchised, i.e. are endowed with the 
power to influence the choice of policy maker when there is a contest for power. Let 
n < N  be the total number of enfranchised citizens, of which a fraction (f> belongs 
to group A. Enfranchised citizens from the ruling group (A) decide whether to  
retain the incumbent as the policy maker for period two. If they so choose, then the 
incumbent remains in power. However, if group A ’s enfranchised citizens decide to  
replace the incumbent, there is an “open” contest between two candidates, one from 
group A  and the other from group B.  Following Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), 
we refer to group A s enfranchised citizens as the selectorate.17
15We require that 7r > 0. However, n  could be very small and many people plainly believe that 
it is in many practical settings. The key issue, however, is that the possibility of a good policy 
maker existing creates a role for signaling.
16We could think of r as embezzling public funds that are supposed to be spent on public goods 
provision. Making A the lower bound on rents guarantees that it is never possible to motivate a 
bad policy maker to act in the general interest on the basis of his personal payoff at the current 
period only.
17As we assume the same preference among citizens of each group, we do not allow a faction 
from the selectorate to join with the opposition to topple the regime. This possibility is interesting 
as a power struggle within the ruling elite in an autocracy is often cited as a force leading to 
democratization (see O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
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Suppose th a t in the event of an open contest, group A ’s candidate has the support 
of a fraction k  of the enfranchised citizens. We allow for a uniformly distributed 
shock to the popularity of group B ’s candidate to  affect the outcome which we 
denote by rj E [— | ,  |]  . The group A  candidate then wins if
k  >  ( 1  — k ) +  rj.
Then the probability th a t a candidate from group A  wins the contest, denoted by 
7  («), is:
7  (k) = <
1 if « >  |
2 k  — |  otherwise 
0  if k  <  | .
This model conveniently nests the standard probabilistic voting model of democracy 
in which all citizens are enfranchised and each citizen has one vote. Then if all 
citizens vote along group identity lines, the probability th a t group A  wins is 7  (/3) . 18
In an autocratic world, not all citizens are enfranchised (e.g. as in South Africa 
during apartheid), in which case k  = <f) if all enfranchised citizens support their 
own group’s candidate. We also allow for group B ’s enfranchised citizens being 
repressed by being denied access to  polling stations or because group A  monopolizes 
coercive forces. We represent this simply by a repression param eter ( v  > 1) with 
k = v(f>/(v(f) + (1 — <f>)) > 4>• If most enfranchised citizens are from group A  (a large 
<f)) or if there is strong repression (large enough u), then 7  ( k )  =  1 , i.e. group A  
is certain to hold onto power in the second period. This represents the case of an 
effectively institutionalized autocracy along the lines of (say) modern day China.
Finally, if the period one policy maker is removed from office, he receives a period 
two payoff as a citizen from group A.
The timing of the game is as follows:
18The purpose of making the contest outcome probabilistic is to allow the probability of group 
A ’s candidate winning to be between 0 and 1 even if the size of support for candidate A  exceeds 
that for B.  With a finite number of citizens in our model, group 4^’s winning probability can be a 
step function of k . This does not affect our analysis because k  only changes discretely in response 
to the period one policies in our model (see below).
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1. N ature determines ( s i , r i )  and whether the period one policy maker is good 
or bad. These are private information to the policy maker.
2. The policy maker picks (ctai, ^ b i , ^ i ) and period one payoffs are realized.
3. Members of the selectorate decide whether to  retain the policy maker.
4. If the policy maker is removed from office, then nature determines whether two 
candidates in an open contest are good or bad. An open contest then ensues 
in which enfranchised citizens of groups A  and B  decide which candidate to 
support. The group A  candidate wins with probability 7  (k).
5. Nature determines (s2 , r 2).
6 . The period two policy maker chooses (cr^, <tb2, e2) and period two payoffs are 
realized.
A key feature of the model is th a t there is a contest for power only if the se­
lectorate of group A  chooses to replace the current leader. It is the absence of a 
guaranteed contest at the end of period one th a t characterizes autocracy in the 
model. Below, we contrast this with a situation where there is an election at the 
end of period one as in the standard agency model of democracy.
4.3.1 Equilibrium
We solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of our model. This requires th a t, in 
every period, each type of policy maker behaves optimally given the contest rule in 
place. Members of the selectorate use Bayes rule to update their beliefs on the type 
of the period one policy maker accordingly and decide optimally whether to replace 
the policy maker a t the end of period one.
It is very easy to work out the equilibrium behavior of policy makers in period 
two. In term s of the general interest policy, every kind of policy maker takes his 
short term  optimal action. Thus e2 =  s2 for a good politician and e2 =  1 — s2 for 
a bad politician. In terms of the distributive policy, the policy maker of group J
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chooses a j 2 =  d and g k 2 =  <L f°r K  ^  J, i.e. giving the biggest reward th a t he can 
to  his own group.
Given these period two policy choices, consider the decision of enfranchised cit­
izens in an open contest between two randomly chosen candidates from groups A  
and B. As the type of candidates is unknown to them, both  candidates will produce 
A with probability 7r if elected. Group J  citizens prefer their own group’s candidate 
who will choose aJ2 =  d to  the other group’s candidate who will choose o j2 =  g_. 
Therefore, all group A  enfranchised citizens support the group A  candidate while 
all group B  enfranchised citizens support the group B  candidate, implying tha t 
the share of support th a t a group A  candidate receives is v(f>/(v(f> +  (1 — </>)). The 
probability tha t group A  retains power in an open contest is therefore:
7 (v0 / ( v 0 +  (1 -  <£))) =  T((f),v).
This probability is key to understand whether autocracy is successful.
Turning now to period one, the distributive policy is again straightforward. As 
the period one policy maker is a member of group A , he will set &a\ — d and 
<*b \  =  <L- Good policy makers always make the right decision on the general interest 
policy so tha t e\ — si. The only issue concerns how bad policy makers behave. 
To work out the bad policy maker’s incentive to  produce A, we must compare his 
payoffs from the good and bad actions. If he stays in power, his expected period 
two payoff is /i +  o T . If he is removed from office, then he will get the payoff of a 
group A  citizen: irA +  a T  w ith probability v), and irA +  q T  with probability
i - rO M -
Let p (J) be the probability tha t the period one policy maker will stay in office if 
he produces a payoff of S G {0, A} from the general interest policy. The bad policy 
maker’s period two payoff from producing a payoff of 8 to  the citizens in period one
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p{8)(n  + d T )  + { \ - p  (6)) [ttA +  r(&, v )a T  +  (1 -  T(</>, u)) a T \ .
Using this, it is easy to  see th a t the bad policy maker will produce the good action 
in period one if:
[p (A) -  p (0)] \p -  ttA  +  (1 -  r (0 ,  v)) (or -  a) T] +  A >  r x.
Consequently, the probability th a t a bad policy maker chooses the right general 
interest action in period one, denoted by A, is
A =  G{[p (A) -  p (0)] \p -  ttA  +  ( 1  -  r(<£, t>)) (a — a )T \  + A).
The bad politician is motivated to  choose the right general interest policy by two 
sources of future rents. The first is the personal rent p  th a t he earns. The second is 
the group specific rent (a — a) T. The la tter is relevant only if his group may lose 
office in an open contest, i.e. if T((f>, v) < 1 .
To understand p ( A) — p(0), we need to examine the behavior of the group 
A  selectorate. Observe th a t if the policy maker generates A, then it is always op­
timal to retain him. He creates higher group specific rents from the redistributive 
policy (strictly so if T((p, v) < 1), and there is a higher probability of good behavior 
than would arise in an open contest. To see the second point, the posterior proba­
bility tha t the incumbent policy maker is good having produced the good outcome 
in period one (by Bayes rule) is:
7T
7T +  ( 1  — 7r) A’
which is a t least as large as t v . Therefore, we have p ( A) =  1. If the policy maker
19Note that r(</>, v) does not depend on 6. This is because in an open contest both candidates 
are equally likely to be good. Group B  enfranchised citizens, therefore, only care about the 
distributional policy and always support their own candidate regardless of S. This is no longer the 
case if an open contest ensues even when the selectorate of group A  prefers keeping the incumbent 
in office. See section 4.3.3 below.
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does not generate A, then the selectorate will fire him if:
(1 — r(</>, v)) (a — a ) T  < 7rA.
Thus p (0) =  0. Poor quality policy makers will be fired as long as the selectorate 
has a sufficient grip on power so th a t they will keep their group specific rents if they 
decide to  replace the policy maker. Otherwise p(0) =  l .20
For notational simplicity, define r  =  (a — a) T ,  which captures the degree of 
salience of the distributional policy. The above discussion then leads us to  the 
following result:
Proposition 1 In the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the probability that a 
bad policy maker picks the right general interest action in period one is given as 
follows:
1. I f  (1 — T((f>, v)) r  <  7rA then:
A =  G (p  — 7rA 4 - ( 1  — r ( 0 , v ) ) t  +  A ) . (4.1)
2. I f  (1 — r (0, -u)) r  >  7rA then:
X =  0. (4.2)
This result says th a t the selectorate will be able to  discipline policy makers in
autocracy leading to a good general interest policy choice if their grip on power
is sufficiently strong. If not, they will fear th a t removing the policy maker will
trigger a contest in which the other group can seize power.21 This suggests tha t
successful autocracies will tend to be those with strong selectorates who can commit
to removing bad leaders.
20We assume that if
(1 -  r ( 0 ,v))  (a - a ) T  = 7rA,
then the selectorate chooses to retain the incumbent.
21Padro-i-Miquel (2006) uses the same logic to analyze why African dictators have implemented 
inefficient policies.
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The case where T((f), v) =  0 is interesting here and could be thought of as a case 
of personal rule where the selectorate’s grip on power is dependent on the specific 
policy maker remaining in power. If r  >  7tA , then personal rule in this sense 
will always result in A =  0. This is because the accountability mechanism via the 
selectorate has no bite. This accords with intuition and often-made empirical claim 
th a t personal rule is not conducive to  good government. We develop a case study 
to  illustrate this in section 4.5.3 below.
The role of checks and balances (a — a) in disciplining autocrats turns out to  
be subtle. First, if group A  retains power for sure (T(0, v) = 1 ), there is no role 
for constraints on the distributional policy making in improving the quality of gov­
ernment. The complete lack of checks and balances could still lead to  good policy 
outcomes if the selectorate is securely in power. Otherwise, improvements in checks 
and balances have a non-monotonic impact on the incentive of autocrats to  make 
a good policy. On one hand, improvements in checks and balances make the case 
of successful autocracies more likely. On the other hand, once checks and balances 
s ta rt disciplining bad politicians, further improvements in checks and balances ac­
tually undermine their incentive to  take the good action. This is because a high 
level of checks and balances makes an autocrat less concerned about the seizure of 
power by group B  as a result of his bad performance. Finally, if we compare two 
autocracies with the same level of checks and balances, we could see a stark differ­
ence in performance between the two, depending on how salient the distributional 
issue is due to  the size of T.
As we observed above, a key feature of our model is the assumption th a t a contest 
for power is triggered only if there is a decision to replace the leader in period one. 
The role of this assumption can now be assessed. Suppose instead th a t there is 
a probability £ th a t a contest ensues even if the selectorate chooses to  retain the 
incumbent. The incumbent then competes with a challenger from group B  for office 
in period two. This does not change the optimal strategy of enfranchised citizens 
in the contest if ( 1  — 7r) A < r . 22 However, it weakens the incentive of the leader in
22This condition implies that the policy maker’s group membership is the salient issue if there
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case 1 of the Proposition since we would now have:
A =  G  ([£T(0, v) +  (1 -  0][A* -  ?rA +  (1 -  T(<j), v)) r] +  A)
which is decreasing in £. Thus the model predicts tha t, conditional on having an 
effective selectorate disciplining the leader, political stability (low £) is an asset. This 
offers a perspective on autocracy th a t is reminiscent of Olson (1993) who pu t weight 
on the power of longer time horizons in improving the quality of government within 
autocracy . 23 However, the exact mechanism in which political stability induces 
a better quality of autocratic government is different. In Olson (1993)’s theory, 
political stability allows an autocrat to internalize the benefit from good economic 
policies through an increased amount of tax  revenue. In our model, political stability 
allows the selectorate to discipline an autocrat who otherwise chooses bad policies 
for his private gains.
4.3.2 Repression and Bribery o f th e Selectorate
The basic model assumes tha t the selectorate is powerful enough to  replace the 
leader if they want to. But autocratic leaders frequently take actions to  entrench 
their power. If such actions were costless, then the leader would always would stay 
in office while setting A =  0. However, in reality, such tactics -  whether repression 
by force or bribery -  are costly. We now explore the implications of this to illustrate 
how the good performance of autocracy in Proposition 1 is dependent on limits on 
actions by incumbents to  entrench their power.
Assume th a t the period one policy maker can pay a cost b >  0  to  repress the 
selectorate when the la tter wishes to remove him from power. If ( 1  — T(^>,v ) ) t  < 
7tA, then the bad policy maker prefers repression to choosing the bad policy and
is a contest for power. Were this not the case, then the group B  enfranchised citizens would be 
content to support a group A  incumbent who had taken the good general interest action in period 
one if there were a contest for power at the end of period one. Thus a guaranteed contest would 
strengthen incentives for good behavior in an autocracy as it does in the analysis of democracy 
with low polarization presented below.
23This idea is later formalized in McGuire and Olson (1996).
108
being ousted as long as the cost of repression is not too high, specifically:
b <  fi — 7rA +  (1 — r ((f), v ) ) r .
Under this condition, the bad policy maker will choose repression if:
r i — b > A.
As a result, the probability th a t the bad leader chooses the good policy is
A =  G (A +  min {b, fi — 7tA +  ( 1  — r(0, v)) r j ) .
I t is clear from this th a t possibility of repression (weakly) reduces the incidence of 
good period one behavior under autocracy. Thus if b =  0 (costless repression), then 
A =  0 and we are back to the case of bad autocracy (case 2 in Proposition 1).
Bribery to stay in office is also a possibility. Suppose th a t the policy maker can 
make a transfer to  each member of the selectorate in exchange for supporting him 
to stay in office after he has taken the bad action. Then he may prefer this strategy 
to  taking the good action if the bribe th a t he would have to pay is small enough. 
The total cost of bribing the selectorate is:
n(f) [7tA  — ( 1  — T(0 , u)) t]  .
The policy maker prefers bribery to taking bad action if:
[ttA  -  (1 -  T(</>, v ) )  r]  (1 +  710) <  /i.
This is more likely to be satisfied when the selectorate is small -  the result in 
Proposition 1 still holds for large enough 710. This case, in particular, emphasizes 
th a t it need not be the benevolence of the selectorate th a t drives good autocracy 
but having a large enough group to make bribery unattractive.
This extension further emphasizes the need for an effective group to  manage
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leadership transitions. To the extent th a t prevention of repression and bribery can 
be institutionalized, we expect autocracy to work better. This analysis also makes 
clear th a t /i (the future value of staying in office) is im portant in shaping incentives. 
Severe punishments for poorly performing leaders after they leave office are doubled- 
edged. On one hand, they improve incentives if repression and bribery are absent. 
On the other, they increase the incentive to  use malign tactics to stay in office. 
Thus the model shows why negotiating attractive exit arrangements for bad leaders 
could sometimes improve policy outcomes.
4.3.3 Com parison w ith  D em ocracy
We now contrast the model above with a stylized representation of democracy. This 
is a non-trivial comparison since it is well-known from the literature on political 
agency models (see, for example, Besley 2006) th a t elections are an imperfect way 
of providing incentives for good policies.
Now assume th a t all citizens are enfranchised with each having one vote: n =  JV, 
(f) = (3, and v  = l .24 The key feature of democracy th a t we model here is a 
guaranteed contest for power a t the end of period one even when group A  citizens 
prefer retaining the incumbent policy maker. The timing of the game is the same 
except for steps 3 and 4, which are now as follows:
3. Citizens from group A  decide whether to  support the incumbent policy maker 
or a randomly picked citizen from group A  whose type (good or bad) is unob­
servable to  citizens (i.e. a primary election).
4. All citizens decide which candidate to support, the group A  candidate chosen 
in step 3 or a randomly picked citizen from group B  whose type (good or 
bad) is unobservable to citizens. The group A  candidate wins with probability 
7 («)■
24 If v  > 1, the model of democracy in this subsection can be that of what Levitsky and Way 
(2002) call competitive authoritarianism, a regime in which elections with universal suffrage are 
regularly held with opposition groups systematically harassed so that the number of effective votes 
per person is less than one for opposition groups.
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The remaining structure of the game is otherwise the same as before.
If group A  citizens decide not to support the incumbent in a primary election, 
the electoral outcome th a t follows is exactly the same as th a t of an open contest in 
the model of autocracy with group A’s winning probability being T(j3,1 ) =  7 ((3). 
The difference comes from a case in which group A  citizens decide to  support the 
incumbent in a primary election. This case emerges if the incumbent takes a good 
action in period one, because otherwise group A  citizens are strictly better off by 
replacing the incumbent with a randomly picked candidate .25 A key issue in a 
democracy concerns whether citizens from group B  reward the group A  incumbent 
for taking the general interest action. This depends on how salient is the general 
interest policy relative to  the distributional policy.
We first look at the case in which the distributional policy is more salient:
( 1  — 7r) A <  r.
This condition says tha t group B  voters will always support a candidate from their 
own group even if the group A  candidate is known to be good. In this case, the 
share of votes the incumbent undertaking a good action in period one obtains will 
be k = p. Consequently, if a bad incumbent chooses a good policy so th a t group A  
citizens support him in a primary election, his expected period two payoff is
+  aT)  +  (1 -  7 (/?))(ttA +  aT).
2 5 T o  see this, let 7 (k/) be the probability that the incumbent who did not produce A wins in an 
election, and 7 («") be the probability that a randomly picked group A  candidate wins. Group A  
citizens’ expected period two payoff is
7 (k')oT +  (1 -  7(k'))(7tA +  aT)
if they let the incumbent run for re-election, and
7r A +  7  (K,")aT +  (1 — 7 (ft,/))a71
if they support a randomly picked candidate. Therefore, they prefer kicking out the incumbent in 
a primary election if
7 (k')7tA -I- [7 (k") — -  g ) T  >  0.
7 (/c") is always equal to 'y(P). 7 («;) is also equal to 7 ((3) if group A  never supports group B  
candidate (i.e. 7rA < (a — a)T).  If group A  prefers group B  candidate to a bad group A  politician 
(i.e. 7rA > (a — a)T),  7 («') =  0. Therefore, the above inequality always holds.
I l l
If he chooses a bad policy, he will be removed in a primary election and his expected 
period two payoff is therefore
7 (/9)(7tA +  aT)  +  (1 — 7 (/?))(7tA  +  aT).
Comparing these two payoffs, it is straightforward to see th a t the probability tha t 
a bad incumbent chooses a good action is
A =  G (7 ( /J )(m -* A ) +  A ). (4.3)
Since group B  citizens are not responsive to the policy maker’s reputation, only 
private rents motivate good behavior. This is because the distribution of group 
specific rents does not depend on which general interest policy is adopted in period 
one. In addition, private rents are discounted by the probability of re-election, 7 (/?), 
which can be less than one. The regularized contest for power coupled with the 
lack of responsiveness by group B  citizens even undermines the motivation of policy 
makers stemming from private gains.
We next tu rn  to a situation where the general interest policy is more salient:
( 1  — 7r) A  >  r
We will look a t the best performance of democracy th a t can be sustained in this 
case. Suppose th a t all group B  citizens will support a candidate from group A  who 
takes the good action in period one. Then, the outcome is equivalent to the good 
autocracy case in section 4.3.1. It is straightforward to  see th a t
A =  G (/i -  7rA +  ( 1  -  7 (/? ))t -f A ) . (4.4)
Good behavior by the period one policy maker is now rewarded with personal rents 
in period two for sure and by an increase in the probability of retaining group specific 
rents. This will be an equilibrium consistent with Bayes rule provided th a t at this
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value o f A:
( 1 - tt) ( 1 - A )
7r A >  r ,
7T +  (1 — 7r) A
which will always hold for a sufficiently low value of r .26
We now compare the performance of autocracy and democracy in term s of the 
probability of disciplining the bad incumbent. Table 4.1 shows which political system 
is better in each of four main param eter regions. W hen the distributional issue is of 
little im portance (a very small r  as in the top-left cell), democracy performs better 
as long as 'y(P) < T((j>,v) (compare equations (4.1) and (4.4)), i.e. power is more 
contestable in a democracy. Thus democracy is better in so far as it strengthens the 
power of the opposition and increases the group specific rent th a t motivates a bad 
politician to stay in office.
Table 4.1: Comparison of Autocracy and Democracy
Good Democracy: 
r  <  ( 1  — 7r) A
Bad Democracy: 
r  >  ( 1  — 7r) A
Good Autocracy: 
(1  —  T ( 0 ,  v ) ) t  < 7tA
Democracy 
if T((f>,v) > 7 (/?)
Autocracy
Bad Autocracy:
( 1  — T(4>, v ) ) t  > 7tA
Democracy Democracy 
if 7  {(3) > 0
W hen the distributional issue is very im portant (a very large r  as in the bottom-
26If this condition does not hold, then there will be a mixed strategy equilibrium with a lower 
level of A. This is a little tricky as it is not entirely obvious how to put mixed strategies together 
with probabilistic voting. However, define:
(1 - t t )  (l -  A)
7T +  ( 1  —  7 r )  A A =  r
Then we require that A is a fixed point of the mapping
A = G(xp ( A )  ( / z -  ttA )  +  [xp ( A )  -  7 (/?)) t ] +  a )
where xp (A) <  1 is the probability of re-election given that the incumbent has produced A. Since
all group B  voters are, by construction, indifferent between group A  and group B  candidates at A ,
we suppose that a proportion (  of the group B  voters support the group A  candidate ex ante (i.e. 
before the aggregate shock takes place) so that:
(a) = 7  (/3 + <(1 - /3) -  (1 -  0  (1 - /3»
The key observation is that any equilibrium where A =  A , must have less good behavior by the 
leader so that the equilibrium behavior in (4.4) is an upper bound on the performance of democracy 
consistent with the level of checks and balances in place.
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right cell in Table 4.1), we see, by comparing equations (4.2) and (4.3), th a t democ­
racy performs better as long as democratic competition does not entirely prevent 
group A  from holding power ('y(P) > 0). W hen the distributional issue is very 
salient, the selectorate in autocracy is unable to  discipline the policy maker. How­
ever, in democracy the fact th a t group A  citizens regularly face competition from 
group B  allows them to discipline a bad politician.
Which of the off-diagonal cells in Table 4.1 is the relevant param eter region 
depends on the size of T(<^ >, v). If (1 — 7r)(l — T(0, u)) >  7r, then the bottom-left 
cell is relevant. In this case, democracy always performs better (compare (4.2) 
and (4.4)). In this case, T(^ >, v) is not large enough for the selectorate to  credibly 
threaten to remove a bad politician if he behaves badly. On the other hand, in 
democracy, group B  citizens are responsive to the policy maker’s good behavior, 
giving the incumbent an incentive to behave well. Broader political participation in 
a democracy is beneficial in this case.
If T(</>, v)  is large enough so th a t (1 — 7r)(l — T(0, v))  <  ir, we are in the top- 
right cell in which autocracy performs better than democracy (compare (4.1) and 
(4.3)). In this case, the distributional issue is relatively im portant, making group 
B  citizens unresponsive to  the good action by the incumbent. In a democracy, this 
unresponsiveness undermines a bad politician’s incentive for good action. In an 
autocracy, however, group B  has very little influence on leadership selection due to 
a high T(0, v). This exclusion of group B  from political participation creates an 
incentive for a bad politician to  undertake good policy because group A  does not 
fear losing power after replacing the leader.
The above analysis suggests tha t, as long as the selectorate has a strong hold over 
power, autocracy is a better form of government if the distributional issue is neither 
too salient nor too irrelevant. In all other cases, however, democracy is a better 
form of government, at least under the plausible condition th a t o <  7(/?) <  r ( 0 ,u ) .  
Thus, while the approach th a t we have taken shows why successful autocracy is a 
possibility, it may also be thought of as showing why democracy is broadly superior 
in terms of promoting general interest policies.
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While the analysis is very simple indeed, it gives a novel take on the difference 
between autocracy and democracy in delivering policies. There is no easy ranking 
between democracy and autocracy—it depends on the institutional setting and the 
environment in which system of government is implemented. For a given level of the 
salience of the distributional issue (a fixed r ) ,  the model suggests a natural ordering 
among a cross-section of democracies and autocracies in terms of implementation of 
general interest policies. Best of all is responsive democracy where general interest 
policies are salient (a large A). Second best is successful autocracy, requiring an 
effective selectorate. Next is polarized democracy where elections do not reward 
good general interest policies. Worst of all is bad autocracy where leaders are able 
to  hold on to  power regardless of their performance while in office. This could 
explain the longer lower tail of the performance distribution among autocracies, as 
seen in Figure 4.1.
However, Figure 4.1 also shows th a t autocracy has a longer upper tail in the 
performance distribution. Our model can explain this by assuming tha t the extent 
of constraints on distributional issues (as proxied by (a — a)) is lower in a political 
system without regularized contests for power. Comparing equations (4.1) and (4.4) 
reveals th a t even if 'y(P) < T((f), u), autocracy can perform better because the policy 
maker is motivated more by group specific rents. The lack of constraints on auto­
cratic leaders in making distributional policies may explain why some autocracies 
perform better than the best of all democracies. Thus there are likely to  be impor­
tan t interaction effects between the different dimensions of government institutions 
as measured in data  sets like POLITY IV.
4.3.4 D iscussion
Padro-i-Miquel (2006) is many ways the closest contribution to this chapter. Al­
though it is not discussed explicitly, his model also predicts th a t secure power of 
the selectorate (high T((f),v)) improves the policy-maker’s performance. W hat dis­
tinguishes our model from his is the effect of institutionalizing participation by the 
opposition group in leadership selection. In Padro-i-Miquel (2006)’s model, the
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institutionalized participation by the opposition prevents an autocrat from expro­
priating them  at his will, which in tu rn  reduces the ruling group’s fear of losing 
power and allows them to  discipline the autocrat. In our model, allowing the op­
position to  participate in leadership selection may not improve the policy choice if 
the distributional policy is more salient. The difference stems from our assumption 
th a t distributional policy making depends on checks and balances and the group 
identity of the policy maker. Moreover, the contest for power does not discipline 
the incumbent in this policy dimension.
The model has deliberately focused on the incidence of common interest policy 
decisions in democracy and autocracy. This makes sense as the performance met­
ric th a t it invokes is uncontroversial. However, it is clear th a t the distributional 
outcomes under all the cases tha t we have studied may be quite different. Thus, 
there could be a preference for one regime or another on distributional grounds. For 
example, in the case of successful autocracy, power is monopolized by group A  and 
this may not be good from a social point of view. A more complete treatm ent of 
the issues would clearly have to widen the perspective th a t we have taken here by 
taking a stance on a welfare criterion th a t pays attention to  distributional issues.
One im portant assumption in our model is the exogeneity of the selectorate mem­
bership. The policy maker in office may, howevere, be able to  select members of the 
selectorate from group A citizens. Endogenous membership of the selectorate may 
change the equilibrium probability tha t bad politicians take good action. Suppose, 
for example, th a t there are two types of citizens, good and bad, just like policy­
makers in our model. Assume further tha t good citizens do not accept bribery from 
the policy maker while bad citizens do. The bad policy-maker then has an incentive 
to select only bad citizens as the selectorate members, reducing the probability of 
good action. In future work, it must be understood under what condition the pol­
icy maker can affect the membership of the selectorate and how such endogenous 
membership affects the equilibrium outcomes.
We also assumed th a t the fraction of good politicians it is fixed in comparing 
across political regimes. However, the model makes clear th a t n  can affect the
116
quality of government, both directly in determining whether good actions are taken 
and indirectly by changing the political equilibrium. Besley (2005) emphasizes the 
im portance of selection mechanisms in political regimes both in history and com­
paring contemporary political regimes. More open access to  political life could be 
an im portant difference between autocracy and democracy which would affect the 
comparison in a way tha t is not modeled in our baseline case.27
Perhaps the most interesting possibility for future work is to appraise the way in 
which this framework predicts the evolution of institutional choices over time. We 
should expect autocracy and democracy to  prevail when they are successful. Thus 
there should be a bias (among long-lived regimes) towards cases where (in terms 
of the model) the equilibrium policy outcomes are (4.1) and (4.4). But for tha t 
democracy requires good checks and balances with general interest policies being 
more salient. Equally, successful autocracy requires a strong, hard-to-repress or 
hard-to-bribe, selectorate. However, coping with weak checks and balances (and 
polarization) should be less of an issue for producing general interest actions in 
autocracy.
Perhaps the main attraction of the approach taken here is th a t it gets the focus 
on institutional features th a t shape policy incentives. W ithin the confines of insti­
tutional variants such as autocracy and democracy, we have emphasized the sources 
of heterogeneous outcomes which are typical of the data.
4.4 Successful Autocracies?
In this section, we look a t autocracies empirically. This analysis serves two pur­
poses. The first is to show th a t there are indeed cases of successful autocracies 
according to objective criteria. Although we have some sense of which autocracies 
are more successful than  others (e.g. the Chinese communist regime versus African 
dictatorships), to the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic analysis 
to  identify good autocracies empirically. The second aim of this section is to identify
27Rauch (2001) can be seen as an attempt to endogenize 7r in our model in the context of 
autocratic regimes.
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the cases of successful autocracy which we will use to investigate the validity of our 
theory in the next section. By relying on objective criteria to identify successful 
autocracies, we avoid arbitrarily selecting only cases th a t are consistent w ith our 
theory.
To identify successful autocracies, we first need to  decide how to  define an autoc­
racy empirically. Ideally, the definition should closely follow the characterization of 
autocracy in our theory: the absence of regularized contest for leadership. In addi­
tion, to capture heterogeneous institutional features among autocracies, we should 
separate periods of autocratic rule by the degree of constraints on the executive 
in making distributional policy (a — a), the proportion of the selectorate among 
enfranchised citizens (0), and the way enfranchised citizens exercise their power (v).
Due to lack of such data  covering a long period of time, however, we rely on 
the Polity data  base (POLITY IV, version 2004) because its coverage of the  sample 
period is the longest among appropriate datasets. We adopt the following proce­
dure to  divide country-years into autocratic and democratic regimes. First, for each 
country, we divide years from 1800 or independence until 2004 between democratic 
and autocratic periods according to the Polity score. The Polity score, ranging 
from -10 to 10, measures the degree of democracy.28 If the Polity score is posi­
tive, we trea t such a year as democratic. Years with a non-positive Polity score 
are autocratic.29 To capture heterogeneity among autocracies and democracies, we 
further divide consecutive democratic and autocratic years into different regimes if 
there is a change in authority characteristics according to  the Polity da ta  set: the 
method of chief executive recruitment (EXREC), the constraint on chief executive 
(EXCONST), and political participation (POLCOMP). These three dimensions of 
authority characteristics measured in the Polity data  base loosely correspond to  
institutional features of autocracy in our model: EXREC for the presence of reg­
ularized contest for executive power, EXCONST for checks and balances on the 
distributional policy, and POLCOM P for the probability th a t the selectorate stays
28If the Polity score is either -66 (foreign occupation), -77 (anarchy), or -88 (regime transition 
periods), we see it as a year without a regime.
29See below for the robustness to choosing a different cut-off value.
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in power when the incumbent is replaced (r(</>, t;)).
In sum, we define a “regime” as consecutive years with the same authority char­
acteristics. A regime is autocratic if its POLITY score is non-positive. Below, we 
restrict our attention to  regimes tha t lasted a t least five full calendar years. Au­
tocratic regimes of shorter length may perform very well simply because of luck or 
just by “inheriting” a good performance from the previous regime.
In the following subsections, we first identify autocracies successful in achieving 
economic growth. We then tu rn  to autocracies successful in human development: 
health and education. These two investigations identify the core set of successful 
autocracies, successful in at least two dimensions of performance among the three 
(growth, health, and education). We check the robustness of the selection of these 
autocracies to alternative definitions of autocracy. Finally, we show th a t “standard” 
exogenous characteristics of countries identified by the literature on the quality of 
government and institutions do not fully predict whether a country has a successful 
autocracy.
4.4.1 Econom ically Successful A utocracies
We measure each regime’s economic performance as follows. Suppose th a t a  regime 
starts in year s and ends in year t. We calculate the regime’s annual economic 
growth rate as
<«)
where Yt is real GDP per capita in year t, taken from the Penn World Table version 
6.2 (the variable RGDPCH ) . 30
We then obtain the 80th percentile of the distribution of annual growth rates 
among all regimes, including democratic ones (313 in to tal). We regard an autocratic 
regime as successful if its annual growth rate exceeds this 80th percentile of the
30We choose t — 1 rather than t  as the end year for calculating annual growth rate because Yt 
may reflect an economic turmoil caused by the regime change and/or the succeeding regime. In 
a few cases where the succeeding regime starts on January 1 of the next year, we use Yt instead 
of Yt- 1- If GDP observations are not available for the entire period of a regime, we use the first 
and/or the last observation to calculate the growth rate. In doing so, we drop regimes with less 
than five years of GDP observations.
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distribution .31
Table 4.2 shows the list of economically successful autocracies obtained by the 
above procedure. There are 35 autocratic regimes whose annual growth ra te  is above 
the 80th percentile of the distribution. The list includes East Asian autocracies well- 
known for high economic growth such as China, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Dictatorships in southern Europe are also in the list. On the 
other hand, there are lesser-known autocracies as well: a couple of African countries 
in the 1960s (Gabon and Togo), those in the Middle East (Iraq in the 1970s, Syria 
in the 1960s), communist regimes in East Europe (Poland, Romania), and a few 
Latin American countries (Ecuador in the 1970s, Peru and Venezuela in the 1950s). 
Overall, the table shows th a t there are indeed successful autocracies in term s of 
economic growth.
Measuring success based on annual growth rates may not be an accurate way of 
assessing economic performance of regimes, however. One concern is th a t a regime’s 
growth rate may pick up the effect of country characteristics. W hatever regime may 
exist, it can be tha t a country’s economy grows anyway. Another concern is th a t 
an economy under a certain regime may grow rapidly solely due to  the convergence 
effect if the regime starts  with very low per capita GDP. Finally, a regime may 
perform well simply because it succeeds the previous regime which devastated the 
economy.
To deal with these concerns, we conduct three alternative assessments of success. 
First, we subtract the country'1 s annual economic growth rate from each regime’s 
growth rate, obtain the 80th percentile of the demeaned growth rates among all 
regimes, and check whether autocratic regimes in Table 4.2 are above the 80th 
percentile. This procedure removes “country fixed effects” from the measure of 
performance of each regime. Second, we group regimes into five quintiles according 
to their initial GDP per capita (Ys in equation (4.5)), obtain each quintile’s average 
growth rate, subtract it from each regime’s growth rate, calculate the 80th percentile
of the demeaned growth rates among all regimes, and check whether autocratic
31 Note that this procedure would yield very few successful autocracies if most regimes in the 
top quintile of the growth distribution were democratic.
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Table 4.2: Economically Successful Autocracies
Regime Years of Annual Robustness
Observations Growth 1 2 3
Equatorial Guinea( 1996-2004) 1996-2003 28.04% Y Y Y
Rwanda (1994-2000) 1994-1999 12.56% Y Y N
Gabon( 1960-1968) 1960-1967 8.59% Y Y -
Belarus(1996-2004) 1996-2003 8.15% N Y -
Liberia( 1997-2003) 1997-2002 7.94% Y Y Y
China(1976-2004) 1976-2004 7.87% Y Y -
Greece (1967-1974) 1967-1973 7.85% Y Y Y
Ecuador(1972-1979) 1972-1978 7.73% Y Y Y
Romania( 1948-1977) 1960-1976 7.63% Y Y -
South Korea(1981-1987) 1981-1986 7.23% Y Y Y
Azerbaij an (1998-2004) 1998-2003 7.15% Y Y Y
Taiwan(1975-1987) 1975-1986 6.81% N Y -
Niger(1974-1981) 1974-1981 6.27% Y Y N
Iraq(1968-1979) 1970-1978 6.17% Y Y -
Taiwan(1949-1975) 1951-1974 5.98% N Y -
Brazil (1965-1974) 1965-1973 5.89% Y Y Y
Spain(1939-1975) 1950-1974 5.77% Y Y -
Poland (1947-1980) 1970-1979 5.76% Y Y _ -
Portugal(1930-1974) 1950-1973 5.75% Y Y ~ -
Togo(1960-1967) 1960-1966 5.68% Y Y -
South Korea( 1973-1981) 1973-1980 5.50% N Y Y
Thailand (1958-1968) 1958-1967 5.34% Y Y Y
Venezuela(1941-1958) 1950-1957 4.93% Y Y -
Singapore( 1965-2004) 1965-2004 4.80% N Y -
Indonesia(1967-1998) 1967-1997 4.56% Y Y -
Vietnam( 1976-2004) 1989-2003 4.47% N Y -
Bhutan( 1953-2004) 1970-2003 4.28% N Y -
China(1969-1976) 1969-1975 4.04% N Y N
Iran( 1955-1979) 1955-1978 4.01% Y Y -
Tunisia( 1971-1981) 1971-1980 3.86% N N Y
Syria(1963-1970) 1963-1969 3.82% Y Y Y
North Korea(1966-2004) 1970-2003 3.75% N Y -
Peru (1950-1956) 1950-1955 3.73% Y N -
Pakistan(1977-1985) 1977-1984 3.70% Y Y Y
UAE(1971-2004) 1971-2003 3.70% N N -
Notes: “Years of Observations” indicate the period for which the annual economic growth rate is calculated. Ro­
bustness 1 is “Y” if the regime’s growth rate minus the country average is above the 80 percentile of the distribution; 
“N” otherwise. Robustness 2 is “Y” if the regime’s growth rate minus the average among regimes in the same initial 
income quintile is above the 80 percentile; “N” otherwise. Robustness 3 is “Y” if the growth rate during the 3-year 
period preceding the regime is positive; “N” if negative; and either if the regime lasted 10 years or longer or if 
there is no data on GDP for the preceding period.
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regimes in Table 4.2 are above the 80th percentile. As a result, the convergence 
effect is removed from each regime’s performance measure .32 Finally, we discount a 
regime’s success if it does not survive ten years or longer and if it follows a three-year 
period of negative growth (i.e. Ys — Ks_ 3 < 0 ), because such a regime can perform 
well simply due to a “reconstruction” effect.33
The three columns to the right in Table 4.2 show the results from these three 
robustness checks. Among the 35 successful autocracies, 2 1  survive all the robust­
ness checks th a t are applicable. The first robustness check turns out to  be tough for 
East Asian autocracies since these countries grew consistently over time. Notwith­
standing, China since 1976, South Korea in the 1980s, Thailand in the 1960s, and 
Indonesia since 1967 survive this test, proving to  be very successful autocracies.
4.4.2 A utocracies Successful in Hum an D evelopm ent
We now tu rn  to human development. To measure success in this sphere, we first 
remove the effect of real GDP per capita by obtaining the residuals from the following 
equation estimated for each cross-section of countries in year t:
Ht = a + /3Yt +  j(Y t)2 +  eu (4.6)
where H t is either life expectancy at birth in year t, obtained from World Develop­
ment Indicators (September 2006 edition), or the gross primary school enrollment 
ratio in year t obtained from UNESCO Institute for Statistics (through the EdStats 
web site maintained by the World Bank ) . 34 We include the squared term of per 
capita income as a regressor because health and education exhibit a strong non­
32 Grouping regimes into ten or twenty categories according to initial income instead to remove 
the convergence effect does not yield substantially different results.
33Note that this procedure is not applicable to regimes for which Ys- 3 is not available in the 
data.
34For life expectancy, years 1960, 1962, 1967, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1990, 
1992, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003, and 2004 are chosen because data for a sizable number of 
countries is available for these years. For primary school enrollment ratio, years 1970, 1975, 1980, 
1985, 1990-1996, and 1999-2004 are chosen for the same reason. For Taiwan, we use data taken 
from the 1987 (for health), 1994 (for education), and 2005 (for both) issues of Statistical Yearbook 
of the Republic o f China.
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linear relationship with income in a cross-section of countries .35 We can interpret 
the residuals as partly reflecting government efforts to  promote human development 
through public health interventions and developing schooling systems.
We average the residuals for each regime and calculate the 80th percentile of 
its distribution among all regimes (307 for health and 275 for education ) . 36 We 
also perform the first of the three robustness checks th a t we conducted for economic 
performance (i.e. removing “country fixed effects”). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 list successful 
autocracies in term s of health and education, respectively. Communist regimes in 
China, Cuba, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam appear in these tables. For health, 
regimes in the Middle East and North Africa enter the list (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia) while the list for education includes a number of African 
regimes.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the distributions of the mean residuals across demo­
cratic and autocratic regimes for health and education, respectively. Figure 4.2 
confirms the finding in Chapter 2  th a t democracies have higher life expectancy than 
autocracies conditional upon income per capita. In addition, both figures show tha t 
the performance of autocracies is more heterogeneous than th a t of democracies for 
human development. 37
4.4.3 R obustness
In order to identify autocracies th a t are successful in at least two dimensions of 
performance among the three (economic growth, health production, and education), 
we assign the score of success to each regime which is equal to  the number of the 
league tables in which a regime appears. If a regime passes all the applicable 
robustness check in each table, one more point is added to the score in each case.
35Preston (1975) finds this non-linear relationship for health. It turns out that a similar non­
linear relationship can be found for primary school enrollment.
36In calculating the average residual for each regime, we exclude the residuals in the first year of 
each regime because they may reflect political instability caused by regime change or the achieve­
ment by the previous regime.
37The lower tail of the distribution for democracies in Figure 4.2 (below -15 years) only includes 
two regimes: South Africa (since 1994) at -19.3 years and Botswana (since 1997) at -30 years, both 
of which suffer severely from HIV epidemics.
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Table 4.3: Autocracies Successful in Health Production
Regime Years of Conditional Robustness Economic
Observations Life Expectancy Success
Cuba(1961-1976) 1970-1972 17.48 Y N
Romania( 1948-1977) 1960-1972 17.48 Y Y
Taiwan(1949-1975) 1960-1972 16.34 Y Y
China(1969-1976) 1970-1972 13.89 N Y
Poland( 1947-1980) 1970-1977 12.68 Y Y
China( 1976-2004) 1977-2004 12.43 N Y
Paraguay (1954-1967) 1960-1962 12.28 Y N
Syria( 1970-2000) 1972-1997 11.89 N N
Azerbaij an (1998-2004) 2000-2003 11.83 N Y
Vietnam( 1976-2004) 1990-2003 11.49 N Y
North Korea(1966-2004) 1970-2003 11.35 N Y
Cuba( 1977-2004) 1980-2003 11.22 N N
Panama(1969-1978) 1970-1977 11.03 Y N
Thailand (1958-1968) 1960-1967 10.69 Y Y
Taiwan (1975-1987) 1977-1985 10.08 Y Y
Jordan( 1992-2004) 1995-2003 9.67 Y N
Morocco( 1998-2004) 2000-2003 8.73 Y N
Paraguay (1967-1989) 1970-1987 8.49 N N
Kyrgyzstan (1991-2004) 1995-2002 8.09 N N
Greece(1967-1974) 1970-1972 7.88 Y Y
South Korea(1973-1981) 1977-1980 7.80 Y Y
Chile(1973-1981) 1977-1980 7.67 Y N
Uzbekistan(1991-2004) 1997-2003 7.58 N N
Spain( 1939-1975) 1960-1972 6.80 Y Y
Morocco (1992-1998) 1995-1997 6.79 Y N
Syria(1963-1970) 1967 6.39 N Y
Portugal(1930-1974) 1960-1972 6.15 Y Y
Tunisia(1987-1993) 1990-1992 6.08 N N
Algeria( 1995-2004) 1997-2003 6.00 Y N
Iraq(1979-2003) 1980-1997 5.85 N N
Tunisia( 1993-2002) 1995-2000 5.82 N N
Notes: “Years of Observations” indicate the first and last years of observations on life expectancy at birth for each 
regime. “Conditional Life Expectancy” is the number of years in life expectancy at birth unexplained by the Preston 
curve (the quadratic function of per capita real GDP). “Robustness” is “Y” if the regime is above the 80 percentile 
of the distribution of conditional life expectancy minus the country average; “N” otherwise. “Economic Success” is 
“Y” if the regime appears in Table 4.2; “N” otherwise.
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Table 4.4: Autocracies Successful in Education
Regime Years of Conditional Robust­ Economii
Observations Enrollment Ratio ness Success
Equatorial Guinea( 1969-1993) 1990 81.55 Y N
Congo-Brazzaville( 1963-1979) 1970-1975 57.44 Y N
Congo-Brazzaville (1979-1991) 1980-1990 50.68 Y N
Cuba(1961-1976) 1970-1975 48.13 Y N
Brazil(1965-1974) 1970 42.25 Y Y
Uganda( 1996-2004) 1999-2003 40.87 Y N
China(1969-1976) 1970-1975 38.01 N Y
Romania( 1948-1977) 1970-1975 34.27 Y Y
Madagascar(1975-1991) 1980-1990 32.39 Y N
Mongolia(1952-1990) 1970-1985 31.72 Y N
China( 1976-2004) 1980-2004 30.98 N Y
Panama( 1969-1978) 1970-1975 29.78 Y N
Spain( 1939-1975) 1970 29.58 Y Y
Lesotho( 1973-1986) 1975-1985 29.40 N N
Peru (1968-1976) 1970-1975 28.87 N N
Philippines (1972-1981) 1975-1980 28.59 N N
Togo(1979-1991) 1980-1990 28.12 N N
Laos(1975-2004) 1980-2003 27.62 N N
Equatorial Guinea( 1996-2004) 1999-2002 26.74 N Y
Mexico( 1930-1977) 1970-1975 25.41 Y N
South Korea (1973-1981) 1975-1980 24.98 Y Y
Ecuador (1972-1979) 1975 24.60 N Y
Gabon( 1991-2004) 1999-2004 24.52 N N
Dominican Republic(1966-1978) 1970-1975 24.41 Y N
Mexico( 1977-1988) 1980-1985 23.96 Y N
Zimbabwe( 1987-2000) 1990-1999 23.77 N N
Tunisia( 1981-1987) 1985 23.77 Y N
Indonesia( 1967-1998) 1970-1996 23.64 N Y
Chile(1973-1981) 1975-1980 23.15 Y N
Togo(1993-2004) 1994-2004 22.77 N N
Paraguay(1967-1989) 1970-1985 22.29 N N
Vietnam( 1976-2004) 1990-2003 22.13 N Y
Cameroon(1966-1972) 1970 21.82 Y N
Syria( 1970-2000) 1975-1999 21.03 N N
Notes: “Years of Observations” indicate the first and last years of observations on gross primary school enrollment 
ratio for each regime. “Conditional Enrollment Ratio” is the percentage points in gross primary school enrollment 
ratio unexplained by the quadratic function of per capita real GDP. “Robustness” is “Y” if the regime is above the 80 
percentile of the distribution of conditional enrollment ratio minus the country average; “N” otherwise. “Economic 
Success” is “Y” if the regime appears in Table 4.2; “N” otherwise.
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The highest score is, therefore, six. We choose four as the cut-off because this ensures 
success in a t least two dimensions and at least one robust success. Table 4.5 shows 
the list of autocracies whose score is four or higher. The list includes dictatorships 
in southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, and Spain), communist regimes in China, 
Cuba, Poland, and Romania, and military dictatorships in Latin America (Brazil, 
Chile, and Panam a) and in East Asia (South Korea and Thailand).
Table 4.5: Core Set of Successful Autocracies
Regime Score Economic Growth Health Education
Success? Robust? Success? Robust? Success? Robust?
Romania( 1948-1977) 6 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Spain(1939-1975) 6 Y Y Y Y Y Y
South Korea(1973-1981) 5 Y N Y Y Y Y
Brazil( 1965-1974) 4 Y Y N - Y Y
Chile(1973-1981) 4 N - Y Y Y Y
China( 1976-2004) 4 Y Y Y N Y N
Cuba(1961-1976) 4 N - Y Y Y Y
Greece(1967-1974) 4 Y Y Y Y N -
Panama(1969-1978) 4 N - Y Y Y Y
Poland (1947-1980) 4 Y Y Y Y N -
Portugal(1930-1974) 4 Y Y Y Y N -
Thailand (1958-1968) 4 Y Y Y Y - -
Notes: For each performance measure (Economic Growth, Health, Education), “Success?” is “Y” if the regime’s 
performance is above the 80 percentile, “N” if not, and if data is unavailable. For Economic Growth, “Robust?” 
is “Y” if the regime does not fail to pass the three robustness checks shown in Table 4.2, “N” if it does, and 
if “Success?” is “N”. For Health and Education, “Robust?” is “Y” if the regime passes the robustness check of 
subtracting the country average (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), “N” if it does not, and “-” if “Success?” is “N”. “Score” 
is calculated as the number of “Y” in each row.
Below, we check the robustness of this list to  alternative definitions of autocratic 
regimes.
D efinition of Regim es
Our definition of a “regime” entirely depends on the coding in the Polity data  base. 
As the original aim of the Polity data  set is to  analyze the duration of regimes (see 
Marshall and Jaggers 2005, p. 3), we have much confidence in the coding of regime 
change timing in the data  set. However, defining the beginning and end of regimes 
in a different way may yield a different list of successful autocracies. To check this 
possibility, we use an alternative definition of regimes. We first divide years for each 
country between democratic and autocratic periods according to the Polity variable 
as we did above. For autocratic periods, we then divide them  into different regimes
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if chief executives of government are different according to  the Archigos data  set 
(version 2.5) . 38 In other words, an autocratic regime term inates either if a country 
is democratized or if a different person assumes executive power. Consequently, each 
autocratic regime now represents one dictator. For a democratic period, we treat it 
as one regime, because leadership changes are so frequent in democracies th a t many 
democratic regimes would not survive five full calendar years or longer if we divided 
them by leadership changes.
W ith this definition of a regime, we conduct exactly the same analysis as in the 
previous subsections. Table 4.6 lists dictators under whose rule annual economic 
growth exceeds the 80th percentile of the growth distribution among all regimes. 
The table also reports whether human development performances are above the 
80th percentile of the distribution and whether each autocrat passes the robustness 
checks. The majority of successful autocratic regimes identified in Table 4.5 also 
appear in this table and perform well in health and/or education, too. Brazil (1965- 
74) and Thailand (1958-68) do not appear here because both  regimes have relatively 
frequent leadership changes and are therefore split into multiple regimes of less than 
five full calendar years. Chile (1973-81) and Cuba (1961-76) are dropped because 
these regimes are part of a dictator’s long-lived rule (Pinochet and Castro) and these 
dictators perform less successfully during the rest of their rule.
As our theory in Section 4.3 emphasizes the role of leadership changes under 
the fixed param eters of regime characteristics, we prefer the definition of regimes 
according to the authority characteristics coded by the Polity data set, which allows 
leadership changes to happen within each autocratic regime. However, Table 4.6 
shows th a t the definition of regimes does not affect the list of successful autocratic 
regimes substantially.
Definition o f Dem ocracy
We define democracies as regimes with their Polity score being positive. As Fearon
(2006) argues, however, this definition allows some dubious cases to be classified
38 Jones and Olken (2007) use this dataset, which is downloadable at Hein Goemans’s website: 
http://mail.rochester.edu/~hgoemans/data.htm.
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Table 4.6: Successful Autocrats
Country Years Name of Autocrat Annual Growth Robust for Growth? Health
Success? Robust?
Education
Success? Robust?
Rwanda 1994-2004 Paul Kagame 10.19% N N - N -
China 1980-1997 Deng Xiaoping 8.51% Y Y Y Y N
Equatorial Guinea 1969-1979 Macias Nguema 8.07% Y N - - -
Liberia 1997-2003 Charles Taylor 7.94% Y N - N -
Greece 1967-1973 Papadopoulos 7.90% Y Y Y N -
South Korea 1972-1979 Park Chung Hee 7.74% Y Y Y Y Y
Belarus 1995-2004 Lukashenko 7.23% N N - N -
China 1997-2003 Jiang Zemin 7.20% Y Y N Y N
Portugal 1968-1974 Caetano 7.03% Y Y Y N -
Equatorial Guinea 1979-2004 Nguema Mbasogo 7.02% N N - Y N
South Korea 1980-1987 Chun Doo Hwan 6.61% Y N - N -
Taiwan 1978-1988 Chiang Ching-Kuo 6.25% N Y N N -
Iraq 1968-1979 Hassan Al-Bakr 6.17% Y N - N -
Swaziland 1968-1982 Subhuza II 6.14% Y N - N -
Taiwan 1950-1975 Chiang Kai-shek 5.98% N Y Y - -
Nicaragua 1947-1956 Anastasio Somoza Garcia 5.91% Y - - - -
North Korea 1948-1994 Kim Il-Sung 5.83% Y Y N - -
Spain 1939-1975 Franco 5.77% Y Y Y Y Y
Singapore 1965-1990 Lee Kuan Yew 5.77% N N - N -
Poland 1970-1980 Gierek 5.76% Y Y Y N -
Romania 1965-1989 Ceausescu 5.68% Y Y N Y Y
Vietnam 1991-1997 Do Muoi 5.55% N Y N Y Y
Portugal 1932-1968 Salazar 5.01% N Y Y - -
Venezuela 1950-1958 Perez Jimenez 4.93% Y - - - -
Qatar 1995-2004 Amad A1 Thani 4.87% Y N - N -
Bhutan 1972-1998 Jigme Singye Wangchuck 4.83% N N - - -
Mexico 1976-1982 Lopez Portillo 4.63% Y N - Y Y
Indonesia 1966-1998 Suharto 4.30% N N - Y N
Iran 1989-1997 Rafsanjani 4.17% Y N - N -
Congo-Brazzaville 1969-1977 Ngouabi 4.16% Y N - Y Y
Iran 1955-1979 Mohammad Reza 4.01% N N - N -
Pakistan 1977-1988 Zia 3.78% Y N - N -
Nigeria 1966-1975 Gowon 3.73% Y N - N -
Peru 1950-1956 Odria 3.73% N - - - -
UAE 1971-2004 An-Nahayan 3.70% N N - N -
Panama 1968-1981 Torrijos Herrera 3.68% N Y Y Y Y
Mexico 1952-1958 Ruiz Cortines 3.65% N - - - -
Notes: Included in the list are autocrats under whose rule annual growth rate exceeds the 80 percentile of the distribution. “Years” indicate the period in which an autocrat rules the country 
non-democratically. “Robust for Growth?” is “Y” if an autocrat’s rule does not fail to pass the three robustness checks described in the note for Table 4.2. For columns titled Health and 
Education, see notes for Table 4.5.
as democracies. It also does not strictly coincide with the presence of regularized 
contest for executive power as our model characterizes democracy. Table 4.7 shows 
the list of regimes whose Polity score is between 1 and 5 inclusive and whose growth 
rate is above the 80th percentile of the distribution of all regimes. Ten more regimes 
now enter the league table for economic growth. Among them, South Korea (1963- 
1972) and Greece (1949-1967) join the core set of successful autocracies in Table 5.
Table 4.7: Successful Regimes with their Polity Score between 1 and 5
Regime Annual Robust for Health Education
Growth Growth? Success? Robust? Success? Robust?
South Korea( 1963-1972) 6.57% Y Y Y Y Y
Greece(1949-1967) 5.33% Y Y Y - -
Pakistan(1962-1969) 4.66% Y N - - -
Malaysia(1971-1995) 4.63% N N - N -
Turkey (1954-1960) 4.55% Y - - - -
France(1958-1969) 4.27% Y N - - -
Cambodia(1998-2004) 4.14% Y N - Y N
Brazil(1947-1958) 3.77% N - - - -
Sri Lanka(1982-2001) 3.62% N Y N Y N
Thailand(1978-1988) 3.59% N Y N N -
Notes: Listed in the table are regimes with their Polity score between 1 and 5 inclusive whose annual economic 
growth exceeds the 80 percentile of the distribution. See also notes for Table 4.5 for the last five columns in the 
table.
We further check the robustness of our definition of democracy to  the use of a 
completely different democracy data  set, the one by Przeworski et al. (2000) . 39 We 
define a regime as a period in which three aspects of political institutions remain the 
same: (1 ) how the chief executive is elected (directly, indirectly, or not elected by 
popular elections); (2 ) how the legislature is elected (elected by popular elections, not 
elected, non-existent); and (3) the number of legal political parties (more than one, 
one, none) . 40 A regime is democratic if all of the following five conditions are met: 
(1 ) the chief executive is elected directly or indirectly; (2 ) the legislature is elected 
by popular elections; (3) there is more than  one legal political party; (4) the current 
chief executive will not establish non-party or one-party rule or unconstitutionally
39The dataset was obtained from Jose Cheibub’s website in December, 2005.
40These three aspects correspond to variables EXSELEC, LEGSELEC, and PARTY in their 
dataset, respectively.
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close legislature in subsequent years; and (5) there was, or will be, partisan power 
alternation via elections .41 Otherwise a regime is autocratic.
Table 4.8 provides the list of successful autocracies when we define democratic 
and autocratic regimes in this way. Since Przeworski et al. (2000)’s data  ends in 
1990, all the autocracies since the 1990s do not appear in this tab le .42 Autocracies 
in Romania, Spain, South Korea, China, Panama, Portugal, and Thailand appear 
in this table as well though, except for South Korea, the robustness of their good 
performances is more tenuous than in Table 4.5. Brazil and Greece drop because 
these two regimes are split into multiple autocracies according to Przeworski et 
al. (2000)’s coding. Chile and Poland drop because the less successful period of 
autocracy (the 1980s) is now integrated into the same regime. Cuba drops due to 
the lack of Przeworski et al. (2000)’s coding.
The last three columns in Table 4.8 show three institutional features of these 
successful autocracies according to  the coding by Przeworski et al. (2000). Suc­
cessful autocracies do not seem to share institutional characteristics in term s of the 
way executive office and legislature seats are filled and the number of legal political 
parties.
4.4.4 Correlates o f Successful A utocracies
In what kind of countries do successful autocracies tend to  emerge? In this sub­
section, we seek exogenous characteristics of countries th a t are correlated with the 
incidence of successful autocracies. It turns out th a t exogenous country character­
istics often used in the literature to explain socioeconomic performances, on the 
whole, do not seem to explain (in a statistical sense) the emergence of successful 
autocracies.
We estimate the following probit regression for the sample of autocratic regimes 
(defined by the Polity data  set), to  see if any country characteristics predict suc-
41 See Chapter 1 of Przeworski et al. (2000) for details.
42The updated versions of Przeworski et al. (2000)’s data by Boix and Rosato (2001) or by 
Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) do not provide information on disaggregated aspects of political in­
stitutions. Therefore, we cannot exploit heterogeneity across autocracies in terms of institutional 
characteristics.
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Table 4.8: Successful Autocracies defined by Przeworski et al. (2000)
Regime Annual 
Growth
Robust for 
Growth?
Health
Success? Robust?
Education
Success? Robust?
Executive
Selection
Legislature
Selection
Number of 
Parties
Botswana(1966-1990) 7.90% N Y N N - Indirect Elective 2+
Ecuador(1972-1979) 7.73% Y N - N - Non-elective No legislature 2+
South Korea(1981-1988) 7.67% Y N - N - Direct Elective 1
South Korea(1973-1980) 7.41% Y Y Y Y Y Indirect Elective 2+
Jordan(1955-1966) 7.21% Y N - N - Non-elective Elective 0
Singapore(1965-1981) 7.05% N N - N - Indirect Elective 1
Iraq(1963-1980) 6.77% Y Y N N - Non-elective No legislature 1
South Korea(1963-1972) 6.57% N Y Y Y Y Direct Elective 2+
Taiwan( 1952-1990) 6.20% N Y N N - Indirect Elective 2+
Portugal( 1951-1974) 5.60% Y N - N - Indirect Elective 1
Romania(1961-1990) 5.31% N Y N N - Non-elective Elective 1
China( 1961-1990) 5.18% N Y N Y N Non-elective Elective 1
Spain(1951-1977) 5.01% N N - N - Non-elective Non-elective 1
Niger( 1974-1983) 4.96% N N - N - Non-elective No legislature 0
Morocco(1956-1963) 4.85% Y N - N - Non-elective No legislature 2+
Thailand( 1957-1969) 4.71% N Y Y N - Non-elective No legislature 0
Togo(1961-1967) 4.70% Y N - N - Indirect Elective 1
Panama(1978-1984) 4.67% Y Y N N - Indirect Elective 0
Pakistan(1962-1969) 4.66% Y N - N - Indirect Elective 2+
Singapore(1981-1990) 4.35% N N - N - Indirect Elective 2+
Malaysia(1971-1990) 4.31% N Y N N - Indirect Elective 2+
Iran(1963-1979) 4.28% N N - N - Non-elective Elective 1
Uruguay(1976-1982) 4.11% Y N - N - Non-elective No legislature 0
Indonesia(1971-1990) 4.02% N N - Y N Indirect Elective 1
Lesotho(1970-1984) 3.95% N N - Y N Non-elective Non-elective 1
Philippines( 1972-1978) 3.93% N N - Y Y Direct No legislature 0
Syria(1963-1970) 3.82% Y Y N N - Non-elective No legislature 1
Egypt( 1979-1990) 3.34% N N - N - Direct Elective 2+
Successful in Human Development only 
Panama(1969-1978) 2.59% Y Y Y Y Non-elective No legislature 0
Togo( 1979-1990) -3.76% - Y Y Y Y Direct Elective 1
Notes: Listed in the table are autocracies, as defined by Przeworski et al. (2000), whose annual economic growth exceeds the 80 percentile of the distribution. Also included are autocracies 
successful in human development only (the last two rows). “Executive Selection” indicates how the chief executive is chosen (Non-elective: assuming power without elections; Indirect: elected 
by legislature; Direct: elected by popular votes); “Legislative Selection” indicates how legislative members are chosen (No legislature: there ;s no legislature; Non-elective: appointed by the 
executive or hereditary succession; elective: elected by popular votes); “Number of Parties” indicates the number of legal political parties. These three columns are obtained from Przeworski et 
al. (2000). For the rest of the columns, see notes for Table 4.5.
cessful autocracies:
P r (SU C C ESS?c =  1) =  $ ( a  +  X^/9 +  Z^-y), (4.7)
where S U C C E S S £  is 1 if an autocratic regime i in country c appears in the list in 
Table k  G {2,3,4,5} and 0 otherwise, 4>(*) is the cumulative distribution function 
of the standard normal distribution, a  is a constant, and Z ic is a vector of controls 
including region dummies43 and dummies for decades (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) 
in which regime i emerges. X c is a vector of exogenous characteristics of country 
c th a t are known as determinants of the quality of government and institutions in 
the literature (ethnic fractionalization, legal origins, European settlers’ mortality).
Table 4.9 shows the results from this analysis. Columns (1 ) to  (3) look a t suc­
cess in economic growth (k = 2). Column (1 ) shows th a t ethnic fractionalization, 
which Alesina et al. (2003) identify as a significant determ inant of economic growth, 
does not predict the emergence of successful autocracies. Column (2 ) shows th a t 
European settlers’ mortality, which Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue affects the degree 
of secure property rights and thus the level of economic development today, does 
not predict the economic success of autocracies, either.
In column (3), we deal with a concern th a t economically successful autocracies 
simply reflect oil booms. Autocratic regimes in oil producing countries like Ecuador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, UAE, and Venezuela appear in 
Table 4.2. It may be the case th a t these successful autocracies simply coincide 
with periods of high oil prices. We first identify net oil exporting countries in 2003 
according to  International Energy Annual 2004 (Table 3.1) . 44 Next, we create a 
dummy variable which is equal to  one if a country’s net oil export is more than 
100 barrels per day .45 We also obtain the world crude oil prices (in US dollars per
43East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North 
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin American and the Caribbean (with Western Europe - 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain - omitted). We follow the World Bank’s classification of regions.
44See http://www.eia.doe.gov/iea. We calculate net oil exports by subtracting the sum of “crude 
oil imports” and “total imports of refined petroleum products” from the sum of “crude oil exports” 
and “total exports of refined petroleum products”.
45We do not use time-variant oil exporter dummies because oil export data does not date back 
to the 1950s. The amount of oil export is also likely to be endogenous over time.
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Table 4.9: Exogenous Country Characteristics and Successful Autocracy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Growth Growth Growth Health Health Education Education Core Core
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.12 -0.54** -0.01 -0.35
[0.16] [0.25] [0.19] [0.47]
Log European Settlers’ Mortality -0.0270 0.0377
[0.0336] [0.1599]
French Legal Origin -0.10 0.12 0.89***
[0.25] [0.09] [0.11]
Socialist Legal Origin 0.52* 0.40 0.98***
[0.28] [0.30] [0.02]
German Legal Origin 0.59*** -0.16 0.78***
[0.15] [0.11] [0.08]
Oil Price Boom -0.02**
[0.01]
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Decade dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 176 74 170 89 90 148 149 38 19
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.15 0.30 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.20 0.32 0.12
Notes: Reported are the marginal effect for continuous regressors and the discrete change in the probability of success for dummy regressors (legal origins), both evaluated at the mean of all 
regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The unit of observation is an autocratic regime. The dependent variables are: a dummy for success in economic growth (included in 
Table 4.2) in columns (l)-(3); a dummy for success in health production (included in Table 4.3) in columns (4)-(5); a dummy for success in education (included in Table 4.4) in columns (6)-(7); 
and a dummy for being included in the core set of successful autocracies (Table 4.5) in columns (8)-(9), “Decade dummies” refer to dummies indicating the decade in which the regime begins 
(1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, with decades before 1960 omitted). “Region dummies” include East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean (with Western Europe omitted). Depending on the specification, some dummies perfectly predict the dependent variable, which causes 
reductions in the number of observations. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%,
barrel) from International Financial Statistics (March 2007),46 and deflate them 
by the World Bank’s Manufactures Unit Value Index (100 in 1990).47 We then 
calculate the average deflated oil price for each autocratic regime and subtract the 
average deflated oil price during the period between 1960 and 2004 to  measure the 
extent to  which each autocratic regime enjoys an oil price boom. Finally, we interact 
the oil exporter dummy with the regime-specific oil price deviation from the 1960- 
2004 average, and replace X c in equation (4.7) with this interaction term. If the 
coefficient on this interaction term  is positive, then successful autocracies simply 
reflect the oil price boom tha t these regimes enjoy. Column (3) shows th a t the 
coefficient is significantly negative, suggesting th a t oil price booms actually make 
autocracies less likely to be successful.48 If we interpret oil export revenues as the 
source of distributional conflict (a large T  in our model), this finding is consistent 
with our theory though we cannot exclude alternative explanations such as Caselli 
(2006).49
In columns (4) and (5), we look at success in health production (k =  3). La 
Porta et al. (1999) find tha t ethnic fractionalization and the French legal origin 
are positively correlated with infant mortality. Column (4) shows th a t autocratic 
regimes successful in health production tend to be in countries with lower ethnic 
fractionalization. Thus the performance of autocracies in term s of health partly 
reflects the effect of ethnic homogeneity. However, as a low value of the Pseudo R 2 
indicates, it is not the whole story. Column (5) shows tha t the French legal origin 
does not explain success of autocracies in health production. Countries with the 
socialist legal origin tend to have autocracies successful in term s of health. This 
result may be in line with our theory to the extent th a t communist regimes tend
46The average prices of UK Brent (light), Dubai (medium), and West Texas Intermediate crude 
oil (line number 00176AAZZF).
47See http://go.worldbank.org/VDQ5AA3VP0. The Index measures the price of developing 
country imports of manufactures in U.S. dollar terms. We follow Deaton (1999), who uses this 
index to deflate commodity export price indices.
48The standard deviation of the deflated oil price is 12.4 US dollars per barrel. Therefore, one 
standard deviation of the oil price decreases the probability of economic success by 24.8 percentage 
points for autocracies in oil-exporting countries.
49If we choose the cut-off of 500 barrels per day to create the oil exporter dummy, the coefficient 
on the interaction term becomes larger in magnitude. If we choose the cut-off of 0 barrel per day 
instead, the coefficient is no longer significant. However, a small amount of oil exports is unlikely 
to push up GDP per capita substantially during the period of oil price booms.
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to  have a strong selectorate. The positive correlation of German legal origin and 
success in health is difficult to  interpret because only regimes in South Korea and 
Taiwan have German legal origin in the sample.
The dependent variable in columns (6 ) and (7) is success in education (SU C C E SS fc). 
La Porta et al. (1999) also find th a t ethnic fractionalization and the French legal 
origin are negatively correlated with school enrollment. We do not find these two 
exogenous country characteristics are correlated with success in education among 
autocracies, either .50
Finally, columns (8 ) and (9) investigate whether the core set of successful autoc­
racies identified in Table 4.5 have any particular characteristics (k = 5). Since the 
number of successful autocracies is very limited in these regressions, a large num­
ber of observations are dropped because some decade dummies and region dummies 
perfectly predict success. Neither ethnic fractionalization nor European settlers’ 
m ortality is significantly correlated with success. Compared to  the British legal 
origin, countries with the French legal origin are more likely to  see successful autoc­
racies, contrary to  the negative correlation between the French legal origin and the 
quality of government, found by La Porta et al. (1999). Countries with the socialist 
and German legal origins are also more likely to have successful autocracies than 
those with the British legal origin. Indeed, only Thailand has the British legal origin 
among the countries listed in Table 4.5.
A positive correlation between socialist legal origin and the likelihood of suc­
cessful autocracy might seem counter-factual. Our theory implies th a t communist 
regimes are successful to  the extent tha t the ideology of communism ensures the 
secure hold of power by the selectorate (typically top communist party officials).
Perhaps communism encourages groups of citizens outside the regime to  accept au­
50If we re-define SU CCESS!fc for k  =  2 , 3,4 by making it zero if regime i ’s success is not robust, 
results for economic and educational success do not substantially change. For health success, the 
coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is no longer significant. If we run OLS regressions with 
economic growth rates, conditional life expectancy or school enrollment ratio as the dependent 
variable, results for educational success do not change. Ethnic fractionalization and the French legal 
origin are now negatively correlated with economic growth and health performance, respectively. 
These results imply that aside from top performers, the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on 
economic growth and that of the French legal origin on health outcomes persist among autocratic 
regimes. The correlation between the oil price boom and economic success and between ethnic 
fractionalization and health success, on the other hand, is no longer significant.
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tocratic rules while opposition groups in dictatorships without any ideology find it 
hard to accept such rule and thus pose a significant threat to the selectorate. Al­
ternatively, the presence of ideology such as communism may enhance coordination 
among members of the ruling group to establish an effective repression mechanism 
to suppress the opposition. Either way, our model does not predict tha t commu­
nism per se breeds success. The later years of Ceausescu’s rule in Romania (see 
Section 4.5.1 below) is an example where a communist regime can be transformed 
into personal rule.
These results suggest th a t the previous literature on the quality of government 
and institutions cannot fully explain why some autocracies are successful in achieving 
high economic growth, better health, and better education. A theory to  explain 
successful autocracies is necessary to make further progress. We now investigate 
how well institutional features identified in our model relate to cases of successful 
autocracy as identified by this empirical exercise.
4.5 Link to the Theory
The previous section identified the core set of successful autocracies. In this section, 
we link these autocracies to our theory in Section 4.3. We first provide several 
case studies of successful autocracies to motivate the institutional context suggested 
by our theory. Next, we provide evidence th a t autocracies are more likely to  be 
successful if the rate of leadership change is high, which is consistent with our 
theory. Finally, we exploit the natural death of leaders as a natural experiment to 
see if the selectorate’s grip on power is indeed secure in successful autocracies, as 
predicted by our theory.
4.5.1 The Selectorate in Successful Autocracies: Some Case 
Studies
A core idea in our model is the role of the selectorate in organizing leadership contests 
within regimes in successful autocracies. We begin by looking a t five case studies
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suggested by Table 4.5. Of these, we will argue th a t Brazil (1965-1974), China 
(1976-2004), and Romania (1948-1977) appear to be consistent with our theory. 
On the other hand, Spain (1939-1975) does not seem to  match very well with our 
theoretical predictions. Finally, we consider South Korea (1973-1981). Although 
this does not seem to fit with our theory either, the advent of this autocratic regime 
can be explained by our theoretical framework.
B raz il (O c to b e r  1965 - J a n u a ry  1974) According to  the Polity data  set, 
the Brazilian military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985 went through three regime 
changes in 1965, 1974, and 1982. Tables 4.2 and 4.4 reveal th a t the second phase 
was successful in economic development and primary school enrollment. During this 
period, Humberto Castelo Branco, A rtur da Costa e Silva, and Emilio Grrastazu 
Medici were the chief executives (Presidents) according to the Archigos data  set.
The de facto  selectorate of this regime was the armed forces. The national 
legislature (Congress) had the formal right to  elect President.51 However, it was only 
allowed to  rubber-stam p the sole presidential candidate presented by the military 
both when the presidential term  for Castelo Branco came to an end in 1967 and 
when Costa e Silva was incapacitated due to  a stroke in 1969. In both cases, top 
military officers chose a candidate behind whom the armed forces could be united 
(Skidmore 1988, pp. 18-21, 51-53; Stepan 1971, pp. 248-252).
The replacement of Castelo Branco in 1967 appears to  be consistent with our 
theoretical prediction th a t the selectorate can oust a poorly-performing incumbent 
in a successful autocracy. Kaufman (1979, pp. 172-3) argues th a t Castelo Branco’s 
economic policy resulted in only a moderate reduction in inflation and th a t the 
recession in the industrial southeast showed few signs of abating. Castelo Branco 
was determined to step down in 1967 (see Stepan 1971, p. 248), but he tried to 
nominate his successor and prevent Costa e Silva from assuming office (see Skidmore 
1988, pp. 51-2). It appears th a t he failed to  do so in part due to  the unpopularity 
of his economic policies among military officers. Upon assuming presidency, Costa e
51 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, pp. 21063, 21939, 23706.
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Silva appointed Delfim Neto as finance minister, under whose economic management 
the Brazilian economy grew rapidly.
The presidential succession after the incapacitation of Costa e Silva also shows 
th a t the Brazilian armed forces’ grip on power was secure. Although the Constitu­
tion stipulated th a t vice-president would succeed the incapacitated president, the 
military did not allow Vice President Pedro Aleixo, a veteran Congressman, to  take 
office. Those outside the regime, including Congressmen, had no say in leadership 
selection.
This episode is consistent with our theory in th a t successful autocracies are those 
with the selectorate whose power is secure in the case of a leadership replacement.
C h in a  (since  S e p te m b e r  1976) Since the death of Mao Zedong, who had 
been Communist Party Chairman since the proclamation of People’s Republic of 
China in 1949, China has been a stable autocratic regime according to  the Polity 
data  set. As Tables 4.2 to  4.4 show, the communist regime of China during this 
period has been successful in economic and human development (though success 
in human development is less spectacular than  in Mao’s era). According to  the 
Archigos data  set, Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao were 
the chief executives under this regime.
Members of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party appear to  correspond 
to the selectorate in our theory. Formally, the P arty ’s leader (Party Chairman until 
1982 and General Secretary afterwards) is elected by the Central Committee of the 
Party whose several hundreds members are in tu rn  elected by the Party Congress. 
However, members of the Central Committee are de facto appointed by around 20 
members of the Politburo .52
After the death of Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng assumed party chairmanship by 
the Politburo’s appointm ent. 53 During the subsequent years until his resignation as 
Party Chairman in June of 1981, H ua’s power was gradually transferred to  Deng 
Xioaping, apparently because the Politburo members were dissatisfied with Hua’s
52See Lieberthal (2004, pp. 173-5) for the formal organizational structure of the Party.
53See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, pp. 28205-7 and 28719.
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attem pt to  continue Mao’s policies (Lieberthal 2004, pp. 125-7). This gradual power 
transfer paralleled with the replacement of Hua’s supporters with Deng’s in the 
Politburo membership .54
As Deng never assumed leadership formally, it is hard to  tell whether members 
of the Politburo disciplined him during his rule. However, the selection of General 
Secretary of the Party does appear to  have been in the hands of the Politburo. Hu 
Yaobang, Deng’s designated successor and General Secretary since 1982, resigned in 
January of 1988, when several members of the Politburo were dissatisfied with his 
economic policies and tolerance on pro-democracy student protests .55 Zhao Ziang, 
who succeeded Hu as General Secretary, was in turn  dismissed by the Politburo for 
similar reasons in May of 1989.56
The handover of power from Deng to Jiang Zemin, who was appointed as General 
Secretary in June of 1989, took place gradually .57 Jiang was formally re-elected as 
General Secretary by the Central Committee in October of 1992 and September 
of 1997. Given th a t Central Committee members are effectively appointed by the 
Politburo, the re-election of Jiang implies th a t the Politburo supported him. In 
November of 2002, Hu Jintao became General Secretary. Lieberthanl (2004, p. 156) 
notes th a t “Jiang reportedly tried to convince his colleagues to allow him to stay 
on as General Secretary” . But he failed, indicating th a t members of the Politburo 
supported H u’s succession.
In every case of leadership succession over this period, the opposition to  the 
Communist Party  rule did not manage to  participate in leadership selection. In our 
model’s term , T(0 , v) was close to one because the opposition group is effectively dis­
54Deng’s supporters (Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen) joined the Polit­
buro in December of 1978 (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 30488). Lieberthal (2004, p. 126) 
regards Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian as Politburo members support­
ing Hua. All of them resigned from the Politburo in February of 1980 (Keesing’s Contemporary 
Archives, p. 30498).
55See the account by Ruan (1994, pp. 165-9, 175-6), who was Hu’s friend.
56Keesing’s Record of World Events, p. 36640. An immediate reason for Zhao’s dismissal was 
his support for pro-democracy student protests in Tiananmen Square. However, Zhao’s support 
had already waned since late 1988 due to his too radical economic reform causing inflation. Also, 
Zhao’s sons were alleged to be corrupt businessmen in Guangdon Province. See Gilley (1998, pp. 
129-31) and Lieberthal (2004, pp. 144-5).
57By the end of 1995, Deng was effectively incapacitated and no longer commented on policies 
(Gilley 1998, p. 288).
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enfranchised ((f) ~  1) and /or their voice counts little (v «  0). When Zhao Ziang was 
dismissed in May of 1989, for example, there had been student-led anti-government 
demonstrations in Beijing since April. The communist government, however, man­
aged to  stay in power by mobilizing the army to suppress the demonstrations (the 
Tiananmen Square massacre) . 58
Overall, China since 1976 fits well with our model of autocracy and case 1 of 
Proposition 1.
R o m a n ia  ( J a n u a ry  1948 - J a n u a ry  1977) Since the proclamation of Peo­
ple’s Republic of Romania until Nicolae Ceausescu consolidated his personal rule, 
Romania’s communist rule is coded as one regime by the Polity data  set. According 
to the Archigos da ta  set, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu were the 
rulers during this period. As Tables 4.2 to  4.4 show, the regime’s performance is 
impressive in all the three dimensions of development.
Top officials in the communist party  are clearly the selectorate under this regime. 
At a meeting in October of 1945, the party ’s central committee secretaries agreed 
th a t Gheorghiu-Dej became general secretary, the top position to lead the party 
(Tismaneanu 2003, p. 121). At the central committee plenum in March of 1956, 
two members of the Politburo (Iosif Chisinevschi and Miron Constantinescu) openly 
challenged Gheorghiu-Dej’s authority. W hen Gheorghiu-Dej died of lung cancer in 
March of 1965, members of the Politburo chose Ceausescu as his successor (Ibid., 
pp. 185-6).
It appears th a t Gheorghui-Dej decided to  promote industrialization after his 
Stalinist background became the source of criticism due to  Khrushchev’s Secret 
Speech, denouncing Stalinism, in 1956. In this context, the leadership challenge 
by Chisinevschi and Constantinescu, mentioned above, took place. Determined to 
promote industrialization, he even resisted Khrushcev’s plan to  transform Romania 
into the agricultural base in the Soviet bloc . 59
58Keesing’s Record of World Events, pp. 36587, 36640, 36720.
59See Tismaneanu (2003, pp. 142-180) for a series of events from the Secret Speech to the 
adoption of industrialization plans.
142
Ceausescu continued this effort of industrialization. By the time this centrally- 
planned industrialization caused economic problems in the late 1970s, however, 
Ceausescu managed to  consolidate his power and established his personal cult, ap­
pointing his wife as the number two in the communist party hierarchy and promoting 
his son as heir-apparent.60 The selectorate’s grip on power appears to have become 
dependent on Ceausescu, unable to discipline his devastating economic policies in 
the 1980s.
S p a in  (A p ril 1939 - N o v em b er 1975) Franco ruled Spain during this period 
(from the end of the Civil War until his death). Although the regime began in 1939, 
the data  th a t we used to  identify Franco as an successful autocrat comes from the 
1950s at the earliest.
We are unable to  find any characteristics of Franco’s regime consistent with our 
theory. The formal rule of leadership succession (Law of Succession), adopted in a 
popular referendum on July 6 , 1947, stipulated th a t Spain was a monarchy which 
Franco would govern until his death and th a t Franco had the right to  appoint his 
successor.61 Therefore, there was no selectorate, at least formally.
Franco’s regime supporters consist of Falangists (Spanish fascists), the military, 
the Catholic church, and monarchists. These groups might be seen as the selectorate, 
but there is little evidence th a t any of them seriously challenged Franco’s leadership 
(Grugel and Rees 1997, pp. 30-43, 51-8). Franco’s balancing act looks like the 
divide-and-rule tactic, which Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) identify as 
the source of long-lasting kleptocracy.
Given this personal-rule characteristics of the regime, Franco’s flexibility on eco­
nomic policies is remarkable. W hen the policy of an autarky and im port-substitution 
industrialization ended up with government deficits, inflation, and current-account
60See Fischer (1989) for a series of events leading to the consolidation of Ceausescu’s power. 
It is perhaps not just a coincidence that Ion Gheorghe Mauer and Emil Bondras, two members 
of the politburo instrumental to the appointment of Ceausescu as Gheorghiu-Dej’s successor in 
1965 (Tismaneanu 2003, pp. 185-6), voluntarily resigned from the politburo and died in office, 
respectively, in the mid-1970 (Ibid., p. 193), after which Ceausescu’s rule became out of control of 
any member of the communist party.
61See Payne (1987, pp. 372-5), Grugel and Rees (1997, pp. 42-3), and Fusi (1987, pp. 66-7) for 
the background of the adoption of the Law of Succession.
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imbalances by the mid-1950s, culminating in strikes and student protests, Franco 
shuffled the cabinet, appointing two technocrats, Alberto Ullastres and Mariano 
Navarro Rubio, to  economic ministers in 1957. W hen the two ministers proposed 
the abandonment of the autarky policy and the plan for macroeconomic stabiliza­
tion, Franco accepted the proposal even though this was against Franco’s ideology 
(Payne 1987, p. 470). We cannot relate this policy change to  the selectorate’s pres­
sure on Franco. If any, there appears to  have been the pressure from the opposition 
outside the regime—protesting workers and students in the 1950s. Weirdly enough, 
the logic of successful democracy in our model seems to apply here, if not through 
regularized elections but through strikes and protests. Alternatively, Franco might 
have been a good policy maker in the term s of our model.
S o u th  K o re a  (F e b ru a ry  1973 - M a rc h  1981) According to the Polity data 
set, South Korean military dictatorship, initiated by a coup in 1961, went through 
four changes of authority characteristics (1963, 1972, 1973, 1981).62 We have iden­
tified the fourth regime as the most successful.63 During this period, Archigos 
identifies four leaders ruling the country: Park Chung Hee until his assassination in 
1979, Choi Kyu Hah from 1979 to  1980, Park Chung Hun briefly in 1980, and Chun 
Doo Hwan from 1980, who continued to rule the country until 1988.
Formally, the selectorate was an electoral college, the National Conference for  
Unification (NCU), whose members were elected by popular votes on a non-partisan 
basis. The Constitution (proposed by Park Chung Hee and approved in a referendum 
in November of 1972) stipulated th a t the NCU would elect the President for six years 
with no term  limits. Elections for the NCU took place in December of 1972 (5,876 
candidates contested the 2359 seats with 225 unopposed in their constituencies) and 
in May of 1978 (boycotted by opposition parties), both followed by the re-election
62Park Chung Hee staged a military coup and became president in 1961; held multiparty pres­
idential elections and won in 1963; disbanded the national legislature, banned political parties 
temporarily, and introduced the indirect presidential election by non-partisan electoral college (see 
below for more detail) in 1972; and held multiparty legislative elections for the two-thirds of the 
seats in 1973 (the remaining one-third is appointed by the president). In 1981, members of the 
electoral college were allowed to be affiliated with political parties.
63Table 4.6 shows that, if we define democracy as a regime with its Polity score larger than 5, 
the second phase (1963-1972) is also a successful autocracy.
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of Park as President .64 After Park’s assassination, the NCU elected Choi Kyu Hah, 
who had been Prime Minister since 1975, as new President in December of 1979. 
After the resignation of Choi in August of 1980, the NCU elected Chun Doo Hwan 
as new President in the same m onth . 65 It is not entirely clear whether members of 
the NCU had any influence on leadership selection, however. 66
Informally, the Korean CIA (KCIA), the regime’s secret police organization, 
could have been the selectorate. It was the KCIA chief who assassinated Park in 
1979. However, the assassin’s predecessors as the KCIA chief were repeatedly purged 
by Park (Clifford 1998, pp. 80-90). There is little evidence th a t anyone within the 
regime credibly threatened to  oust Park.
A threat does appear to  have come from those outside the regime, especially 
the opposition party leader Kim Dae-Jung .67 He ran for the presidency in the 1971 
election, only narrowly defeated by Park, even though Park’s export-led industrial­
ization policy since the mid-1960s had been successful. This electoral result appears 
to  have prompted Park to  abolish m ultiparty direct presidential elections in 1972.68 
We can interpret this series of events in term s of our model. South Korea in the 
early 1970s could have been the case of high polarization where ( 1  — 7r) A < r .  Al­
though the economy grew rapidly and therefore the size of the pie to share among 
the population, T, became larger, workers did not benefit much from it due to  
wage suppression by the regime.69 The opposition group, therefore, would never 
reward the incumbent’s good behavior. Park’s supporters including the business 
community—and Park himself if he was a good policy maker in the term s of our 
model—therefore preferred the autocratic regime in which the selectorate could dis­
cipline the incumbent (or Park as a good policy maker could keep choosing a good
64See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, pp. 25747, 29795).
65Chun Doo Hwan seized the control of the military in December of 1979 and imposed martial 
law in May 1980, shortly after which he became the head of an advisory body (consisting of military 
officers) to President Choi. See Clifford (1998, pp. 143-163).
66We are unable to find any scholarly research on the NCU, which Korea specialists appear to 
dismiss as a rubber-stamping organization.
67Clifford (1998, p. 86) notes that, according to a former KCIA director, Park feared two things: 
Kim Dae Jung and the U.S. Congress.
68Sohn (1989, pp. 31-2) quotes Park’s remark on the 1971 electoral result: “... I have done my 
best to get rid of poverty. ... [D]o I deserve only this margin against Kim Dae Jung?”
69See the account on worker protests in the early 1970s by Sohn (1989, pp. 34-6).
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policy without being ousted).
4.5.2 Turnover
Our theory predicts tha t autocracies are successful if the selectorate can credibly 
remove poorly-performing leaders. This implies tha t an autocratic regime with a 
high rate of leadership change is more likely to  be successful on average than  those 
with less turnover . 70
To test this empirical implication, we obtain the number of leadership changes for 
each autocratic regime, from the Archigos data  set . 71 We then calculate the number 
of leadership changes per year for each regime. The raw data  support the idea tha t 
there are turnover differences in successful and unsuccessful autocracies (as identified 
in the base case of section 4.4.1 above). The probability of turnover in a successful 
autocracy is 13% compared to  7% in an unsuccessful autocracy (the difference being 
statistically significant a t 5%). This implies th a t leaders in successful autocratic 
regimes spend on average seven and half years in office compared to  nine years for 
unsuccessful autocratic regimes. Interestingly, this contrasts with a much higher 
rate of annual turnover of leaders (26%) in regimes classified as democracies implying 
an average leadership tenure of just over four years.
To examine this further, we estimate equation (4.7) where X c is replaced w ith the 
number of leadership changes per year for regime i. Table 4.10 shows the estimated 
marginal effect of the rate of leadership changes. The dependent variable in column 
(1 ) is a dummy indicating economic success (whether an autocratic regime is listed 
in Table 4.2). The higher rate of leadership changes is significantly associated with
70Note that if we look at the same successful autocratic regime over time, our theory predicts 
the opposite: leadership change follows a bad performance. This prediction is not what we try to 
provide empirical support for here. Also note that leadership turnover and regime performance are 
jointly determined in our theoretical model. The aim of empirical analysis in this subsection is, 
therefore, not to establish causality but to show correlations which are consistent with our theory.
71 We match POLITY IV and Archigos on a daily basis to avoid assigning leadership changes 
to regimes that emerge later in the same year. If a leadership change and the emergence of a 
new regime take place on the same date, we assign the leadership change to the preceding regime. 
Finally, if the Archigos data set indicates that there is no national leader, we regard only the 
beginning of such a period as a leadership change rather than counting two leadership changes at 
the beginning and the end, because we are interested in whether the selectorate can replace the 
incumbent.
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a higher likelihood of economic success, consistent with our theoretical prediction. 
One standard deviation of the number of leadership changes per year (0.11) changes 
the probability of economic success by around 1 1  percentage points.
If we restrict economic success to  robust cases, the significant positive correlation 
between leadership turnover and success remains (column (2)). For success in health 
and education, however, columns (3) to (6 ) show no significant correlation between 
the rate of leadership changes and regime performance. In column (7), the dependent 
variable is a dummy indicating whether an autocratic regime is in the core set of 
successful ones identified by Table 4.5. There is no correlation for this group either . 72
In sum, this evidence suggestively supports a key idea from our theory when 
economic success is used as the outcome. The results on health and education 
suggest th a t the selectorate in autocracy is less responsive to  leadership performance 
in human development, perhaps because members of the selectorate can privately 
afford better health and education.
4.5.3 D eath  of Leader as a N atural Experim ent
Our theory predicts tha t an autocracy is successful if the selectorate’s grip on power 
is secure (r(</>, v) is high). More specifically, an autocrat is disciplined by the selec­
torate if overthrowing him does not lead to  the seizure of power by citizens outside 
the selectorate.
Observing T(0 , v) for each autocratic regime is not an easy task. We may observe 
a leadership change in a poorly-performing autocracy with the selectorate remaining 
in power afterwards. This may be interpreted as an unsuccessful autocracy with a 
high r (0 ,  v) which is apparently inconsistent with our theory. However, it can also 
be interpreted as an equilibrium outcome of our model where the policy maker 
chooses the bad policy and thus gets removed from office by the selectorate with a 
high r (4>,v). The problem here is th a t leadership changes are endogenous to the 
regime performance.
72These results are robust to excluding leadership changes due to natural causes (natural deaths, 
resignation for health reasons, and suicides) from the calculation of the rate of leadership turnover.
147
Table 4.10: Leadership Turnover and Successful Autocracies
0 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 )
D e p e n d e n t  V a r i a b l e : S u c c e s s R o b u s t  S u c c e s s S u c c e s s R o b u s t  S u c c e s s S u c c e s s R o b u s t  S u c c e s s C o r e
i n  G r o w t h i n  G r o w t h i n  H e a l t h i n  H e a l t h i n  E d u c a t i o n i n  E d u c a t i o n S u c c e s s
#  o f  l e a d e r s h i p  c h a n g e s  p e r  y e a r 0.99*** 0.61*** -0.22 -0.34 -0.29 0.08 0.09
[0.28] [0.20] [0.57] [0.58] [0.38] [0.28] [0.96]
C o n s t a n t Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S
D e c a d e  d u m m i e s Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S
R e g i o n  d u m m i e s Y E S Y E S Y E S ' Y E S Y E S Y E S Y E S
O b s e r v a t i o n s 177 177 90 84 149 149 38
P s e u d o  R 2 0.31 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.23
Notes: Reported axe the marginal effect evaluated at the mean of all regressors. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The unit of observation is an autocratic regime. The dependent 
variables are: in column (1), a dummy for being included in Table 4.2; in column (2), a dummy for being included in Table 4.2 and not failing to pass any robustness checks; in column (3) a 
dummy for being included in Table 4.3; in column (4), a dummy for being included in Table 4,3 and passing the robustness check; in column (5) a dummy for being included in Table 4.4; in 
column (6), a dummy for being included in Table 4,4 and passing the robustness check; in column (7), a dummy for being included in Table 4.5. See Table 4.9 for details on decade and region 
dummies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
However, if a leader dies or becomes incapacitated due to  natural causes, whether 
the selectorate remains in power afterwards does indicate T((f), v). Our theory, there­
fore, predicts th a t an autocratic regime performs well if a random death or inca­
pacitation of the leader does not lead to the loss of power by the selectorate. It 
also should be the case th a t after a poorly-performing dictator dies due to natural 
causes, the selectorate is likely to change afterwards .73
Table 4.11 shows the list of autocratic regimes (with da ta  on either growth, 
health, or education) under which the chief executive died in office due to natural 
causes, according to  the Archigos data  set. Among the core set of successful autoc­
racies identified in Table 4.5, regimes in China, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
and Thailand went through a natural death of the leader. We already saw above 
th a t the deaths of Deng Xiaoping in China and Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Roma­
nia did not lead to  the loss of power by the selectorate, indicating th a t these two 
regimes had a high value of and this might have allowed the selectorate to
discipline their leader. We find tha t Portugal and Thailand are also consistent with 
our theory . 74 To see whether unsuccessful autocracies confronted with a random 
death reveal a poorly entrenched selectorate, we also look a t Guinea.
We proceed as follows. For each autocratic regime, we (i) describe the perfor­
mance of an autocrat who died in office; (ii) identify the selectorate under the dead 
leader’s rule; and (iii) investigate whether the selectorate remained in power after 
the death.
P o r tu g a l  (Ju ly  1930 - A p ril 1974) Prime Minister Oliveira Salazar suffered 
a cerebral thrombosis and hemorrhage, lapsing into a coma on September 16 of 
1968.75 Salazar had been premier since 1932. His rule was successful in economic
73Jones and Olken (2005) first exploit the random death of leaders as a natural experiment. 
Their research question is whether who is in power makes a difference in economic growth. They 
compare economic growth rates before and after the random death of leaders to check if causality 
runs from leadership change to growth. In our case, looking at the random death of leaders reveals 
the underlying parameter T(0, v). We then check if the uncovered T(0, v) positively correlates 
with economic growth and other outcomes under the naturally-dead leaders.
74A random death in Poland occurred before we observe performance measures. The death of 
Franco in Spain does not fit with our theory as it led to democratization.
75Salazar was alive until 1970. Wiarda (1977, footnote 3 in Chapter 9) notes, however, that “he 
no longer made decisions and ... had no impact on the policies of the new government.”
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Table 4.11: Autocratic Regimes with Leader’s N atural Death
Regime Year of Annual Economic Growth Conditional Health Conditional Education
Leader’s Score Life Enrollment
Death Growth Success? Robust? Expectancy Success? Robust? Ratio Success? Robust?
Romania(1948-1977) 1965 6 7.63% Y Y 17.48 Y Y 34.27 Y Y
Spain(1939-1975) 1975 6 5.77% Y Y 6.80 Y Y 29.58 Y Y
China(1976-2004) 1997 4 7.87% Y Y 12.43 Y N 30.98 Y N
Poland(1947-1980) 1956 4 5.76% Y Y 12.68 Y Y 19.82 N -
Portugal(1930-1974) 1968 4 5.75% Y Y 6.15 Y Y 8.46 N -
Thailand( 1958-1968) 1963 4 5.34% Y Y 10.69 Y Y - -
China(1969-1976) 1976 3 4.04% Y N 13.89 Y N 38.01 Y N
Taiwan(1949-1975) 1975 3 5.98% Y N 16.34 Y Y - -
Taiwan(1975-1987) 1978 3 6.81% Y N 10.08 Y Y 5.56 N -
Vietnam( 1976-2004) 1986 3 4.47% Y N 11.49 Y N 22.13 Y N
Gabon(1960-1968) 1967 2 8.59% Y Y -26.81 N - - -
Jordan(1992-2004) 1999 2 0.89% N - 9.67 Y Y -6.92 N -
Morocco(1998-2004) 1999 2 1.19% N - 8.73 Y Y 2.24 N -
North Korea(1966-2004) 1994 2 3.75% Y N 11.35 Y N - -
Syria( 1970-2000) 2000 2 2.18% N - 11.89 Y N 21.03 Y N
Bhutan(1953-2004) 1972 1 4.28% Y N 0.92 N - - -
Lao PDR(1975-2004) 1992 1 1.35% N - -3.72 N - 27.62 Y N
Algeria(1965-1989) 1978 0 1.35% N - -0.75 N - 4.01 N -
Egypt(1952-1976) 1970 0 1.29% N - -0.20 N - -3.77 N -
Guinea(1958-1984) 1984 0 -0.67% N - -14.59 N - -44.54 N -
Haiti(1961-1971) 1971 0 - - -3.24 N - -15.74 N -
Iran(1982-1997) 1989 0 0.86% N - 1.78 N - 11.13 N -
Kenya(1969-1979) 1978 0 -0.47% N - 3.66 N - 12.64 N -
Kuwait(1965-1971) 1965 0 - - 2.25 N - 8.57 N -
Liberia( 1909-1980) 1971 0 -1.13% N - -9.03 N - -35.24 N -
Mauritania( 1962-1991) 1979 0 -0.19% N - -5.44 N - -42.17 N -
Nepal(1962-1981) 1972 0 0.49% N - -4.75 N - -18.18 N -
Nicaragua(1936-1979) 1966 0 2.45% N - -7.86 N - -6.87 N -
Saudi Arabia(1926-2004) 1953,1982 0 0.20% N - -12.30 N - -40.52 N -
Swaziland(1973-1993) 1982 0 3.31% N - -9.63 N - 10.28 N -
Notes: Listed axe autocratic regimes under which the chief executive died in office due to natural causes. “Year of Leader’s Death” indicates the year of such death. For the rest of the columns, 
see notes for Tables 4.3 to 4,5.
growth and health production as seen in Table 4.6.
The selectorate under Salazar’s rule appears to  be the armed forces.76 Before 
Salazar became prime minister in 1932, the armed forces had controlled the govern­
ment since its seizure of power in 1926. The Constitution of 1933 stipulated tha t 
the ceremonial president had the power to appoint and remove premiers, and the 
post of presidency was consistently given to military men (W iarda 1977, pp. 100, 
122-3).
The armed forces retained the control of the country after Salazar’s incapaci­
tation (W iarda 1977, pp. 253-4). President Americo Thomaz, a retired admiral, 
summoned the Council of State, a constitutional advisory body consisting of the 
nation’s prominent figures, and also met with other powerful figures of the regime. 
On September 26, Thomaz announced publicly th a t he released Salazar from his post 
and appointed Marcello Caetano as prime minister. Caetano remained in power until 
1974.77
This sequence of events after the incapacitation of Salazar indicates th a t the 
selectorate’s grip on power was rather secure. Salazar, whose rule could be seen as 
personal rule, may have actually been disciplined by the military, and thus had an 
incentive to  promote economic development and improve people’s health.
T h a ila n d  (O c to b e r  1958 - F e b ru a ry  1968) Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat 
died from heart and lung ailments on December 8 , 1963 (Lentz 1994, p. 749). Sarit, a 
military officer, seized power in a bloodless coup in October of 1958. His dictatorial 
rule since then performed well in economic growth and health production . 78
The selectorate under Sarit’s regime appears to be King Bhumibol Adulyadej and 
the military. In February of 1959, Sarit was formally elected prime minister by the
76Maxwell (1986, p. 112) provides an alternative view, however, by noting that “[t]he Portuguese 
dictatorship was preeminently civilian and legalistic.”
77Maxwell (1986, p. 112) notes that the appointment of Caetano as premier was conditional on 
his acceptance of the military’s position on what to do with Portugal’s territories in Africa. This 
further suggests that the selectorate was the military.
78Thailand’s economic growth rate from 1958 to 1962 is 5.5 percent. Life expectancy at birth 
conditional on real GDP per capita is 11.4 years (the average of 1960 and 1962), comparable to 
the whole regime performance (see Table 4.3). Sarit does not enter Table 4.6 because his rule did 
not last more than five full calendar years.
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Constituent Assembly whose members were appointed by royal decree . 79 According 
to Chaloemtiarana (2007, p. 187), 152 out of the 2 2 0  members of the Assembly were 
military officers. Chaloemtiarana (2007, chapter 6 ) argues th a t Sarit needed the 
support from the military and the king. The support from the king appears to have 
been the most crucial for Sarit, as he “accorded the throne much more power and 
prestige than  [his] predecessors had” to seek the military regime’s legitimacy (Ibid., 
p. 205).
After the death of Sarit, the selectorate remained the same. The king’s influence 
got even stronger. Thanom Kittikachorn, a military officer who had been Deputy 
Minister and Defence Minister since 1959, succeeded Sarit by King Bhumibol’s ap­
pointm ent .80 Thanom “turned increasingly to  the king for support and advice” 
(Ibid., p. 217). The military had the last say in keeping Thanom in power. When 
Thanom ’s government faced student demonstrations in 1973, the military refused 
to suppress them, forcing Thanom to  flee the country (Nelson 2001, p. 262) 81
The above episode suggests th a t the selectorate -  the king and the military -  
had a tight grip on power. Our theory implies th a t this allowed them to credibly 
threaten to oust Sarit or Thanom in the case of a poor performance. Impressive 
performance of the Thai military regime by Sarit and Thanom on economic growth 
and health may have been due to the discipline imposed by the king and the military.
G u in e a  (O c to b e r  1958 - A p ril 1984) On March 26 of 1984, President 
Ahmed Sekou Toure died in an US hospital to  which he was taken by air from 
Guinea after suffering a heart attack on the day before .82 Sekou Toure ruled Guinea 
since its independence. As Table 4.11 shows, the performance of his rule is mis­
erable: a negative economic growth rate (-0.67%), lower life expectancy and lower 
primary school enrollment compared to countries with the same level of real GDP
79Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 16691.
80Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, p. 19814.
81 Although the Polity dataset codes 1968 as the end of Thai military regime, Thanom remained 
in power by holding multiparty parliamentary elections in which his party won. He then dissolved 
the parliament and banned political parties in 1971, restoring the military dictatorship.
82Africa Research Bulletin, March 1-31, 1984, p. 7178.
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per capita .83
The ruling selectorate appears to have been members of the political bureau of 
the sole legal party, the Parti Democratique de Guinea (PDG ) . 84 By Constitution, 
the political bureau of the PDG would meet to  choose a new leader within 45 days 
after the incapacitation of the president.85
After the death of Sekou Toure, Prime Minister Lansana Beavogui became in­
terim  president and was supposed to succeed formally by the appointment of the 
PDG political bureau .86 On April 3, however, young military officers staged a blood­
less coup with Colonel Lansana Conte becoming a new president. The PDG was 
then dissolved.
This episode indicates th a t the selectorate, the PDG political bureau, stayed 
in power solely due to  Sekou Toure’s presence. They plausibly expected th a t they 
would lose power if they removed Sekou Toure (r(</>, v) ~  0). This lack of secure 
power on the part of the selectorate may explain why Sekou Toure performed so 
badly while remaining in office.87
4.5.4 Sum mary
This tour of the evidence conducted through the lens of our model is sketchy. How­
ever, it does breathe life into the institutional setting tha t we modeled. The case 
studies suggest th a t the power of the selectorate and their role in disciplining poorly 
performing leaders could be a force in shaping the performance of autocracy in the 
absence of an electoral sanction. This leads to more turnover on average in successful
83Kaba (1977, p. 40) lists Sekou Toure’s failures in health production: the shortage of hospital 
beds in the capital city, the appointment of inexperienced individuals to hospital administration, 
medicine shortage, and Sekou Toure’s denial of a cholera epidemic in 1973.
84 Sekou Toure was a founding-member of the PDG and became Secretary General of the Party 
in 1952 (Johnson 1970, p. 350). In 1957, the PDG won multiparty elections for the Territorial 
Assembly under French rule. In November of 1958, one month after independence, the PDG 
became the sole legal party by Constitution (see Brune 1999).
85Keesing’s Record o f World Events, p. 32955.
86According to Momoh (1984, p. 757), “[t]he powerful Toure family including the ambitious 
Minister of Mines and Geology, Ismael Toure, had persuaded ... Beavogui to accept the post of 
acting president. (...) Beavougui, as it was understood, would have held the post for two or three 
years because ... the Political Bureau ... would elect him to carry on.”
87According to Jackson and Rosberg (1982, p. 210), Guinea under Sekou Toure’s rule saw “per­
sistent attempts by the government to hold to the ruler’s ideological approach while ignoring the 
lessons to be learned from economic and planning failures.”
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autocracies than in unsuccessful ones.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter is a contribution to  on-going debates about the institutional basis of 
successful government. It tries to  understand differences between good and bad 
autocracies in terms of the forces th a t shape accountability in the absence of regu­
larized elections. It does so in three steps. The first has been to develop a simple 
model of incentives to generate good policy when the decision to retain the leader is 
vested in a selectorate comprising citizens from some ruling “group” . Second, it has 
identified “successful autocracies” using objective empirical criteria. Third, it has 
used the group of autocracies identified from this exercise as a basis for case studies 
in successful autocracy with a view to matching the theory to  real world experience.
Our modeling approach makes clear th a t democracies can be better or worse 
than autocracies in terms of accountability although it suggests a presumption in 
favor of democracy on this basis. This is consistent with the raw data. In our model, 
successful autocracies are those where poor quality leadership leads to removal of 
leaders from office. While it is asking too much of a simple theory to do justice 
to  the richness of the real world experience, we find some suggestive evidence tha t 
the forces shaping leadership replacement in the way th a t the model suggests may 
be at work in successful autocracies. Leadership turnover is greater in successful 
compared to  unsuccessful autocracies. Moreover, studying the sample of successful 
autocracies th a t handled leadership deaths from natural causes reinforces the view 
th a t successful autocracies are those where the ruling group has a hold over power.
The analysis in this chapter is a first step in a wider project. It seems essential 
in collecting da ta  th a t characterizes differences in political regimes to  be guided 
by what theory suggests could be im portant. Among the large array of impressive 
data  collection exercises, there is very little th a t provides a persuasive mapping 
between things th a t shape political incentives and outcomes. For a broad category 
like autocracy, it is essential to  bridge this gap more in future work to understand
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the lessons for the genesis of good government.
This chapter provides a complement to  other on-going work in this area. The 
approach emphasizes the value of rooting our understanding in simple theoretical 
models, not least as a lens to  focus empirical exercises. It also suggests a way of 
applying agency models to the democracy-autocracy comparison which may have 
other fruitful applications. While it is evident th a t much remains to  be done to  
bring theory and data  together in understanding the forces th a t shape the quality 
of government, the theoretical tools th a t are being developed in political economy 
and the rich da ta  now available provide a secure starting point for this endeavor.
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Chapter 5 
Ethnic Favoritism: Micro 
Evidence from Guinea
5.1 Introduction
Ethnic diversity is empirically associated with low economic growth (Easterly and 
Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003), poor quality of government (La Porta et al. 1999), 
and civil wars (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).1 Investigations on the mecha­
nism of this association have so far concerned collective action problems exacerbated 
by ethnic diversity (e.g. Miguel and Gugerty 2005). Another possible mechanism 
largely ignored in the economics literature is ethnic favoritism by the government. A 
conventional wisdom has it th a t policy-makers favor their own ethnic groups in the 
allocation of public funds. As a result, citizens support politicians from their own 
ethnic group even if these politicians may be less honest or less able than those from 
other ethnic groups (Banerjee and Pande 2007). As which ethnic group is in power is 
salient, citizens even resort to violence to  have their co-ethnics in power. 2 However, 
there is a lack of systematic evidence th a t ethnic groups in power are indeed better 
off. This chapter aims to test this conventional wisdom on ethnic favoritism in a 
systematic and convincing way, in order to  provide the basis for any discussions on
1See Alesina and LaFerrara (2005) for a survey.
2Tishken (1994), in his review of a book on ethnic conflict, lists ethnic favoritism in state 
resource allocations as one reason for why many conflicts take on an ethnic dimension.
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ethnic conflicts due to  government patronage.
Evidence on ethnic favoritism by the government in the literature is largely 
anecdotal.3 W hen statistics is provided, it is often the government expenditure by 
ethno-region (e.g. Barkan and Chege 1989). Given th a t government expenditures 
often do not reach the end-users of public goods in poor countries (Reinikka and 
Svensson 2004), it is not clear whether ethnic groups in power really benefit from 
more budget allocations to their regions. This chapter looks at infant mortality as 
a measure of welfare each ethnic group actually enjoys.
Comparing each ethnic group’s welfare cross-sectionally does not allow us to 
disentangle the effect of government favoritism from heterogeneity in unobservable 
characteristics across ethnic groups. To empirically show whether it m atters which 
ethnic group is in power, we need to exploit change in the ethnicity of political 
leadership and compare changes in welfare across ethnic groups. However, change 
in the ethnicity of leadership may be endogenous to  change in each ethnic group’s 
welfare. It could be the case th a t ethnicity in power changes because a certain group 
accumulates economic power which allows it to  seize political power as well. Then 
we would wrongly attribu te improvements in welfare for the ethnic group gaining 
power to the effect of having a co-ethnic in power. Alternatively, ethnicity in power 
may change because an ethnic group discriminated by the government seizes power 
out of grievance. As a result, the ethnic group newly in power becomes better off 
after the leadership change though this change in welfare has nothing to  do with 
ethnic favoritism per se.
In order to  ensure the exogeneity of ethnicity in power, we need to look at a case 
where ethnicity in power is determined independently of relative welfare changes 
across ethnic groups. For this purpose, this chapter focuses on Guinea, a country 
in West Africa with high ethnic diversity. The president ruling this country since 
independence in 1957 unexpectedly died in office in 1984. Only eight days later, a 
group of military officers who were excluded from political power until then seized 
power with the officer most senior in rank becoming a new president. He is from a
3Bates (1983) cites several examples from Africa.
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different ethnic group than his predecessor’s. As discussed in detail in section 5.3.1 
below, the ethnicity of a new president after the sudden death of the predecessor 
was unlikely to be determined by relative change in welfare across ethnic groups. 
Therefore, changes in welfare, measured by infant mortality, after the leadership 
change for the new president’s ethnic group relative to  other groups give an unbiased 
estimate of the effect of having a co-ethnic in power.
I estimate the effect of having a co-ethnic as president a t two levels of disaggre­
gation. First, I investigate whether Guineans in districts with the new president’s 
ethnic group accounting for more than half the population improve their welfare 
after the leadership change. Second, I examine whether the new president’s ethnic 
group benefits more from the leadership change than  other ethnic groups within the 
same district. These two levels of analysis shed light on why ethnicity m atters in 
politics. If ethnicity m atters only due to its correlation with local administrative 
districts, ethnic favoritism brings about a difference in welfare a t the district level, 
but not within districts. If ethnicity m atters as an excluding devise, then a difference 
in welfare within districts should be affected by leadership change.
Empirical results obtained in this chapter do not provide evidence for ethnic 
favoritism taking place in Guinea. Districts where the new president’s ethnic group 
predominates do not see a larger drop in infant mortality than  other districts after 
the leadership change. Mothers from the new president’s ethnic group do not see 
their babies less likely to die compared to other ethnic groups in the same district 
after having their co-ethnic in power, either. Due to  several data  limitations, these 
empirical results cannot entirely exclude alternative interpretations. However, they 
do suggest tha t individual welfare does not hugely depend on which ethnic group is 
in power, a t least in the context of child survival in Guinea.
The only systematic evidence on ethnic favoritism in the literature th a t I am 
aware of is Kasara (2007), who shows th a t African leaders tax  their co-ethnics 
more heavily than other ethnic groups, by exploiting time-series variation within 
each subnational ethno-region across 30 African countries .4 Although her study has
4 More precisely, she controls for country-crop fixed effects. As “both crop production and ethnic
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more external validity than this chapter in terms of countries covered in the study, 
the endogeneity of changes in the ethnicity of leaders is not explicitly dealt with. In 
addition, unlike this chapter, she does not directly look at welfare as an outcome or 
investigate the possibility of ethnic favoritism within region by using individual-level 
data.
This chapter also relates to the theoretical literature on ethnic politics. Bates 
(1983) argues tha t ethnicity m atters in politics because ethnic groups are spacially 
clustered and because the provision of local public goods such as roads, schools, and 
clinics has a spatial aspect. I investigate the district-level favoritism to see if this 
argument can be supported by systematic empirical evidence.
Fearon (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) propose an alternative theoretical 
reason for the salience of ethnicity in politics .5 They argue th a t ethnicity functions as 
an excluding device in the allocation of public funds. By restricting access to  public 
funds by ethnicity which people cannot easily change, those in power can avoid the 
dilution of each one’s share of the spoils such as tax  revenues from natural resource 
exports. This argument implies th a t ethnic favoritism occurs at the individual level 
even in the same area. Therefore, I also examine within-district favoritism and see 
if the ethnic group in power is better off than  other groups within the same area.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides the background 
to  this study. Section 5.3 describes identification strategy and data. Sections 5.4 
and 5.5 show empirical results on ethnic favoritism a t the district level and within 
districts, respectively, followed by the concluding section.
5.2 Background
This section provides background information on Guinea and its ethnic groups. 
After a brief discussion on the representativeness of Guinea for sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole, I show how Guinean ethnic groups differ from each other and th a t the
groups are geographically concentrated” (Kasara 2007, p. 160) in Africa, country-crop combinations 
correspond to ethnic groups in each country.
5Bates (1983, p. 158) also mentions this mechanism briefly.
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conflict among them  is a persistent feature of the Guinean history to date. These 
pieces of information confirm th a t Guinea is an appropriate country to  study on 
ethnic favoritism. Finally, I explain why we would expect ethnic favoritism to  affect 
infant mortality, the outcome under investigation in this chapter, in Guinea after 
1984.
5.2.1 Ethnic Groups in Guinea
Guinea is a country in West Africa with the population of over 7 million. Its GDP 
per capita in purchasing power parity terms is close to the average of 48 sub-Saharan 
African countries in 2000 though economic growth between 1960 and 2 0 0 0  is among 
the worst in the region .6 Infant mortality per 1,000 live births has always been above 
the African average. 7 Ethnic diversity is also higher than the African average.8 
These statistics suggest th a t what we see in Guinea is likely to  represent the basket 
case even by African standards .9
Guinea has six major ethnic groups: Sousou, Peulh, Malinke, Kissi, Toma, and 
Guerze, with the last three groups often grouped together as “Foresters” . 10 Accord­
ing to O ’Toole and Baker (2005, p. 163), the estimated ethnic composition in 2000 
was 40 percent Peulh, 30 percent Malinke, 20 percent Sousou, and 10 percent other 
groups.
Members of each group speak different languages though the Sousou, Malinke, 
Toma, and Guerze languages are more similar to  each other (belonging to the Mande
6Guinea’s real GDP per capita is 2,546 US dollars in purchasing power parity terms in 2000 
while the African average is 2,633 dollars. The Guinean economic growth rate between 1960 and 
2000 is -0.47 percent, which is the fourth lowest among 33 African countries with data available. 
All the figures are based on Penn World Table 6.2.
7Infant mortality per 1,000 live births for Guinea and for the African average is 215 versus 
160 in 1960, 162 versus 105 in 1985, and 112 versus 95 in 2000 (World Development Indicators, 
September 2006).
8The ethnic fractionalization index (Alesina et al. 2003) is 0.74 for Guinea and 0.66 on average 
for 47 sub-Saharan African countries. Guinea’s ethnic polarization index (Montalvo and Reynal- 
Querol 2005) is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa (0.84).
9Indeed, the 2007 Failed State Index, compiled by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy 
magazine, ranks Guinea as the 9th most fragile state in the world (see “The Failed State Index 
2007,” Foreign Policy, July/August 2007, pp. 54-63).
10There are various spellings for the names of ethnic groups in Guinea (Susu or Sosso for Sousou; 
Fulbe, Fula, Fulani, or Peul for Peulh; Maninka, Mandinka, or Manding for Malinke; Loma for 
Toma; Kpelle for Guerze). I follow the spelling in the codebook of the Demographic and Health 
Survey conducted in Guinea in 1999 (the dataset used in this chapter).
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language group) than to the rest. Although French is the official language of Guinea, 
only about 20 percent of the population understand French (O’Toole and Baker 2005, 
p. 93). One can identify each other’s ethnicity from their surname to some extent . 11
Sousou, Peulh, Malinke, and “Foresters” each predominate in one of the four 
topographical regions: Lower Guinea (or Guinee Maritime), Middle Guinea (or Futa 
Jalon), Upper Guinea (or Haute Guinee), and Forest Guinea (or Guinee Forestiere), 
respectively. Each region has a slightly different climate pattern  and thus people 
cultivate different crops, implying th a t a simple cross-sectional comparison of ethnic 
groups in terms of welfare can be misleading.
The six ethnic groups in Guinea are socially and culturally distinctive . 12 Peulh 
is particularly different from the rest. Its subsistence economy depends on animal 
husbandry a lot more than the other groups in Guinea. Core membership of Peulh 
kin groups is confined to  a single community while lineages for the other groups 
comprise residents of more than one community. Settlement patterns differ, too. For 
Peulh, a community comprises a nucleated village or town with outlying homesteads 
or satellite hamlets. For other groups, a community is just a nucleated village or 
town only. Finally, Peulh traditional society is more politically complex: there 
is a jurisdictional level above local communities. For other ethnic groups, each 
community is traditionally independent.
Non-Peulh ethnic groups also exhibit differences. In term s of family organi­
zation, Sousou, Malinke, and Kissi have large extended families while Toma and 
Guerze families are independent. Polygyny is general for all groups, but co-wives 
live together for Sousou and Guerze, but occupy separate quarters for the rest. For 
rules for inheritance of real property, all groups are patrilineal. But a m an’s property 
is inherited by his sons in Kissi and Guerze societies while the other groups desig­
nate other patrilineal heirs than sons. In Kissi society, the inheritance is equally 
distributed among all sons. In Guerze, on the other hand, the senior son inherits
11 Guineans with family names such as Bah, Balde, Barry, Diallo, Sow, Tall, and Thiam are 
generally Peulh while family names Camara, Conde, Diawara, Fofana, Kante, Kourouma, Kouyate, 
Soumaoro, and TYaore indicate the Malinke people (O’Toole and Baker 2005, pp. 96 and 139).
12The following two paragraphs are derived from entries in columns 7, 14, 20, 30, 32, 74, and 76 
for Af2 (Kissi), A fll (Toma), Afl5 (Kpelle), Ag6 (Futajakonke), Ag9 (Malinke), and Ag26 (Susu) 
in tables of Murdock (1967).
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real property. For inheritance of movable property, all but Sousou follow the same 
rule as for real property. Sousou society now allows a m an’s sons to  equally inherit.
Do these ethnic groups in Guinea differ in socio-economic characteristics today? 
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 show the shares of women aged 15-49 in 1999 who have 
attended primary school, own a television set, and have access to  electricity, respec­
tively, calculated for each of the four ethnic groups (Kissi, Toma, and Guerze are 
grouped together as Foresters) by district. In 24 out of 38 districts, a t least one eth­
nic group is statistically different from the other groups in terms of the proportion of 
educated women. For the ownership of a television set and the access to electricity, 
12 and 13 districts see a statistically significant difference in the prevalence across 
ethnic groups. In particular, all five communes in Conakry, which are much smaller 
areas than the other 33 districts, show significant socio-economic differences across 
ethnic groups in at least one dimension, suggesting th a t ethnicity, rather than the 
area of residence, makes a difference in socio-economic outcomes. At the country 
level, every ethnic group is significantly different from each other (except for Malinke 
and Foresters in the level of education).
5.2.2 H istory of Ethnic Rivalries
Ethnic groups in Guinea have a long history of rivalry. During pre-colonial days, 
Peulh rulers oppressed Sousou people while Foresters fought against the invasion by 
Malinke people . 13 Under the French colonial rule starting a t the end of the 19th 
century, the four ethnic groups could not agree on the location of a new secondary 
school financed by the colonial authority in 1947.14 Most political parties formed 
after 1945 were ethnically-based . 15 Prior to  independence, there were riots against 
Peulh people, especially by Sousou people . 16
Guinea became independent from France in 1958 after Guineans voted for inde­
pendence in a referendum .17 Ahmed Sekou Toure, a Malinke, became president and
13See O’Toole and Baker (2005), pp. xxxvii, xxxvix, 81-2.
14See Adamolekun (1976), p. 125.
15See O’Toole and Baker (2005), p. 160.
16See ibid., pp. xl-xli, and Adamolekun (1976), p. 125.
17In this referendum, Peulh people are said to have voted against independence, and because of
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Table 5.1: Shares of Educated Women by Ethnicity and District
District Sousou Peulh Malinke Foresters Total
Prefectures in Lower Guinea
Boffa 11% 16% 50% 100%*** 13%
Boke 15% 9% 11% 38% 13%
Coyah 23% 14% 36% 100%** 24%
Dubreka 5% 0% 4% 4%
Forecariah 4% 17% 4% 0%* 5%
Fria 5% 13% 0% 100%*** 7%
Kindia 5% 4% 15% 100%*** 6%
Telimele 0%* 3% - 11% 3%
Prefectures in Middle Guinea
Dalaba 4%** 0%** 3%
Gaoual 9% 13% 0% 9%
Koubia 3% 3%
Koundara 40%*** 13% 10% 0%* 13%
Labe 100%*** 16% 9% 16%
Lelouma 1%*** 6%*** 2%
Mali 100%*** 6% 0% 6%
Mamou 20% 0% 15% 1%
Pita 2% 2%
Tougue 0%* 6%* 6%
Prefectures in Upper Guinea
Dabola 100%*** 1% 4% 3%
Dinguiraye 0% 2% 8% 6%
Faranah 4% 0% 9%* 7%
Kankan 36% 7%* 63%*** 9%
Kerouane 100%*** 8% 11% 33% 12%
Kouroussa 3%*** 100%*** 4%
Mandiana 0%* 7% 100%*** 7%
Siguiri 13% 5% 5%
Prefectures in Forest Guinea
Beyla 2% 2%
Gueckedou 100%*** 4%* 19% 12% 13%
Kissidougou 0%*** 18%* 36%* 25%
Lola 0% 3% 9% 8%
Macenta 5% 7% 7% 7%
Nzerekore 11% 9% 13% 12%
Yomou 86%*** 67% 12%** 17%
Communes in Conakry
Dixinn 44% 38% 56% 42%
Kaloum 48% 42% 73% 24%*** 49%
Matam 62% 46%* 65% 100%*** 60%
Matoto 44% 48% 53% 74%* 48%
Ratoma 41% 30%* 59%* 74%*** 41%
Total 2 2 %*** 9%*** 12% 16% 13%
Sources: Guinea Demographic and Health Survey in 1999.
Notes: Shown in this table are the sample shares of women who went to primary school among all women aged 
between 15 to  49 by ethnicity and district. Stars indicate whether the share is significantly different from the other 
three ethnic groups altogether. Difference in samplling probabilities across clusters and the two-stage sampling 
procedure is taken into account in the calculation. * significant at 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 5.2: Shares of Women Owning a Television by Ethnicity and District
District Sousou Peulh Malinke Foresters Total
Prefectures in Lower Guinea
Boffa 0 % 4% 1 0 0 %*** 0 % 4%
Boke 7% 9% 2 2 %*** 38% 1 0 %
Coyah 25% 54% 92%** 50% 36%
Dubreka 1 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
Forecariah 5% 0 % 0 % 65%*** 7%
Fria 14%* 28%* 0 % 0 % 17%
Kindia 3% 6 % 24% 0 %* 6 %
Telimele 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Prefectures in Middle Guinea
Dalaba 3% 0 % 3%
Gaoual 1 % 0 % 0 % 1 %
Koubia 0 % 0 %
Koundara 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Labe 0 % 1 2 % 9% 1 2 %
Lelouma 1 % 0 % 1 %
Mali 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Mamou 1 0 0 %*** 1 % 6 % 2 %
Pita 0 % 0 %
Tougue 0 % 0 % 0 %
Prefectures in Upper Guinea
Dabola 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Dinguiraye 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Faranah 17% 0 % 8 % 9%
Kankan 0 % 3% 0 % 3%
Kerouane 0 % 0 % 2 % 0 % 1 %
Kouroussa 0 % 0 % 0 %
Mandiana 0 % 1 % 0 % 1%
Siguiri 0 % 0 % 0 %
Prefectures in Forest Guinea
Beyla 1 % 1 %
Gueckedou 0 % 1 % 0 % 1 % 1 %
Kissidougou 0 % 0 % 4% 0 % 2 %
Lola 0 % 3% 1 % 1 %
Macenta 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Nzerekore 0 % 14% 3% 5%
Yomou 71%** 56%* 5%** 9%
Communes in Conakry
Dixinn 71%* 43%*** 95%*** 57%
Kaloum 59% 53% 73% 67% 61%
Matam 58% 46% 79%* 1 0 0 %*** 59%
Matoto 44% 42% 62%* 2 0 %** 47%
Ratoma 59% 43%* 70% 70% 55%
Total 23%*** 7%*** 8 % 3%*** 1 0 %
Sources: Guinea Demographic and Health Survey in 1999.
Notes: Shown in this table are the sample shares of women whose household owns a television set among all women 
aged between 15 to 49 by ethnicity and district. Stars indicate whether the share is significantly different from 
the other three ethnic groups altogether. Difference in samplling probabilities across clusters and the two-stage 
sampling procedure is taken into account in the calculation. * significant at 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 5.3: Shares of Women with Access to Electricity by Ethnicity and District
District Sousou Peulh Malinke Foresters Total
Prefectures in Lower Guinea
Boffa 1 1 % 4% 1 0 0 %*** 1 0 0 %*** 14%
Boke 19% 25% 30% 45% 23%
Coyah 48% 8 8 % 92% 1 0 0 % 59%
Dubreka 4% 0 % 71%* 6 %
Forecariah 6 % 30%*** 0 % 65%*** 1 0 %
Fria 17% 40% 0 % 1 0 0 %** 23%
Kindia 7% 15% 47%* 0 % 1 2 %
Telimele 0 % 1 % 0 % 1 %
Prefectures in Middle Guinea
Dalaba 4% 0 % 3%
Gaoual 2 % 0 % 0 % 2 %
Koubia 0 % 0 %
Koundara 0 % 5% 18% 0 % 7%
Labe 0 % 7% 9% 7%
Lelouma 3% 0 % 3%
Mali 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Mamou 1 0 0 %*** 2 % 6 % 3%
Pita 0 % 0 %
Tougue 0 % 0 % 0 %
Prefectures in Upper Guinea
Dabola 1 0 0 %*** 5% 15% 1 1 %
Dinguiraye 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Faranah 17% 17% 23% 2 1 %
Kankan 0 % 4% 0 % 4%
Kerouane 0 % 0 % 6 % 0 % 5%
Kouroussa 1 % 0 % 1 %
Mandiana 0 % 3% 0 % 3%
Siguiri 25% 2 % 2 %
Prefectures in Forest Guinea
Beyla 0 % 0 %
Gueckedou 1 0 0 %*** 1 % 0 % 1 % 2 %
Kissidougou 0 %* 0 %* 1 1 % 2 % 6 %
Lola 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Macenta 0 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
Nzerekore 0 % 0 % 1 % 1 %
Yomou 71%** 56%* 5%** 9%
Communes in Conakry
Dixinn 89% 77% 97%* 83%
Kaloum 60% 73% 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 69%
Matam 79% 89% 79% 1 0 0 %** 81%
Matoto 62% 6 8 % 79% 74% 6 8 %
Ratoma 75% 58%* 85% 56% 70%
Total 33%*** 1 2 %** 1 2 %* 15%
Sources: Guinea Demographic and Health Survey in 1999.
Notes: Shown in this table are the sample shares of women whose household has access to electricity among all 
women aged between 15 to 49 by ethnicity and district. Stars indicate whether the share is significantly different 
from the other three ethnic groups altogether. Difference in samplling probabilities across clusters and the two-stage 
sampling procedure is taken into account in the calculation. * significant at 10% level, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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established one-party rule immediately after independence. He was accused of ig­
noring Middle Guinea (and thus Peulh people living there) in the first development 
plan for 1960 to  1962.18 His ethnic group, Malinke, was allegedly overrepresented in 
the army and in top leadership . 19 In 1976, Peulh leaders were alledged to  attem pt 
a coup against President Toure .20
Sekou Toure died in office unexpectedly on March 26, 1984, a t the age of 62.21 
Upon Sekou Toure’s sudden death, Lansana Beavogui, a Toma who had been prime 
minister under Toure’s rule since 1972, became interim president. Only eight days 
later, Colonel Lansana Conte, a Sousou, staged a coup against the interim gov­
ernment and became president. (It is this leadership change th a t I exploit in the 
empirical analysis below.) His presidential guards were said to be mostly Sousou .22 
When Diara Traore, a Malinke military officer who was number two in Conte’s 
military government, attem pted a coup in 1985, there was looting against Malinke 
people in the capital city of Conakry .23
In 1990, when the first local elections were held, violent clashes between ethnic 
factions errupted in some areas .24 When opposition parties were legalized in 1992, 
most newly formed political parties were ethnically based .25 In 1993, the first mul­
tiparty  presidential election since independence was held in which Lansana Conte 
won with 52 percent of valid votes (Brune 1999, p. 457). Conte was re-elected in 
1998 and 2003, and as of July of 2007, he is still in power. Today, with President
this they suffered some discrimination after independence (see, for example, “Guinea: Breaking 
the Circle,” Africa Confidential, September 24, 1976, p. 4). However, Brune (1999, p. 454) shows 
that the only 4.8 percent of the votes cast were against independence while Peulh people were 
accounted for about 30 percent of the population in 1955 (Riviere 1977, p. 31).
18See Adamolekun (1976), p. 132.
19See ibid., pp. 131-2, 172-3. See also Everett (1985), p. 23. According to Yansane (1990, 
footnote 48), however, “Toure certainly did not favor any ethnic group except for his family.” As 
his family members are, by definition, all Malinke, this “family” favoritism may have been seen as 
ethnic favoritism.
20See O’Toole and Baker (2005), p. 96.
21 Adamolekun (1976) and Riviere (1977) argue that Sekou Toure was successful in integrating 
ethnic groups in Guinea. Gardinier (1988), however, points out that it is not clear how Toure 
managed to integrate Guineans while his education policy led to a situation where “primary and 
secondary school classes were taught only in local dialects” (Everett 1985, p. 23).
22See Schissel (1986), p. 23.
23See O’Toole and Baker (2005), p. 203. Presumably, non-Malinke citizens in Conakry saw this 
coup as Malinke’s attempt to seize power back. As will be discussed in Section 5.3.1 below, though, 
a closer look reveals that this attempted coup does not appear to be ethnically motivated.
24See ibid., p. xlvi.
25See ibid., p. 161.
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Conte’s ailing health conditions, there is fear of civil wars between ethnic groups 
after his death. Peulh people are reported to  demand presidency after almost five 
decades of rules by other ethnic groups .26
The above description of Guinean history shows th a t ethnicity appears to have 
been salient in this country for a long time. W hether or not the ethnicity of the 
president m atters for each ethnic group’s welfare, however, is an empirical question 
which this chapter aims to answer.
5.2.3 H ealth  Care System  in Guinea
To estimate the impact of leadership ethnicity change, I look at infant mortality as 
an outcome. An obvious question is why we expect infant mortality to  change as a 
result of ethnic favoritism. A plausible mechanism in the context of Guinea in the 
mid-1980s is a selective revamp of primary health care systems.
By the end of Sekou Toure’s rule, health systems in Guinea collapsed severely. 
Kaba (1977, p. 40) reports th a t despite a rapid population growth of Conakry, no 
new hospital was constructed in the city. Inexperienced individuals were appointed 
to hospital administration. Medicine shortage was endemic. Toure even denied a 
cholera epidemic in 1973. Knippenberg et al. (1997, pp. S30-S31) describes the state 
of the Guinean health system right after the death of Toure in 1984. Storage and 
distribution of vaccine and drugs was inadequate due to  scarcity of spare parts for 
refrigerators and of fuel for vehicles. The lack of financial resources due to  Toure’s 
economic mismanagement exacerbated the unavailability of drugs. Access to  health 
services was limited due to a long distance to clinics. Health staff could not travel 
to villages for outreach activities because of lack of transport or fuel. The quality 
of health service, if provided, was perceived as poor by Guineans.
After seizing power, Lansana Conte initiated the revitalization of health systems 
in 1986 by formulating a new health policy (World Bank 2005, p. 1) and by de­
veloping prim ary health care centers throughout the country with an emphasis on 
child and maternal care (Glik et al. 1989, p. 423). Prim ary health care in Guinea
26See Sillah (2007).
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is organized a t the level of 38 health districts (33 prefectures and 5 communes in 
the capital city ) . 27 Therefore, Conte could have deliberately allocated public funds 
and human resources for health care preferentially to districts where his co-ethnics 
predominate. In addition, district health system managers may have needed to  ta r­
get Sousou-dominated towns and villages within their district in the improvement 
of health care systems, in order to show their loyalty to  the president. Given the 
extremely poor conditions of the health care system after the death of Sekou Toure 
as described above, such selective attem pts to improve the system in favor of Sousou 
people could have resulted in an immediate change in infant mortality.
5.3 Identification Strategy and Data
5.3.1 Exogenous Change in P resident’s Ethnicity?
As indicated above, there have been only two presidents in Guinea since indepen­
dence, and the president’s ethnicity changed from Malinke to  Sousou in 1984.
I exploit this change in the ethnicity of the president of Guinea in 1984 to  estimate 
the effect of having a co-ethnic as president on individual welfare measured by infant 
mortality. An obvious issue on this identification strategy is whether the seizure of 
power by Conte, a Sousou military officer, is exogenous to  changes in determinants 
of the welfare of Sousou people, or Guineans in Sousou-dominated districts, over 
time.
The welfare of Sousou people is unlikely to be correlated with the fact tha t 
Conte seized power and stayed in office for four reasons. First, Conte had not 
been politically powerful before the coup. Momoh (1984, p. 756) describes him as 
belonging to “the less privileged sector of Guinean armed forces” . As a result, it 
is unlikely th a t he accumulated economic and political power of Sousou people by 
using his position in the government and th a t this allowed him to  seize power.
Second, the military coup does not seem to  have been ethnically motivated, 
suggesting th a t Sousou’s economic power was unlikely to be crucial for Conte to
27See Millimouno et al. (2006, p. 17).
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seize power. Several non-Sousou military officers participated in the military coup. 
As mentioned above, the number two figure in Conte’s government, Diara Traore, 
is a Malinke .28 Among the other 16 original members of the m ilitary jun ta  (Comite 
Militaire de Redressment National), one major, two captains, and one lieutenant 
are Peulh, and four majors are Malinke, judging from their surnam es .29 Another 
member of the military junta, Captain Jean Traore, is from Forest Guinea, where 
‘Foresters’ (Kissi, Toma, Guerze) reside, and he is thought to  be one of the closest to 
Conte . 30 On the other hand, the only Sousou politician among top political leaders 
under Toure’s rule, N’Famara Keita (see Adamolekun 1976, pp. 173-4), was arrested
after the coup and died in prison a year after .31
Third, the 1985 attem pted coup by Traore does not appear to have been a 
clash between Sousou and Malinke ethnic groups, suggesting th a t Sousou’s economic 
power was unlikely to be decisive for Conte to  stay in power. Ousmane Sow, whose 
surname indicates th a t he is a Peulh (O’Toole and Baker 2005, p. 96), led a battalion 
to first counter-attack Diara Traore’s soldiers during the 1985 coup attem pt. In 
addition, not all Malinke officers supported Traore .32
Finally, Conte became president because he was the most senior in rank among 
the coup plotters (Hodonou 2004), and the reason for his senior position does not 
appear to have been his ethnic background but his military talent. He was a sergeant 
at the time of independence. In 1970, when Portugal invaded Conakry, the capital 
city, to attack the headquarters of the independence movement for Guinea-Bissau 
and Cape Verde (which were Portuguese colonies a t th a t time), Conte was in charge 
of the defense of Conakry and successful to repel the Portuguese invasion. After­
wards, he was named captain for the exceptional service to  his country .33 Conte 
may have been able to lead the military jun ta  because of this military background.
I cannot entirely exclude the possibility th a t Conte seized power because the
28According to Kaba (1985, p. 178), Traore was the “main force” behind the coup.
29See Momoh (1984) for the list of members of the military junta. I rely on O’Toole and Baker 
(2005, pp. 96, 117, and 139) for which surname is typical for which ethnic group.
30Africa Contemporary Record, 1984-1985, p. B470; O’Toole and Baker (2005), p. 203.
31 See Keesing’s Record of World Events, p. 33710 (July 1985) and O’Toole and Baker (2005, p. 
124).
32See “Guinea: Diarra Traore’s Attempted Comeback,” West Africa, 15 July 1985, pp. 1412-3.
33See O’Toole and Baker (2005, pp. 55 and 164-5).
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Sousou-dominated region was becoming relatively better-off than others, however. 
Lower Guinea, where the Sousou predominates and his home village is located, 
has m ajor bauxite mines in operation during the 1970s and the 1980s (see Campbell 
1991, pp. 34-39). Given th a t Guinea possesses about one-third of the world’s highest- 
grade bauxite deposits and has been the world’s leading exporter, bauxite mining 
could have been a huge source of economic power though it is not clear to  what 
extent local people benefited from bauxite mines as local processing of bauxite was 
limited (Campbell 1991). In addition, Conte was a commander of the Boke military 
region in Lower Guinea (Hodonou 2004), where there was one bauxite mine in 
operation since 1973. He might have accumulated personal wealth from bauxite 
export, which could have allowed him to  buy support for his presidency. In fact, 
the m ilitary’s support for Conte, which is likely to be crucial for political survival in 
non-democratic politics, appears to  have been based on the improvements in living 
conditions among officers and soldiers in the army . 34 This might not have been 
possible if Conte’s regional base was a poor area.
To partly deal with this concern, I will control for district-specific linear trends in 
infant mortality in the analysis of district-level favoritism. W hen I look a t within- 
district level favoritism, however, the above concern is minimal as I control for 
district-year fixed effects to allow any arbitrary trends in infant mortality a t the 
district level.
5.3.2 D ata
The data  source used in this chapter is the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
conducted in Guinea during May and June of 1999. In the survey, a nationally 
representative sample of women aged 15 to 49 (6,753 in total) are interviewed on, 
among others, their ethnicity and their children’s birth  date and, if applicable, age 
at death in months. From these interview results, I construct a panel dataset of
34According to Momoh (1984, p. 757), under Sekou Toure’s rule, “[w]ages for the armed forces 
had been poor while housing was short and mostly in deplorable conditions.” On the other hand, 
Conte ensured that the army would be shielded from the public sector payroll cut under the 
structural adjustment (Africa Contemporary Record, 1984-85, p. B473).
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mothers with the time dimension being the b irth  year of their children. From this 
sample, I drop babies born within 12 months before the survey, because these babies 
may die before their first birthday, causing measurement error. The resulting sample 
contains 21,739 babies born to  5,183 women. The earliest year of birth  in the sample 
is 1961.
I drop babies born to foreign women (252 in total) as we are interested in 
individual-level favoritism among Guineans.
Although the surveyed mothers are nationally representative, babies in the con­
structed panel data  are not, because babies born to women who are over 49 years old 
or dead at the survey date are missing from the sample. If the survival of these miss­
ing babies is systematically different from those in the sample, then my estimation 
results would be biased. I will come back to this issue below.
From information on the age at death, I create a dummy variable for infant 
death (death within the first year of life) as the dependent variable in the following 
analysis. For exogenous controls, I also create dummy variables for baby girls and 
babies born in multiple birth  (twins, triplets, and quadruplets) because baby girls 
are known to  be less likely to  die for biological reasons and babies born in multiple 
birth are more likely to die. These variables are included as regressors to  increase 
the precision of coefficient estimates.
To identify Sousou-dominated districts, I obtain the share of Sousou people in the 
population by district in the following way. I calculate the sample share of Sousou 
women among all women aged between 15 and 49 in each district in 1999, by using 
the sample of all surveyed women, including those who do not give any birth  in 
the past. Table 5.4 shows the share of Sousou women in each district obtained this 
way. If the share exceeds 50 percent, I trea t such districts as Sousou-dominated. 
Prefectures in Lower Guinea except for Boke and Telimele, and two out of five 
communes in Conakry turn  out to be Sousou-dominated.
These obtained sample shares of Sousou women may differ from the actual shares 
of Sousou people relevant to ethnic favoritism because the share of Sousou men is 
not taken into account and because the ethnic group distribution in each district
171
Table 5.4: Shares of Sousou Women by District
District Name Sousou share
Prefectures in Lower Guinea
Boffa 87.5%
Boke 46.4%
Coyah 67.1%
Dubreka 86.9%
Forecariah 73.8%
Fria 74.3%
Kindia 56.3%
Telimele 0.9%
Prefectures in Middle Guinea
Dalaba 0 .0 %
Gaoual 0 .0 %
Koubia 0 .0 %
Koundara 3.3%
Labe 0 .6 %
Lelouma 0 .0 %
Mali 0 .6 %
Mamou 1 .0 %
Pita 0 .0 %
Tougue 1.5%
Prefectures in Upper Guinea
Dabola 0.9%
Dinguiraye 0.9%
Faranah 19.2%
Kankan 0 .0 %
Kerouane 0.9%
Kouroussa 0 .0 %
Mandiana 0 .0 %
Siguiri 0 .0 %
Prefectures in Forest Guinea
Beyla 0 .0 %
Gueckedou 0.9%
Kissidougou 0.9%
Lola 0 .0 %
Macenta 0 .0 %
Nzerekore 0 .0 %
Yomou 0 .0 %
Communes in Conakry
Dixinn 26.4%
Kaloum 64.9%
Matam 67.3%
Matoto 41.5%
Ratoma 36.2%
Notes: Shown in this table are the sample shares of Sousou women among all women aged between 15 to 49 by 
district. See Appendix C for details on how these figures are obtained.
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may be different between in the late 1980s and in 1999. In addition, the surveyed 
women may not be representative for each district because sampling is stratified 
not by district but by five regions (Lower Guinea, Middle Guinea, Upper Guinea, 
Forest Guinea, and Conakry). Due to the lack of data, however, this is the only 
way of obtaining ethnicity shares in each district. As I only exploit whether Sousou 
people’s share is over 50 percent of the population, this procedure is unlikely to yield 
a substantial misclassification of Sousou-dominated districts.
The survey results provide where interviewed mothers live a t the survey time. 
However, there is no information on whether and when these mothers migrated to 
the surveyed place. As a result, I inevitably misallocate some babies to the places 
where they were not actually born. This could bias the estimation of the impact 
of leadership change because after Lansana Conte seized power, some of more than 
one million Guineans (which is up to  20 percent of the population) who had fled 
the country due to the repressive nature of Sekou Toure’s rule returned to  Guinea, 
though the number of such returnees is not very large (O’Toole and Baker 2005, p. 
171). This issue will be discussed below where appropriate.
5.3.3 Sum mary Statistics
Table 5.5 shows the average infant m ortality rates by period and subsample. Overall,
12.3 percent of live births lead to  death within the first year of life in Guinea, and the 
rate has been on the decline from 15.4 percent until 1984 to 11.1 percent since 1985. 
Districts where the majority of women are Sousou have a lower infant mortality 
rate on average than the other districts (10.8 versus 12.7 percent). The decline in 
infant m ortality is quicker in Sousou majority districts (5.5 versus 4.1 percentage 
points), suggesting the possibility th a t the government treats these districts better 
after 1984. Babies born to Sousou mothers are less likely to die within the first 
year of life than those born to women of the other ethnic groups (10.2 versus 12.9 
percent). However, the fall of infant mortality is quicker for non-Sousou babies than 
for Sousou babies (4.5 versus 3.6 percentage points). Of course, these raw statistics 
may, for example, reflect change in the composition of mothers over time which
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has nothing to do with the change in the ethnicity of the president. The following 
sections deal with such concerns.
Table 5.5: Sample Average Infant M ortality Rates
Sample All Years Until 1984 From 1985
All 12.3% 15.4% 1 1 .1 %
(21739) (6406) (15333)
Sousou m ajority districts 1 0 .8 % 14.6% 9.1%
(3861) (1191) (2670)
Other districts 12.7% 15.6% 11.5%
(17878) (5215) (12663)
Sousou mothers 1 0 .2 % 12.7% 9.1%
(4315) (1366) (2949)
Other mothers 12.9% 16.1% 1 1 .6 %
(17424) (5040) (12384)
Notes: The numbers of observations are in parentheses.
5.4 Favoritism at the District Level?
First, we look at whether Lansana Conte favors districts where his ethnic group, 
Sousou, accounts for the majority of the population. The following equation is 
estimated:
Vimdt — +  Pt +  7 * 1(£ >  1984) +  SDd * 1 (t > 1993) +  Ximdt@ T  Eimdt' (b-1)
The dependent variable, yimdt, is a dummy indicating whether baby i born to mother 
m  in district d in year t  dies within the first year of life.35 a m and (3t are a mother 
fixed effect and a birth-year fixed effect, respectively. Dd is a dummy equal to 1 
if Sousou accounts for the majority of the population in district d , and 1 (*) is an 
indicator function which is 1 if the argument in parentheses is true and 0  otherwise. 
A vector of exogenous controls, Ximdt, includes dummies for whether baby i is a
girl and for whether baby i is born in multiple birth.
35Throughout the empirical analysis in this chapter, babies born until 1970 are treated as born in 
the same year. There are only 516 such babies (2.4 percent of the sample), and estimating year fixed 
effects (or district-year fixed effects in Section 5) for each single year until 1970 is computationally 
demanding and may yield inaccurate estimates of fixed effects.
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Coefficient 7  measures changes in infant m ortality for babies of a mother in 
Sousou-majority districts, relative to babies for a mother in the other districts, after 
Conte seized power. I additionally control for Dd * l ( t  > 1993) to  allow the pattern  
of regional favoritism to change after m ultiparty elections are introduced in 1993.36 
Therefore, coefficient 7  measures the impact of Conte’s power until multiparty elec­
tions were introduced. In the estimation, standard errors are clustered a t the district 
level to take into account serial and spatial correlations in each district.
The identifying assumption for consistent estimation of 7  is th a t the error term, 
Eimdti is strictly exogenous to Dd * l( t  > 1984) and D d * 1 (£ >  1993) conditional 
on mother and year fixed effects and exogenous covariates. As mother fixed effects 
are controlled for, changes in the composition of mothers over time for each dis­
trict do not affect this identifying assumption. If economic conditions in Sousou 
majority districts were improving around 1984 while there was no such improve­
ment in other areas of Guinea, however, this assumption breaks down. In some 
specifications, I partly deal with this concern by replacing year fixed effects with 
region-year fixed effects where regions include Lower Guinea, Middle Guinea, Upper 
Guinea, Forest Guinea, and Conakry. Since Sousou m ajority districts are located 
in either Lower Guinea or Conakry (see Table 5.4), this specification exploits vari­
ation within these two regions only, minimizing the difference in the trajectory of 
the error term  between Sousou-majority districts and others. Also, I additionally 
control for district-specific linear trends to  take into account the possibility tha t 
Sousou-majority districts exhibit a steeper linear declining trend in infant mortality 
over time, perhaps due to bauxite mining as discussed in Section 5.3.1.
Table 5.6 shows the results of estimating equation (5.1). Column (1 ) shows 
tha t infant mortality drops by 2.3 percentage points for mothers living in Sousou- 
majority districts after 1984, and this result is statistically significant a t 10 percent 
level. Column (2 ) controls for region-year fixed effects instead of year fixed effects. 
The estimate becomes noisier, but the magnitude of the coefficient becomes larger. 
Column (3) additionally controls for district-specific linear trends. Now the sign of
36See Posner (2005, 2007) for the impact of political regime change on ethnic politics.
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the coefficient flips, and it is not statistically significant. These results suggest tha t 
Sousou-majority districts have a steeper declining trend in infant mortality than 
the other districts over time, casting doubt on the interpretation th a t the coefficient 
estimates in columns (1 ) and (2 ) reflect the effect of Conte seizing power. Columns 
(4) and (5) restrict the sample to  mothers in urban and rural areas, respectively, 
with the same specification as in column (3). As health care provisions to  rural 
areas require an extra effort for health professionals (e.g. outreach activities), it 
might be the case th a t regional favoritism affects the welfare for urban people only. 
Alternatively, if health care provision in urban areas had already reached a certain 
level before 1984, regional favoritism might only affect the welfare for those in ru­
ral areas. Estimation results in columns (4) and (5) suggest th a t neither of these 
hypotheses appears to  be the case. Interestingly, urban areas in Sousou-majority 
districts became worse off after multiparty elections were introduced in 1993.
To investigate further whether results in columns (1) and (2 ) are solely due to a 
steeper declining trend in infant mortality in Sousou-majority districts, I estimate 
the following equation:
1993
Himdt =  &m T  fit T  ^   ^ 7jDd, * 1 (t — j )  +  fiDd * l ( t  > 1993) +  XimdtO +  Eimdt• (5.2)
j=1975
Coefficient 7 j measures changes in infant m ortality in year j  compared to the period 
until 1974. Estim ated 7 j ’s in the three specifications (year fixed effects, region-year 
fixed effects, and region-year fixed effects with district-specific linear trends) are 
shown in Table 5.7 and plotted in Figure 5.1. The figure does not show clearly 
th a t infant mortality in Sousou-majority districts relative to  the other districts has 
dropped since 1984.
There are three data issues th a t may cause estimation bias in the above results. 
As discussed in Section 5.3.2, some Guineans in exile during Sekou Toure’s rule 
returned home after 1984. If these people had lived a better life in exile than 
they did after coming home and mainly returned to  Sousou-dominated districts— 
relatively better-off areas in Guinea as seen in Table 5.5—the estimation of coefficient
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Table 5.6: Ethnic Favoritism at the District Level
(The Dependent Variable: Death within the first year of life)
(1 ) (2 ) (3) (4) (5)
sample: all all all urban rural
Sousou-majority*Postl984 -0.023* -0.031 0.027 0.041 0.019
[0 .0 1 2 ] [0 .0 2 0 ] [0.029] [0.042] [0.051]
Sousou-majority*Postl993 -0.007 -0.013 0.026 0.079*** -0.004
[0.016] [0 .0 2 0 ] [0 .0 2 1 ] [0.017] [0.029]
Year fixed effects YES NO NO NO NO
Region-year fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES
District-specific linear trends NO NO YES YES YES
Number of Districts 38 38 38 28 33
Number of Mothers 5183 5183 5183 1560 3623
Observations 21739 21739 21739 5938 15801
Adjusted R 2 0.069 0.070 0.070 0.024 0.082
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in brackets. In all columns, a dummy for baby girls, a dummy for babies born in multiple birth, and mother fixed effects 
are controlled for. “Sousou-majority” is a dummy indicating whether a baby’s mother lives in a district with Sousou women accounting for more than half the female population aged 15 to 49
in 1999; “Postl984” and “Postl993” are dummies for whether a baby is born after 1984 and 1993, respectively. Columns (1) to (3) include all babies in the sample; column (4) only babies born
to women living in urban areas in 1999; column (5) only babies born to women living in rural areas in 1999,
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 5.7: Dynamics of Infant M ortality Changes in Sousou-dominated Districts
(The Dependent Variable: Death within the first year of life)
(1) (2) (3)
1975 -0.044 -0.051 -0.011
[0.062] [0.096] [0.122]
1976 0.04 0.035 0.083
[0.113] [0.127] [0.177]
1977 0.009 -0.154*** -0.095
[0.072] [0.055] [0.106]
1978 -0.083 -0.026 0.046
[0.065] [0.077] [0.143]
1979 -0.045 -0.091 -0.007
[0.068] [0.063] [0.148]
1980 -0.028 -0.084 0.009
[0.074] [0.075] [0.175]
1981 -0.03 -0.04 0.063
[0.031] [0.058] [0.214]
1982 0.002 -0.003 0.114
[0.038] [0.030] [0.196]
1983 -0.037 -0.062 0.063
[0.041] [0.054] [0.236]
1984 -0.015 -0.108* 0.03
[0.054] [0.062] [0.217]
1985 -0.028 -0.043 0.105
[0.046] [0.047] [0.249]
1986 -0.06 -0.082 0.08
[0.041] [0.053] [0.293]
1987 -0.03 -0.072 0.099
[0.059] [0.056] [0.311]
1988 -0.073* -0.106 0.078
[0.040] [0.066] [0.342]
1989 -0.025 -0.063 0.133
[0.041] [0.065] [0.345]
1990 -0.025 -0.089* 0.118
[0.045] [0.049] [0.327]
1991 -0.046 -0.097* 0.122
[0.048] [0.048] [0.376]
1992 -0.066* -0.148** 0.082
[0.035] [0.057] [0.403]
1993 -0.039 -0.074 0.166
[0.039] [0.053] [0.413]
1994+ -0.051 -0.103*** 0.17
[0.040] [0.037] [0.445]
Year fixed effects YES NO NO
Region-year fixed effects NO YES YES
District-specific linear trends NO NO YES
Number of Districts 38 38 38
Number of Mothers 5183 5183 5183
Observations 21739 21739 21739
Adjusted R 2 0.068 0.070 0.070
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported in brackets. In all columns, a dummy 
for baby girls, a dummy for babies bom in multiple birth, and mother fixed effects are controlled for. Estimated 
coefficients on the interaction between the Sousou-majority district dummy and the dummy for the year indicated 
are reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Figure 5.1: Dynamics of Infant Mortality in Sousou-majority Districts
Notes: Plotted are estimated coefficients reported in Table 5.7. The series “Year FE” corresponds to column (1) in 
Table 5.7; “Region-year FE” column (2); and “District-specific Trends” column (3). See Table 5.7 for more details.
7  in equation (5.1) will be biased upwards. Alternatively, if Guineans in exile lived 
a worse life and they returned to districts where Sousou people were a minority, 
coefficient 7  will be estimated with upward bias.
In addition, sample selection due to the fact tha t babies born to women who are 
not alive at the survey time may also cause underestimation of the effect of ethnic 
favoritism. If the survival rate of babies improves with birth order for healthy 
mothers and worsens for unhealthy mothers, and if unhealthy mothers are more 
likely to survive in Sousou-dominated districts due to a better health system as a 
result of favoritism than in other districts, then a difference in differences in infant 
mortality between Sousou-dominated and other districts will be underestimated.
Finally, misclassifying Sousou-dominated districts may cause the underestima­
tion of the impact of ethnic favoritism. If non-Sousou people have been migrating to 
Sousou-dominated districts since 1984 because the government treats these districts 
better, using the sample share of Sousou women in 1999 may misclassify Sousou-
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dominated districts in the late 1980s as non-Sousou dominated. This misclassifica- 
tion then biases the point estim ate towards zero. However, choosing different cut-off 
values to  define Sousou-dominated districts does not yield substantially different re­
sults (not reported), suggesting th a t this concern appears to be minimal.
To conclude this section, there is no clear evidence th a t Lansana Conte favored 
districts where many members of his ethnic group reside, though the data  issues 
mentioned above may cause this result.
5.5 Favoritism within Districts?
To investigate the possibility of individual-level favoritism within each district, I 
estimate the following equation:
Vimdt ~  &m d" Xdt d" ^pEm * \  {t >  1984) -|- U)Em * l( t  >  1993) +  XimdtO -(- Vimdtti (h-3)
where Xdt is a district-year fixed effect and E m is a dummy indicating whether 
mother m  is a Sousou. To allow multiparty elections to  change the impact of ethnic 
favoritism, I control for Em * l( t  >  1993). Coefficient /ip measures the difference in 
changes in infant m ortality after 1984 (until 1993) between Sousou and the other 
ethnic groups conditional on any district-level yearly factor affecting infant survival 
such as weather and district-level macroeconomic conditions. If favoritism by the 
government targets Sousou individuals within each district, we should see ip < 0. 
Standard errors are clustered a t the district-ethnicity level. In this analysis, I drop 
babies born to foreign women (252 in total) as we are interested in individual-level 
favoritism among Guineans.
The identification assumption for consistent estimation of ip is th a t the error 
term, v iTnct, is uncorrelated with all the values of Em * l( t  > 1984) and E m * 1 (f >  
1993) for mother m  in years when mother m  gives birth and for all babies born in 
district d in year t , because mother fixed effects and district-year fixed effects are 
controlled for. This assumption is immune to  the possibility tha t districts domi­
nated by Sousou citizens have improved their health care system or macroeconomic
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conditions since 1984. If, however, an overall improvement in health care or macroe­
conomy at the district level differentially affects Sousou people and the other ethnic 
groups because, for example, Sousou people benefit more due to  their superior ed­
ucational background ,37 then we would see a statistically significant estimate of ip 
even if the government does not intentionally target Sousou people in its policy re­
forms. Unfortunately, I cannot disentangle this possibility from ethnic favoritism at 
the individual level.
The first three columns in Table 5.8 shows the estimated ip and u  in equation 
(5.3). Column (1 ) shows th a t there is no statistically significant difference in changes 
in infant survival rates between Sousou and the other ethnic groups in the same dis­
trict. Columns (2 ) and (3) restrict the sample to urban and rural areas, respectively. 
Sousou people appear to  suffer more in urban areas and benefit more in rural areas, 
but neither is a statistically significant result. Interestingly, infant m ortality for 
Sousou babies go up by 2.9 percentage points relative to babies of other ethnicity 
after 1993, which is statistically significant a t 10 percent level.
Columns (4) to (6 ) allow ip and u; to differ between Sousou-majority districts and 
the others, by interacting E m* l(t > 1984) and E m* l( t > 1993) with Dd and (1 —Dd). 
As noted in Section 5.2.3, the central government allocates health expenditures 
at the district level. If the budget is preferentially allocated to  Sousou majority 
districts, then Sousou people in these districts will only benefit from favoritism. 
The results obtained in columns (1) to  (3) may be due to  the attenuation caused by 
Sousou people in Sousou-minority districts.
The results in columns (4) to (6 ) show th a t in Sousou-majority districts, Sousou 
mothers are not significantly less likely to see their baby die within the first year 
of life than  mothers from the other ethnic groups after 1984. However, the point 
estimate, especially for the rural sample, is very large compared to  the sample 
mean m ortality (12.3%), implying th a t the da ta  does not have sufficient variation 
to identify the favoritism effect precisely. For districts where Sousou people are a
37In the sample of 3,034 Guinean women born before 1970 (so these women reached a childbearing 
age by 1984), 24 percent of Sousou women attended school while 12 percent of non-Sousou women 
went to school (the difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level).
181
Table 5.8: Ethnic Favoritism within Districts
(The Dependent Variable: Death within the first year of life)
(1 ) (2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) (6 )
sample: all urban rural all urban rural
Sousou*Postl984 -0.004 0.029 -0.037
[0.025] [0.028] [0.034]
Sousou-majority -0.043 0.005 -0.074
*Sousou*Postl984 [0.037] [0.054] [0.060]
(1-Sousou-majority) 0.031 0.031 0.042
*Sousou*Postl984 [0.033] [0.040] [0.043]
Sousou*Postl993 0.029* 0.040** 0 . 0 2 2
[0.015] [0.019] [0 .0 2 0 ]
Sousou-majority -0.004 -0.099*** 0.047
*Sousou*Postl993 [0.017] [0.024] [0.030]
(1 -Sousou-majority) 0.059*** 0.086*** -0.038
*Sousou*Postl993 [0.016] [0.019] [0.050]
F -test 2 . 2 0 0.16 2.47
p-value 0.140 0.687 0.119
Number of Ethnicity-districts 134 90 98 134 90 98
Number of Mothers 5116 1526 3590 5116 1526 3590
Observations 21487 5819 15668 21487 5819 15668
Adjusted R 2 0.076 0.302 0.309 0.076 0.018 0.086
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the ethnicity-district level axe reported in brackets. In all columns, a dummy for baby girls, a dummy for babies born in multiple birth, mother fixed 
effects, and district-yeax fixed effects axe controlled for. “Sousou” is a dummy indicating whether a baby is born to a Sousou woman; see notes for Table 5.6 for the definition of “Postl984”, 
“Postl993”, and “Sousou-majority”. Columns (1) and (4) includes all babies in the sample; columns (2) and (5) only babies born to women living in urban areas in 1999; columns (3) and (6) 
only babies born to women living in rural areas in 1999. The null for F-test is that the coefficient on Sousou-majority*Sousou*Postl984 and (l-Sousou-majority)*Sousou*Postl984 axe the same. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
minority, mortality for Sousou infants goes up after 1984 relative to other ethnic 
groups though the estimates are imprecise. As both point estimates are noisy, we 
cannot reject the null th a t changes in infant m ortality for Sousou people are the 
same between the two types of districts.
After 1993, however, Sousou people in urban areas of the Sousou-majority dis­
tricts appear to benefit significantly while those in the Sousou-minority districts 
seem to hurt. These results, however, should be interpreted with caution because 
the introduction of m ultiparty elections in 1993 may be endogenous to the relative 
welfare of Sousou people in each district.
As in the district-level analysis in Section 5.4, migration and m ortality selection 
of mothers may drive these results. The estimate of 'ijj will be biased upwards if 
Sousou mothers in exile living in a country more favorable for child survival than 
Guinea returned home after 1984 while exiled mothers from other ethnic groups 
did not because the new president is not their co-ethnic, for example. Also, if 
the survival of unhealthy mothers became more likely for Sousou people bu t not for 
other ethnic groups due to favoritism, and if the survival of babies bom  to unhealthy 
mothers are more difficult to  ensure, then the impact of ethnic favoritism will be 
underestimated.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter exploits an exogenous change in the president’s ethnicity in Guinea 
in 1984 to empirically test a conventional wisdom th a t the ethnic group in power 
is better off than  others. Estimation results do not support this claim. After the 
president’s ethnicity changes, welfare measured by infant mortality does not improve 
for districts where the new president’s ethnic group predominates relative to other 
districts. The new president’s ethnic group does not see an improvement in welfare 
compared to other groups within the same district, either.
D ata limitations might explain these findings. The inclusion of babies born to 
migrating women in the sample, and the exclusion of babies whose mother died
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before 1999 from the sample, might attenuate the estimated impact of ethnic fa­
voritism. Still, empirical results in this chapter suggest th a t the impact of ethnic 
favoritism is not large enough to survive the attenuation due to  such data  limita­
tions. Caution needs to be taken against assuming, w ithout solid evidence, tha t the 
ethnicity of political leaders makes a difference to each ethnic group’s welfare. The­
oretical arguments on ethnic politics incorporating this conventional wisdom should 
be heard carefully.
One reason why there was no substantially large impact of ethnic favoritism 
on welfare in Guinea could be th a t Guinea had not been a democratic country, 
at least until 1993. Before the leadership change in 1984, opposition parties were 
banned. The new president did not hold national elections until 1993. Bates (1983) 
argues th a t politicians rely on ethnic appeal to  seek political support because, due 
to the correlation between ethnicity and space, one ethnic group predominates in 
each constituency. In democracy, obtaining the support from a majority of people 
in each constituency is crucial to  stay in power. In non-democracy, however, what 
needs to  stay in power may be just the support from people in the capital city or in 
the military, where in the case of Guinea, no single ethnic group predominates. How 
political regimes affect ethnic favoritism need to  be understood in future research .38
38See Posner (2005, 2007) for an example of research in this direction.
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Appendix A
D ata Appendix to Chapter 2
A .l Dependent Variables
Life expectancy at birth (in years) is obtained from World Development Indicators 
(September 2005). We only use the data  for every fifth year between 1962 and 2 0 0 2  
as observations for a large number of countries are available in these years. (We do 
not use the data  for years 1990 and 2003, in which a large number of observations 
are also available, in order to maintain consistency in the data  structure.)
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) is obtained from World Development 
Indicators (September 2005). For the same reason as for life expectancy, we only 
use the data  for every tenth year between 1960 and 2000. (We do not use the data  
for 1995 and 2003 despite the availability for a large number of countries for the 
same reason as above.)
Sanitation (in percentage of the population with access to  improved sanitation 
facilities) and clean water (in percentage of the population with access to improved 
water sources) are obtained from World Development Indicators (September 2005). 
The data  is only available for 1990 and 2002.
D PT and measles immunization (in percentage of children aged 12 to  23 months 
who received vaccination before reaching the age of one) are obtained from World 
Development Indicators (September 2005). The data  is available annualy from 1980 
through 2003. We calculate the averages over five-year periods beginning in 1981,
185
throwing away the data  for 1980, 2001, 2002, and 2003.
Government health expenditures per capita (in constant 1996 international dol­
lars) are obtained as follows. The data  in current international dollars is obtained 
from World Health Reports 2002 (Annex Table 5 for 1996 figures), 2004 (Annex Table 
6  for 1997), and 2005 (Annex Table 6  for 1998 to 2000), all downloaded a t the World 
Health Organization website (http://w w w .w ho.int/w hr/annexes/en/index.htm l). In 
order to separate the effect of inflation, these figures are deflated by the GDP defla­
tor obtained from the Penn World Table 6.1 (by dividing nominal GDP per capita 
(variable CGDP) by real GDP per capita (variable RGDPCH)). These drop some 
observations of government health expenditures due to the lack of GDP data  in the 
Penn World Table. Then the average over 1996-2000 is calculated.
A .2 Dem ocracy Variables
A country-year is treated as democratic if variable POLITY2 in the POLITY IV 
dataset version 20031 is more than zero2. This variable is missing if a  country is 
not independent or occupied by foreign forces (for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
since 1995, Cambodia during 1979-87, Lebanon since 1990, Syria during 1958-1960). 
We trea t such a case as a colony, excluded from the sample , 3 although we use 
this information when we construct a political history variable (see below). Also 
note th a t the POLITY IV data  excludes countries with the population of less than 
500,000. This drops some countries with life expectancy observations (e.g. small 
island nations in the Caribbean).
We make adjustments to the POLITY2 variable for the following countries.
1. Burundi: Assign the value of 0 in 2002. POLITY 2 is missing for Burundhi in
2002 due to  the regime transition .4 We treat it as non-democratic.
downloaded at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity
2Persson (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006a) adopt the same definition of democracy. 
Epstein et al. (2003) define country-years with POLITY2 equal to 8 or higher as “full democracies” 
and those with POLITY2 larger than 0 and less than 8 as “partial democracies”.
3Data on life expectancy and infant mortality is available for some countries during the pre­
independence years or foreign occupation. We do not use such observations in the analysis in order 
to avoid confounding the effects of autocracy and colonial rules.
4See page 16 of Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
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2 . Peru: Assign the value of 5 in 2000. This is simply a data  entry error by the 
POLITY IV.
3. Former Soviet Union republics: Assign the values of Soviet Union before their 
independence in the early 1990s. For three Baltic countries, we do not replace 
their POLITY2 values during their independence from around 1920 through 
1944.
4. Czech and Slovak Republics: Assign the values of Czechoslovakia before 1993.
5. Former Yugoslav republics: Assign the values of Yugoslavia before their inde­
pendence in the early 1990s.
6 . Eritrea: Assign the values of Ethiopia during 1952-1992. We do not extend this 
modification beyond the year of 1952 because Eritrea was an Italian colony 
until 1941, a British colony from 1941 to  1945, and then a United Nations 
protectorate until Ethiopia officially federated it in 1952.
7. Bangladesh: Assign the values of Pakistan before independence in 1972.
8 . Vietnam: Assign the values of North Vietnam before the unification in 1976. 
The choice of North Vietnam instead of South Vietnam does not m atter as 
both Vietnams were always autocratic.
9. North Korea and South Korea: Assign the POLITY2 values of Korea during 
1900-1910.
Our short-term democracy measure for year t (DEMOCRACY since t-4 or dsrt 
in equation (1 )) is constructed by dividing the number of democratic years between 
years t  — 4 and t by five. Note th a t in this calculation, the years under colonial rules 
are included in the denominator. If a country became independent in, say, year t — 1 
and has been democratic for two years till year £, then DEMOCRACY since t  — 4 
takes a value of 0.4.
The long-term democracy measure for year t (DEMOCRACY since 1956 or D srt 
in equation (1 )) is constructed by dividing the sum of democratic years between years
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1956 and t  by t  — 1955. Note th a t for countries th a t have been democratic since its 
independence in the middle of the sample period (e.g. Papua New Guinea, which 
became independent in 1975) this measure is not 1 because they were not democratic 
but a colony until the year of independence. Note also th a t the long-term democracy 
measure is missing for Germany because East Germany was non-democratic while 
West Germany was democratic since 1956 until the unification in 1990.5
The alternative democracy measure is obtained from Boix and Rosato (2001). 
Variable DEMOCRACY in their dataset is a dummy equal to 1 if a country-year is 
democratic. We drop observations if variable SOVEREIGN (a dummy for indepen­
dence) is 0 .6 We make the same adjustment to  variable DEMOCRACY for former 
Soviet Union republics, Czech and Slovak Republics, former Yugoslav republics, 
Eritrea, Bangladesh, Vietnam, North Korea and South Korea as described above. 
Then the short-term and long-term democracy measures are constructed exactly in 
the same way as above.
Forms of democracy variables used in Columns (1) and (2 ) of Table 2.6 are 
constructed as follows. For the period between 1956 and 2002, each country-year 
with variable POLITY2 being positive is assigned with forms of government and 
electoral systems according to  Table 4 of Persson (2005). As Persson (2005) only 
code countries experiencing constitutional reforms during 1962 to  1998, we then use 
Table A l of Persson and Tabellini (2004) for coding non-reforming countries as long 
as their POLITY2 variable is positive. This leaves several country-years uncoded. 
For these cases, we rely on the Database of Political Institutions version 2004 (Beck 
et al. 2001), downloaded from Philip Keefer’s website . 7 Specifically, a country-year 
is coded as presidential if variable SYSTEM is 0 or 1, as parliamentary if variable 
SYSTEM is 2 , as m ajoritarian if HOUSESYS is 1 , and as proportional if HOUS- 
ESYS is 0. This still leaves some country-years uncoded. In such cases, we use Table 
A l of Cheibub et al. (2004) for forms of government and Golder (2005)’s electoral
5Yemen avoids this problem as both North Yemen and South Yemen were non-democratic or 
under colonial rules between 1956 and the unification in 1990. The same holds true for Vietnam.
6VariabIe DEMOCRACY in Boix and Rosato (2001) is 0 either if a country is independent and 
nondemocratic or if a country is not independent.
7http: / /econ. worldbank.org/staff/pkeefer
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system dataset, downloaded a t M att Golder’s website , 8 for electoral systems. Based 
on the la tter dataset, we code a country-year as m ajoritarian if variable ELECSYS- 
TEM_TYPE is 1 and as proportional if ELECSYSTEM_TYPE is 2 or 3. In the 
end, we are unable to code the following country-years: Benin from 1960 to 1962, 
the Comoros in 1975, Equatorial Guinea in 1968, Nepal in 1959, Niger from 1999 to  
2 0 0 2  for the electoral system, Pakistan from 1956 to 1957, Syria from 1956 to 1957, 
and East Timor in 2002 for the electoral system. We trea t them as non-democratic 
in the analysis of columns (1) and (2 ) of Table 2.6. As in the construction of democ­
racy measures, coding for Pakistan and Czechoslovakia is used for pre-independence 
years of Bangladesh and Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively.
The above coding procedure gives four dummy variables (two for forms of gov­
ernment, and two for electoral systems). Then for each of the four variables, we 
construct the long-term (since 1956) measures just as we did for the democracy 
measures (see above).
Dimensions of democracy variables used in Column (3) of Table 2.6 are con­
structed from the POLITY IV dataset. First, variables EXREC, XCONST, and 
POLCOM P are adjusted for Bangladesh and Czech and Slovak Republics as we 
did for variable POLITY2 (see above). We then make these variables missing if 
they are - 6 6  (foreign occupation) so th a t missing country-years for these variables 
are the same as for variable POLITY2 .9 From these three variables, we construct 
three dummy variables as follows. EXECUTIVE COM PETITION is a dummy vari­
able coded as 1 if variable EXREC is 6  or higher. EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINT 
is a dummy variable equal to  1 if variable XCONST is 4 or higher. POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION is a dummy variable equal to  1 if variable POLCOM P is 7 or 
higher. Note th a t each of the three conditions for creating the dummy variables cor­
responds to  the addition of a positive number to  variable POLITY2 . 10 As we define 
democracy as having a positive POLITY2 score, this is likely to be the best, albeit 
adm ittedly crude, way of decomposing the measure of democracy by the POLITY
8http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/elections.html
9See page 16 of Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
10See Marshall and Jaggers (2002), especially pages 13-15 and tables 3.1 and 3.2.
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IV dataset. Then for each of the three dummy variables, we construct the long-term 
measures in the same way as we did for the democracy measures.
A .3 Political History Variables
Political history variables are constructed by using the POLITY IV dataset for years 
1900 to  1955. Note th a t these variables are missing for Germany and Yemen. East 
Germany had a different political history from West Germany during 1949 to 1955. 
North Yemen became independent in 1918 while the year of independence for South 
Yemen is 1967.
DEMOCRACY for 1900-1955 is obtained for each country by dividing the sum 
of democratic years between 1900 and 1955 inclusive by 56.
COLONY for 1900-1955 is obtained for each country by dividing the sum of 
colonial years (defined as years for which POLITY2 is missing) during 1900 to  1955 
inclusive by 56.
A.4 Other Controls
INCOME, defined as real GDP per capita averaged over years t — 4 to t (in thousand 
constant 1996 international dollars), is constructed as follows. Variable RGDPCH 
in the Penn World Table 6 .111 is divided by 1000 to  match with life expectancy, 
which is always a two-digit figure, and then averaged over years t  — 4 to t. Unless 
observations are missing for all the five years, we keep observations and add them 
up and divide it by the number of available observations . 12
SCHOOLING, the average years of schooling in the population aged over 15, in 
1960 is obtained from Barro and Lee (2000)’s dataset . 13 The variable name in the 
original dataset is TYR15.14
n Downloaded at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu
12Several countries in the Penn World Table 6.1 have observations only in 1996. For such 
countries, INCOME is not missing for years 1996 to 2000, with its value equal to per capita 
income in 1996.
13Downloaded at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html
14We do not use the panel data set format file downloadable on the website, because it drops
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Legal origin dummies (British, German, Scandinavian, Socialist) are obtained 
from La Porta et al. (1999).15 In addition, we trea t the legal origin of East Timor 
(not included in La Portal et al (1999)’s analysis but included in our sample for 
Column (1) of Table 1) as French . 16
Region dummies are constructed according to  the World Bank’s region clas­
sification (East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa). For the list of countries in each region, see the World Bank’s website 
(www.worldbank.org/countries). For countries not receiving the World Bank loans 
in 2005, we assign them into either of these six regions in the following way: Aus­
tralia, Brunei, Japan, Myammar, New Zealand, North Korea, and Singapore are 
included in East Asia and Pacific; Bahamas, Barbados, and Cuba in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. The rest of the countries are grouped as Western Europe and 
North America. Note tha t the World Bank groups former Soviet bloc countries plus 
Turkey as Europe and Central Asia and th a t their definition of Middle East and 
North Africa includes M alta and Djibouti. We do not reclassify these countries.
Malaria ecology index due to  Kiszewski et al. (2004) is downloaded a t Jeffrey 
Sachs’s website . 17 The index measures the potential intensity of malaria transmis­
sion, uncolored by clinical externalities. The higher the index, the more intense the 
potential malaria transmission. The minimum value is zero while the maximum is 
about 31.55 (Burkina Faso).
European settler m ortality in the 19th century is obtained from Appendix Table 
A2 of Acemoglu et al. (2001). It measures the annualized number of deaths among 
1,000 European settlers where each death is replaced with a new settler.
Ethnic fractionalization index due to Alesina et al. (2003) is downloaded at
some observations available in the original appendix tables of Barro and Lee (2000).
15The data file is downloaded at Andrei Shleifer’s website 
(http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html).
16As the income data is not available, East Timor drops from the sample for other regressions. 
According to CIA World Factbook 2005 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook), “UN- 
drafted legal system based on Indonesian law remains in place but will be replaced by civil and 
penal codes based on Portuguese law (2004)”. Both Indonesia and Portugal are of French legal 
origin.
17http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/malaria/index.html
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William Easterly’s website. 18 It measures the probability th a t two randomly chosen 
persons in a country belong to different ethnic groups.
Incidence o f wars is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the government of a country is 
a primary actor in a war (defined as armed conflicts with a t least 1 0 0 0  battle-related 
deaths per year). The data  source is the Armed Conflict Dataset Version 3-2005b 
(see Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Strand et al. (2005)), downloaded a t its website . 19 
The dummy variable is created so th a t it is equal to  1 if variable LOCATION in the 
monadic dataset is 3.
Mineral exporters is a dummy variable equal to  1 if the gross value of mineral 
exports as percentages of GDP averaged over 1960-2002 is larger than  8  percent. 
The gross value of mineral exports as percentages of GDP is constructed as follows 
by using data  obtained from World Development Indicators (September 2005). Fuel 
exports and ores and metals exports (as percentages of merchandise export) are 
each multiplied by merchandise exports (in current US dollars) and divided by GDP 
(in current US dollars). For Singapore, fuel exports is set at 0.01, following Ross 
(2001) . 20 Each of the resulting values is then averaged for each country over the 
period from 1960 (the earliest year in which the data  is available) through 2002 
whenever the da ta  is available for at least one year. The mineral exporter dummy 
is set to be 1 if the sum of these two average values exceeds 8 .
18http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/Research.html
19http://www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict
20Ross (2001) also corrects fuel export figures for Trinidad and Tobago. Unlike Singapore, 
however, it does produce oil. (Its average net fuel export is around 20 percent).
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Table A.l: Summary Statistics for Main Time-variant Variables
Variables Whole
Sample
INCOME
Sample 1960s
INCOME Sample 
1970s 1980s 1990s
Life Expectancy 60.68 60.48 54.77 57.75 61.22 64.12
(12.05) (12.38) (12.33) (11.64) (11.36) (12.03)
1309 999 182 205 216 396
DEMOCRACY 0.40 0.51 0.45 0.40 0.43 0.63
since t-4 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.48) (0.45)
(by POLITY IV) 1309 999 182 205 216 396
INCOME 5.76 3.77 4.92 5.83 7.06
(6 .0 1 ) (3.61) (4.81) (5.76) (7.16)
999 182 205 216 396
Notes-. For each variable, the top row shows the mean, the middle row the standard deviation (in parentheses), and the bottom row the number of observations. “Whole Sample” is the sample 
used for Column (1) of Table 2.1; “INCOME Sample” the sample used for Column (2) of Table 2.1 and Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2. 1960s include years 1962 and 1967; 1970s years 1972 
and 1977; 1980s years 1982 and 1987; 1990s years 1992, 1997, and 2002.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Other Time-variant Variables
Mean Standard Deviation Observations Minimum Maximum
DEMOCRACY 
since 1956 (POLITY)
0.40 0.40 996 0 1
DEMOCRACY
since t-4 (Boix and Rosato)
0.38 0.46 764 0 1
DEMOCRACY
since 1956 (Boix and Rosato)
0.34 0.42 764 0 1
Infant Mortality 69.80 53.87 543 2.9 285
Sanitation 58.63 28.85 183 4 100
Clean Water 76.83 20.75 190 20 100
DPT Immunization 70.24 25.39 486 1.2 99
Measles Immunization 68.67 24.02 484 1 99
Health Spending 319.84 470.14 145 4.80 1914.06
Incidence of Wars 0.06 0.24 993 0 1
PRESIDENTIAL 
since 1956
0.14 0.27 996 0 1
PARLIAMENTARY 
since 1956
0.25 0.39 996 0 1
M A J ORITARI AN 
since 1956
0.18 0.33 996 0 1
PROPORTIONAL 
since 1956
0.21 0.35 996 0 1
EXECUTIVE COMPETITION 
since 1956
0.41 0.40 996 0 1
EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINT 
since 1956
0.37 0.40 996 0 1
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
since 1956
0.32 0.39 996 0 1
Table A.3: Summary Statistics for Time-invariant Variables
Mean Standard Deviation Number of Countries Minimum Maximum
DEMOCRACY 0.19 0.32 144 0 1
for 1900-1955 
COLONY 0.53 0.43 144 0 1
for 1900-1955 
SCHOOLING 3.63 2.52 92 0 .1 2 9.73
in 1960
Malaria ecology 3.97 6.81 143 0 31.55
Settler mortality 256.10 481.91 61 8.55 2940
Ethnic fractionalization 0.46 0.25 144 0 0.93
Mineral expoters 0.25 0.43 138 0 1
Appendix B
D ata Appendix to Chapter 3
B .l  Democracy Data  
B .1.1 Years of D em ocratization
To identify in which year the 28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the sample are 
democratized, I follow the procedure described below.
For each country, I code answers to the following questions for each year since 
independence or 1950:
1. Who is the chief executive at the beginning of the year? (This involves the 
judgment of whether a  country has adopted a presidential or parliamentary 
system.)
2. Did he assume office (or was he confirmed as chief executive) by elections, or 
by constitutionally succeeding the predecessor who was elected in a contested 
election? If yes, go to  question 3. If no, it is not democratic.
3. Were the elections contested by opposition parties? If yes, go to  question 4. 
If no because all the opposition candidates/parties boycott, go to  question 4 . 1 
If no because of other reasons, it is not democratic.
1One can argue that the boycott by all opposition parties means non-democratic because voters 
do not have choices. Still, as long as opposition parties are legal, the chief executive, after elected 
in the boycotted election, has reasons to think about re-election in a contested election because he 
does not know whether opposition parties will boycott again.
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4. Were the elections conducted with universal suffrage? If yes, go to  question 5. 
If no, it is not democratic.
5. Are opposition parties legal at the beginning of the year? If no, it is not 
democratic .2
This way, I identify the year in which answers to  all the five questions above 
become yes. Then I check if the chief executive identified in question 1 differs before 
and after th a t year. If it does, it is democratization. Following the suggestion by 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 19), the detailed coding process and the disaggre­
gated data  (ie. answers to the five questions above) are publicly available on my 
website .3 I have not conducted a test of inter-coder reliability, also suggested by 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002, p. 18). After finishing the data  collection on my own, 
however, Lindberg (2003) came to  my notice, who compiled the details of multi­
party elections in Africa from 1989 to  2001. If I followed Lindberg (2003) for coding 
the year of the first multiparty election for executive office, it would be almost the 
same .4 This partly serves as a test of inter-coder reliability.
The above procedure reveals th a t 1 1  countries, as listed in Table 3.1 and shown 
in Figure 3.2, were democratized in the 1990s without the reversion to  autocracy in 
the subsequent years. In the following, I describe cases th a t need some justification.
In the Comoros, the dictator Ahmed Abdallah Abderamane was assassinated in 
November 1989, succeeded by Said Mohamed Djohar as interim president. Djohar 
then won the first multiparty presidential election in March 1990. I regard this as 
the replacement of the chief executive after the first m ultiparty election. Djohar was 
then deposed in a coup in September 1995. France, however, intervened to  prevent 
the collapse of the constitutional order, followed by a fresh presidential election in 
March 1996. There was another coup in 1999, which is out of the sample period.
2This final step is similar to “the consolidation rule” adopted by Przeworski et al. (2000, pp. 
20- 21).
3The address: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kudamats/research.htm.
4The only exception is Madagascar, in which “multiparty” elections have been held since the 
1980s according to Lindberg (2003). Opposition parties in the 1980s, however, were restricted to 
those loyal to the regime (see Przeworski et al. 2000, p. 20, and Nohlen et al. 1999, p. 532).
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In Ethiopia the rebel forces toppled the dictator in 1991 and then became the rul­
ing political party, holding and winning the first multiparty parliamentary elections 
in 1995.5 In the main analysis, I trea t 1995 as Ethiopia’s year of democratization. 
The estimation results are robust to coding Ethiopia as not democratized.
In Lesotho, there was a coup in 1994 and a military mutiny in 1998 against 
democratically elected governments. Each time foreign countries led by South Africa 
intervened to prevent the collapse of democracy. In the main analysis, 1993 is 
set to be the year of democratization for Lesotho. As Lesotho has adopted the 
parliamentary form of government, the first m ultiparty election for executive office 
is the same as th a t for legislature.
In Niger, there were coups against democratically elected governments in 1996 
and 1999. Each time, the coup taker subsequently held m ultiparty presidential 
elections.
For Nigeria, there was a multiparty presidential election in June 1993, but the 
result was annulled by the military.
For South Africa, the first multiparty election for executive office took the form of 
elections for the Constitutional Assembly, which elected Nelson Mandela as president 
and became national legislature.
Tanzania might be regarded as a democratized country because in the first multi­
party presidential election held in 1995, the incumbent president did not run though 
his successor from the same ruling party stood as a candidate and won. The estima­
tion results are robust to  treating 1995 as the year of democratization in Tanzania.
G hana (twice), Nigeria, and Uganda were democratized in 1969 and 1979, 1979, 
and 1980, respectively. However, all of these cases led to the collapse of democracy 
within five years. In Chapter 3 ,1 do not estimate the effect of these democratization 
episodes.6 Cote d ’Ivoire was also democratized in 2000, which is outside the sample 
period.
5As Ethiopia has adopted the parliamentary form of government, the first multiparty election 
for executive office is the same as that for legislature.
6If I create a dummy for these democratic years (Ghana, 1970-72 and 1980-81; Nigeria, 1980- 
83; Uganda 1980-85) and add it as an additional regressor in equation (1), the coefficient on this 
dummy is not significantly different from zero.
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Several countries were also “democratized” by independence if we regard inde­
pendence as the replacement of the chief executive. As it is difficult to disentangle 
the effect of democratization from th a t of independence in these cases, however, I 
do not estimate the effect of “democratization by independence” , either. Therefore, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe, in which answers to the above five questions are always yes 
since independence, are not included in the group of democratized countries in the 
analysis.
B .1.2 Years of First M ultiparty Elections
In Column ( 1 ) of Table 3.9, I use a dummy variable for multiparty elections. To 
construct this variable, I identify the year of the first multiparty elections for exec­
utive office in the 17 non-democratized countries as the year in which answers to all 
the five questions above become yes. In addition to  the list of these years in Column 
(1) of Table 3.1, Burkina Faso (in 1978) and Ghana (in 1960) introduced m ultiparty 
elections with universal suffrage for executive office, followed by the collapse of the 
m ultiparty system within a few years. I do not include these two episodes in the 
construction of the m ultiparty election dummy. I also set the dummy to  be zero 
for Senegal for all years even though this country introduced multiparty elections in 
1978.7
The following cases need some justification:
Burkina Faso’s presidential election in 1991 was boycotted by all opposition 
parties though they were legalized to  participate. The next presidential election, 
held in 1998, was contested by all opposition parties. In the main analysis, I treat 
1991 as the year of the first multiparty election. The estimation results are robust 
to coding 1998 instead as the year of democratization for Burkina Faso.
In Cote d ’Ivoire, there was a coup in December 1999. As there is no baby who 
was born in Cote d ’Ivoire after March 1999 in the sample, however, this does not 
affect my analysis.
7Setting the multiparty election dummy to be 1 for Senegal after 1978 does not change the 
estimation result in Column (1) of Table 3.9 substantially.
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Madagascar held multiparty presidential elections in 1982 and 1989. But oppo­
sition parties were restricted to those loyal to  the ruling party.
Uganda held an presidential election in May 1996 where opposition candidates 
were allowed to  contest but on non-party basis. Political parties, however, de facto 
exist and support their favorite candidate.
B .1.3 N on-dem ocratic Leadership Change
The dummy for non-democratic leadership change used in Column (2 ) of Table 3.9 
is constructed as follows. Among the 17 non-democratized countries, I first identify 
the year in which the chief executive is replaced for the period since 1986. There are 
seven of such leadership changes: Burkina Faso (1987), Chad (1990), Cote d ’Ivoire 
(1993), Mozambique (1986), Rwanda (1994), Tanzania (1995), and Uganda (1986). 
I create a dummy variable which is equal to one for these seven countries after the 
year of leadership change.
B.2 Demographic and Health Survey Variables
In this section, I describe which variables in the Demographic and Health Surveys I 
use to construct dependent variables and regressors and to restrict the sample. The 
construction of some dependent variables for pathway analysis is slightly different 
between for the DHS-I surveys (those DHS surveys conducted during the 1980s) and 
for the later rounds of surveys. This is because the structure of the questionnaire 
was slightly modified in the subsequent rounds of the DHS surveys.
B .2.1 D ependent variables
In fa n t D e a th  (a dummy for death within the first year of life) is set to be 1 if B7 
(the im puted age at death in months) is less than  1 2 , and to  be 0 otherwise. There 
is no missing observation for infant death.
N e o n a ta l D e a th  (a dummy for death within the first month of life) is set to  
be 1 if B7 is 0, and to be 0 otherwise. As for infant death, there is no missing
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observation for neonatal death.
T e ta n u s  T oxoid  (a dummy for whether a mother was given tetanus toxoid 
injections during her pregnancy) is set to be 1 if M l is either 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 , or 7; 0 
if M l is 0; missing if M l is either 8  or 9.
D e liv e ry  A ss is tan ce  (a dummy for whether a mother was assisted with the 
delivery of her child by health professionals — doctors, nurses, midwives, etc.) is, 
for the DHS-I surveys, set to be 1 if M3 is either 1, 2, or 3; 0 if M3 is either 0, 4, 
5, 6 , 7 or 8 ; and missing if M3 is 9. For the other surveys, it is set to be 1 if either 
M3A, M3B, M3C, M3D, or M3E is 1; 0 if either M3F, M3G, M3H, M3I, M3J, M3K, 
M3L, M3M, or M3N is 1; and missing otherwise. Delivery assistance by trained 
traditional birth  attendant (variable M3F equal to  1) is not included as assistance 
by “health professionals” because the DHS-I surveys do not distinguish trained and 
not trained traditional birth attendants.
E v er B re a s tfe d  (a dummy for whether a baby is ever breastfed) is set to be 1 
if M5 is less than  94; 0 if M5 is 94 (never breastfed); and missing otherwise.
A ccess to  T o ile t (a dummy for whether a baby’s household has access to  “flush 
toilets”) is, except for the DHS-I surveys, set to be 1 if V I16 for their mothers is 
either 11 or 1 2 ; 0 otherwise unless V116 is either 97 or 99, for which this variable 
is missing. For the DHS-I surveys, it is set to  be 1 if V I16 is 1; 0 otherwise unless 
V I16 is 9, for which this variable is missing.
R ad io  (a dummy for whether a baby’s household owns a radio) is set to  be 1 if 
V120 is 1; 0 if V120 is 0; and missing if V120 is either 7, 9, or missing.
T elev ision  (a dummy for whether a baby’s household owns a television set) is 
set to be 1 if V121 is 1; 0 if V121 is 0; and missing if V121 is either 7, 9, or missing.
R e fr ig e ra to r  (a dummy for whether a baby’s household owns a refrigerator) is 
set to be 1 if V122 is 1; 0 if V122 is 0; and missing if V122 is either 7, 9, or missing.
B icycle  (a dummy for whether a baby’s household owns a bicycle) is set to be 
1 if V I23 is 1 ; 0 if V I23 is 0; and missing if V123 is either 7, 9, or missing.
M o to rcy c le  (a dummy for whether a baby’s household owns a motorcycle) is 
set to be 1 if V I24 is 1; 0 if V I24 is 0; and missing if V I24 is either 7, 9, or missing.
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C a r (a dummy for whether a baby’s household owns a car) is set to  be 1 if V125 
is 1; 0 if V I25 is 0; and missing if V I25 is either 7, 9, or missing.
E le c tr ic ity  (a dummy for whether a baby’s household has access to electricity) 
is set to be 1 if V I19 is 1; 0 if V I19 is 0; and missing if V I19 is either 7, 9, or 
missing.
B.2.2 Controls
G irl (a dummy for being a baby girl) is set to  be 1 if B4 is 2, and to  be 0 if B4 is 
1. There is no missing observation for this variable.
M u ltip le  B ir th  (a dummy for being born in a multiple birth) is set to be 1 if 
BO is different from 0, and to  be 0 if BO is 0. There is no missing observation for 
this variable.
B ir th  o rd e r  d u m m ies  are constructed from variable BORD. A dummy for the 
second birth  is set to  be 1 if BORD is 2; A dummy for the th ird  birth  is set to  be 1 
if BORD is 3; and so forth. A dummy for the 10th birth  or higher is set to  be 1 if 
BORD is 10 or higher. There is no missing observation for these variables.
M o th e rs ’ a g e -a t-b ir th  c a te g o ry  d u m m ies  are created from B3 (the date of 
birth  of a respondent’s child in century month codes) and V011 (the date of birth 
of a respondent in century month codes).8 A dummy for being born when his/her 
mother was in her 20s is set to be 1 if the difference between B3 and V011 divided 
by 12 is 20 or over and less than 30, and so forth.
S h o rt b ir th sp a c in g  (a dummy for being born within 24 months after the pre­
vious birth) is set to be 1 if B l l  is less than 24; 0 if B l l  is 24 or over; and missing 
if B l l  is missing. B l l  is missing for first-born children including those born in a 
multiple birth.
8 A century month code is the number of months since the start of the 20th century. Century 
month codes are, thus, equal to (YEAR-1900)*12+MONTH.
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B .2.3  Variables interacted w ith  the dem ocracy dum my
E d u c a te d  (a dummy for being born to a mother who attended primary school) is 
set to be 1 if V106 is either 1, 2, or 3; 0 if V106 is 0; and missing if V106 is either 4 
or 9.9
U n e d u c a te d  (a dummy for being born to a mother who never went to  school) 
is set to  be 1 if V I06 is 0; 0 if V I06 is either 1, 2, or 3; and missing if V I06 is either 
4 or 9.
U rb a n  (a dummy for being born to a mother living in urban areas at the survey 
date) is set to  be 1 if V I02 is 1; and 0 if V I02 is 2. There is no missing observation 
for this variable.
R u ra l  (a dummy for being born to a mother living in rural areas at the survey 
date) is set to  be 1 if V I02 is 2; and 0 if V I02 is 1. There is no missing observation 
for this variable.
See section B.3 below for D ic ta to r ’s e th n ic  g ro u p  and O th e r  e th n ic  g roups. 
B .2.4  Sam ple restrictions
Children born before the year of independence of their country are identified by 
comparing B2 (year of birth) with the year of independence in each country.10
Children born within 12 months before their m other’s interview are identified by 
taking the difference between V008 (date of interview in century month codes) and 
B3. If this difference is less than 12, I drop such babies from the infant mortality 
sample while I keep such babies in the sample for access to toilets, the ownership of 
consumer durable goods, and access to  electricity (see below).
Children born to asset-poor mothers (column (2) of Table 3.8) are identified 
by variables V120, V121, V122, V123, V124, and V125. If all these variables are 
0, then I retain such children in the sample with exceptions of Ethiopia, Malawi, 
and M auritania. For Ethiopia and Malawi, I keep babies in the sample if V120,
9In the Tanzania 1996 survey, V106 takes a value of 4 if the highest education level attained is 
“Other”. There are 13 such observations. I treat them as missing.
10Page 36 of Africa South o f the Sahara 2005 (London: Europa Publications), for example, 
provides the list of years of independence of African countries.
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V121, V123, V124, and V125 are all zero because V122 is missing for all children in 
these two countries. For M auritania, I keep children in the sample if V120, V121, 
V122, and V125 are all zero because V123 and V124 are missing for all babies in 
M auritania. If some of these asset variables are missing and if the observed variables 
indicate no possession of consumer durables, I drop such observations because this 
does not entirely exclude the possibility th a t some of the assets are actually owned.
Children conceived in the surveyed community (column (8) of Table 3.8) are 
identified by variables V008, V104 (the number of years a respondent has lived in 
the surveyed community), and B3. If V104 is less than 95, I drop children in the 
sample if and only if V008 — V I04 *12 > B 3  — 12.11 If V I04 is either 96 (visitor to 
the surveyd community), 97 (inconsistent), 98 (don’t  know), 99 (not available), or 
missing (all babies in Chad, Cote d ’Ivoire, and Guinea), I drop such children.
B .2.5  Sample C onstruction for Pathw ay A nalysis
For tetanus vaccination, delivery assistance, and breastfeeding, the sample consists 
of children whose MIDX variable is not missing in surveys listed in Table 3.3. Note 
th a t this includes children who died before turning the age of one year.
For access to  toilets, the ownership of consumer durable goods, and access to  
electricity, I create a repeated cross-section sample of babies born within the past 
one year before the survey date. These babies are identified by checking if V008- 
B3<12.12
B .2.6  M other category fixed effects
I create mother categories in the following way. V102 is used for identifying areas 
of residence (urban or rural). Educated and Uneducated as defined above are used 
for the level of education. V011 is used for identifying the birth year cohort. For
n V104 is 95 if a respondent has always lived in the surveyed community.
12I use the retrospective fertility survey component of the DHS surveys to construct the sample 
of babies bom within 12 months before the survey date. This ensures that those babies who 
are dead at the survey date are included in the sample. I do not use households as the unit of 
observations because change in access to health infrastructure for households without an infant is 
irrelevant to change in infant mortality.
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administrative regions of residence, see “D ata Appendix C: The Matching Sub- 
National Administrative Regions across Different Rounds of the DHS Surveys in 
sub-Saharan Africa” available on my website.13
B .2.7  T im e dim ension
The year of birth  (t in equations (3.1), (3.3), and (3.4) is identified by variable B2. 
For the survey year period (s in equation (3.5)), I use the year of survey listed in 
Table 3.3.
B.3 D ata on the dictator’s ethnicity
The main source of information on the ethnicity of the dictator who ruled the country 
until democratization in the 1990s is Morrison et al. (1989).14 For dictators whose 
ethnicity is not available or clear enough in Morrison et al. (1989), various other 
sources were consulted.
B .3.1 Benin
Betamaribe (vl31=6). M athieu Kerekou ruled the country until 1991, when he was 
defeated by Nicephore Soglo in the first multiparty presidential election. Kerekou’s 
ethnicity is Somba according to Morrison et al. (1989, p. 368). Somba is also known 
as Betam aribe.15
B .3 .2 Burkina Faso
Mossi (vl31=7). Blaise Compaore has been in power since 1987 and was re-elected in 
multiparty presidential elections in 1991 and 1998. His ethnicity is Mossi (Englebert, 
1996, p. 62 and p. 123).
13http://personal.lse.ac.uk/kudamats/research.htm.
14This is also used by Londregan, Bienen, and van de Walle (1995) in their analysis of ethnicity 
and leadership succession in Africa until the 1980s.
15See www.benintourism.com/en/interne.php?idrub=13&;id=87 (the Official Website of Tourism 
in Benin) (accessed on 10 May 2006).
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B .3 .3 Cam eroon
Beti (vl31=44). Paul Biya has been in power since 1982 and was re-elected in mul­
tiparty  presidential elections in 1992 and 1997. Nyamnjoh (1999, p. 108) indicates 
th a t Biya’s ethnicity is Beti.
B .3.4  Chad
Gorane (v l3 1 = l). Idriss Deby has been in power since 1990 and was re-elected in 
the first m ultiparty presidential election in 1996. His ethnicity is Zaghawa, which is 
a subgroup of the Gorane people ( “Chad: Idriss Deby” , Africa Research Bulletin: 
Political, Social and Cultural Series, May 2006, p. 16645).
B .3 .5 Comoros
Ethnicity da ta  is not available in the 1996 DHS survey.
B .3 .6 C ote d ’Ivoire
Baoule (si 19=20). Felix Houphouet-Boigny had been in power since independence 
until his death in 1993. He was re-elected in the first m ultiparty presidential election 
in 1990. His ethnicity is Baoule according to Morrison et al. (1989, p. 500).
B .3 .7 Ethiopia
Amhara (vl31=4). Mengistu Haile Mariam ruled the country until he was over­
thrown by rebel forces in 1991. Meles Zenawi became an interim president and was 
elected as prime minister after his party’s victory in the 1995 multiparty parliamen­
tary election. Mengistu’s ethnicity is Amhara (Morrison et al., 1989, p. 446).
B .3 .8 Gabon
Mbede-Teke (vl31=3). Omar Bongo has been in power since 1967 and was re­
elected in m ultiparty presidential elections in 1993 and 1998. His ethnicity is Teke
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according to Morrison et al. (1989, p. 460).
B .3 .9 Ghana
Ewe (vl31=3). Jerry Rawlings had been in power since 1982, re-elected in mul­
tiparty  presidential elections in 1992 and 1996, until his retirement in 2000. His 
ethnicity is Ewe (Morrison et al., 1989, p. 476).
B .3 .10 Guinea
Sousou (v l3 1 = l). Lansana Conte has been in power since 1984 and was re-elected in 
multiparty presidential elections in 1993 and 1998. His ethnicity is Sousou ( “Liberia: 
Cross-border Crisis” , Africa Confidential, 21 July 2005, p. 1).
B .3 .11 Kenya
Kalenjin (vl31=2). Daniel arap Moi had been in power since 1978, re-elected in 
m ultiparty presidential elections in 1992 and 1997, until his retirement in 2002. Moi’s 
ethnicity is Tugen (Fox 1996, p. 602), which is a subgroup of Kalenjin (Morrison et 
al., 1989, p. 506).16
B .3 .12 Lesotho
Ethnicity data  is not available in the 2004 DHS survey.
B .3 .13 M adagascar
Ethnicity data  is not available in the 1997 DHS survey.
B .3 .14 Malawi
Chewa (v l3 1 = l). Hastings Kamuzu Banda ruled the country from independence 
until 1994, when he was defeated by Bakili Muluzi in the first multiparty presidential
16Morrison et al. (1989, p. 509) describes Moi’s ethnicity as Kipsigis. However, other sources 
written by Kenyan specialists (e.g. Adar and Munyae 2001) say that Moi is a Tugen.
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election. Banda’s ethnicity is Chewa (Morrison et al., 1989, p. 542).
B .3 .15 M ali
Bambara and Malinke (v l3 1 = l and 2). Moussa Traore was in power from 1968 to 
1991, when he was ousted in a m ilitary coup. A m ultiparty presidential election 
followed in the subsequent year. Traore’s ethnicity is Mande, which consists of 
Bambara and Malinke (Morrison et al., 1989, p. 548 and p. 550).
B .3 .16 M auritania
Ethnicity data  is not available in the 2000 DHS survey.
B .3.17 M ozambique
Ethnicity data  is not available in the 2003 DHS survey.
B .3 .18 N iger
Djerma (vl31=2). Ali Saibou was in power from 1987 to  1993, when the first 
multiparty presidential election - in which Saibou did not run - gave presidency 
to Mahamane Ousamane. Saibou was born to  a Djerma-Songhai family (Uwechue, 
1996, p. 601).
B .3 .19 N igeria
Kanuri (sll8= 123), Tera (199), Bolawa (34), Karekare (124), Bade (12), Munga 
(163), Ngizim (169), M andara (155). Sani Abacha ruled the country from 1993 until 
his death in 1998. A m ultiparty presidential election was held in the subsequent year 
in which Olusegun Obasanjo won. Abacha’s parents are of the Kanuri ethnic group 
(Uwechue, 1996, p. 1). Morrison et al. (1989, pp. 584-5) indicate th a t the Kanuri 
group consists of the subgroups mentioned above.17
17I cannot match Mober and Koyam, which are subgroups of Kanuri according to Morrison et 
al. (1989), with ethnic groups listed in the 2003 DHS survey.
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B .3 .20 South Africa
W hite (vl31=3). Frederick W. de Klerk was President from 1989 until 1994, when 
the elections for Constitutional Assembly - which became national legislature later 
- were held in which de Klerk’s National Party  lost to  Nelson Mandela’s African 
National Congress. De Klerk was the son of an Afrikaner (Uwechue, 1996, p. 175).
B .3 .21 Tanzania
Ethnicity data  is not available in the 2004 DHS survey.
B .3 .22 Togo
Kabye-tem (vl31=4). Gnassingbe Eyadema ruled the country since 1967, re-elected 
in multiparty presidential elections in 1993 and 1998, until his death in 2005. His 
ethnicity is “Kabre (Kabye)” according to  Uwechue (1996, p. 212).
B .3 .23 Uganda
Ethnicity data  is not available in the 2000 DHS survey.
B .3 .24 Zambia
Bemba (v l3 1 = l), Lunda (2), Lala (3), Bisa (4), Ushi (5), Chishinga (6), Ngumbo 
(7), Lamba (8), Kabende(9), Tabwa (10), Swawka (11), Shila (15), Unga (16), Bwile
(17), Kunda (52), and Senga (60). Kenneth Kaunda ruled the country since indepen­
dence until 1991, when he was defeated by Frederick Chiluba in the first m ultiparty 
presidential election. K aunda’s ethnicity is Bemba, which includes all the subgroups 
mentioned above (Morrison et al., 1989, p. 702 and p. 704).
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B.4 Country-level Variables from Other Datasets
Log p e r  c a p ita  G D P  is taken from Penn World Table 6.2 (the logarithm of variable 
RGDPCH).18
W a r is a dummy variable equal to one if variable LOCATION is 3 in the Armed 
Conflict Database version 3-2005b.19
F oreign  A id  is obtained from the OECD Development Assistance Committee 
Database: “Destination of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid - Dis­
bursements (Table 2a)” .20
E x ec u tiv e  C o n s tra in ts  is taken from the POLITY IV dataset version 2003 
(variable XCONST).21 In the estimation (column (3) of Table 3.9), I drop country- 
years from the sample if XCONST is -66 (foreign occupation), -77 (central authority 
collapsed), -88 (regime transition), or missing.
C iv il L ib e r ty  R e s tr ic tio n  is the Civil Liberty Index taken from Freedom In  
the World by Freedom House (variable CL).22 For South Africa in 1972, I use a 
value for black people. For 1981,1 use values for January 1981 to August 1982. For 
1982, I linearly interpolate values from the ones for January 1981 to August 1982 
and for August 1982 to November 1983.23 For 1983,1 use values for August 1982 to 
November 1983.
F ree  P re s s  is a dummy variable equal to one if the press freedom status is F in 
the Freedom of the Press Historical D ata.24 From 1980 to  1988, I use the freedom 
status for print press.
P a r t ly  F ree  P re s s  is a dummy variable equal to one if the press freedom status
is PF  in the Freedom of the Press Historical Data.
18Downloaded at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed on 20 September 2006).
19I use the Monadic Table Stata File downloaded from http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict 
(accessed on 12 December 2005).
20ODA (OA) Total Net (variable number 206) in million US dollars (2004 Prices) is used. The 
data was downloaded at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline (accessed on 11 November 2006).
21Downloaded at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ (accessed on 28 November 2005).
22Downloaded at http://www.freedomhouse.org/tempIate.cfm?page=15 (accessed on 22 Septem­
ber 2006).
23 It turns out that all countries in the sample do not have different values for the Civil Liberty 
Index between January 1981 to August 1982 and August 1982 to November 1983.
24Downloaded at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=274 (accessed on 22 
September 2006).
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B.5 Democracy Dummies in Table 3.10
Democracy dummies and the dummies for the collapse of democracy used in Table 
3.10 are constructed in the following way.
In columns (1), (2), and (3), the Political Rights Index from Freedom In the 
World by Freedom House (variable PR) is used. For column (1), the democracy 
dummy is constructed by setting it to be 1 for years since 1990 if the Political 
Rights Index for the previous year is less than 3. This variable is zero for all countries 
before 1990 even if the Index is less than 3. In addition, the dummy for the collapse 
of democracy is created by setting it to  be 1 if the Political Rights Index is 3 or 
higher and if the democracy dummy is 1 for a t least one year in the previous years. 
Columns (2) and (3) use 4 and 5, respectively, as the cut-off value and follow the 
same procedure. An exception to  this is Senegal in column (3). As the Political 
Rights Index for Sengal has always been below 5 since 1978, I set the democracy 
dummy to be 0 for all years.
In columns (4), (5), and (6), variable POLITY2 in the POLITY IV dataset 
(version 2003) is used instead. For column (4), the democracy dummy is constructed 
by setting it to be 1 for years since 1990 if POLITY2 for the previous year is more 
than 6. The dummy for the collapse of democracy is created by setting it to  be 1 if 
POLITY2 is 6 or lower and if the democracy dummy is 1 for a t least one year in the 
previous years. Columns (5) and (6) use 4 and 0, respectively, as the cut-off value 
and follow the same procedure.25 An exception to this is South Africa in column
(6). As variable POLITY2 for South Africa has always been above 0 during the 
sample period, I set the democracy dummy to be 0 for all years.
In column (7), I use variables EXREC and PARCOMP from the POLITY IV 
dataset (version 2003) to construct a democracy dummy. The democracy dummy 
is set to  be 1 for years since 1990 if EXREC in the previous year is 7 or 8 and 
if PARCOMP in the previous year is 3 or higher. The dummy for the collapse of 
democracy is created by setting it to be 1 if either EXREC or PARCOMP in the
25Score 0 is used as the cut-off point by works summarized in Persson and Tabellini (2006); 
score 4 by Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2005). Political scientists often regard a country as 
democratic if its POLITY2 score is seven or higher (e.g. Epstein et al., 2003).
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previous year is below the threshold level and if the democracy dummy is 1 for 
a t least one year in the previous years. The choice of threshold values for each 
varaible is justified as follows. Variable EXREC categorises the way of recruiting 
the chief executive into eight types (see Appendum A of Marshall and Jaggers 2002). 
It is 7 or 8 if the chief executive is chosen through elections matching candidates 
from at least two political parties. Therefore, requiring variable EXREC to  be 7 
or 8 roughly corresponds to the requirement of multiparty elections for executive 
office. Variable PARCOMP measures the extent to which “alternative preferences 
for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena” (Ibid., p. 25). The 
legality of opposition parties along with universal suffrage appears to  correspond to 
this variable being 3 or higher. PARCOMP is 2 if the government limits political 
competition in ways tha t “exclude substantial groups (20% of more of the adult 
population) from participation.” Its sufficient evidence is “the banning of a political 
party which received more than  10% of the vote in a recent national election” (Ibid., 
p. 26). PARCOMP is 3, on the other hand, if “parochial or ethnic-based political 
factions ... regularly compete for political influence” (Ibid., p. 26).
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Appendix C
D ata Appendix to Chapter 5
The data  used in Chapter 5 all comes from the Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) conducted in Guinea in 1999.1 This Appendix describes how I construct 
variables used in the analysis from the original variables and restrict the sample 
from the original.2
C .l Construction of variables
The dependent variable in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, a dummy for death within the first 
year of life, is set to be 1 if B7 (the imputed age at death in months) is less than 
12, and to be 0 otherwise. There is no missing observation for this variable.
For exogenous controls, a dummy for baby girls is set to  be 1 if B4 is 2, and 0 
otherwise. A dummy for babies born in multiple birth (twins, triplets, and quadru­
plets) is set to  be 1 if BO is 1 or larger, and 0 otherwise. For these two variables, 
there is no missing observation.
The birth  year of each baby is identified by B2. This is used to control for 
birth-year fixed effects and to  create P o s tl9 8 4  and P o s tl9 9 3  in Tables 5.6 and 
5.7 (dummies for babies born after 1984 and 1993, respectively). As there are few 
babies bom  each year before 1970 in the sample (361 in total), these babies are
1The dataset is downloadable at http://www.measuredhs.com after registration.
2In the original DHS dataset, with some exceptions, variables on mother characteristics begin 
with letter V followed by numbers, and variables on baby characteristics begin with letter B 
followed by numbers.
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regarded as born in 1969 when birth-year fixed effects are controlled for, to ease 
computation.
Each baby’s mother is identified by CASEID. This is used to  control for mother 
fixed effects.
The district in which each baby’s mother lives a t the survey time is identified 
by ADM1CODE and ADM2CODE in the GPS data  file. ADM1CODE is used for 
mothers living outside Conakry (ADM1CODE is not 12) to identify which prefecture 
they live in. ADM2CODE is used for mothers living in Conakry (ADM1CODE is 
12) to identify which commune they live in. Combined with the birth year, this is 
used to  control for district-specific linear trends in columns (3) to (5) of Table 5.6, 
and to  control for district-year fixed effects in Table 5.8. It is also used to cluster 
standard errors in Tables 5.6 and 5.7.
The region in which each baby’s mother lives a t the survey time is identified by 
V101. Combined with the birth year, this is used to control for region-year fixed 
effects in columns (2) to (5) of Table 5.6. See Table 5.4 for which district belongs 
to which region.
S ousou  (a dummy indicating whether a baby’s mother is Sousou, used in Table 
5.8) is set to be 1 if V131 is 1, and 0 otherwise.3
S o u so u -m a jo rity  (a dummy indicating whether a baby is born to  a woman who 
lives in a district where Sousou people predominate in 1999, used in Tables 5.6 and 
5.7) is constructed as follows. Using a cross-section sample of surveyed women, I 
first multiply a dummy for Sousou women (set to be 1 if V131 is 1, and 0 otherwise) 
with the sampling weight of each woman (V005 divided by 1,000,000), because the 
probability of selection differs between urban and rural clusters within each district. 
I then calculate the sum of this weighted dummy by each district. The resulting 
sum is then divided by the sum of the sampling weights for women in each district. 
Table 5.4 shows the result. If a baby’s mother lives in a district where this sample 
share of Sousou women exceeds 50 percent, S o u so u -m a jo rity  is set to  be 1, and 0 
otherwise.
3Babies born to a woman for whom V131 is missing are dropped from the sample used in Table 
5.8 (see below).
To cluster standard errors a t the ethnicity-district level in Table 5.8, V131 is used 
to identify ethnicities (Sousou, Peulh, Malinke, Kissi, Toma, Guerze, and Others).
C.2 Sample restrictions
From all the babies born to the surveyed women (22,943 in total), I drop 1,204 
babies born within 12 months before the survey date. For columns (4) and (5) of 
Table 5.6 and columns (2) and (3) of Table 5.8, V102 is used to  restrict the sample 
to urban areas (V102 is 1) or to  rural areas (V102 is 2). In Table 5.8, babies born 
to 92 foreign women (V131 is missing) are dropped from the sample.4
4Women for whom V131 is missing are all foreigners (S119 is not 1).
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